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Chapter 1: Why We Need Theories of Happiness 
 
Most people who dedicate their lives to attaining happiness don‘t know what 
it is they are looking for. And I do not mean not knowing ―the way‖ to happiness that 
so many books in the popular press claim to illuminate. I am talking about what 
happiness is. The authors of such books speak to the question of what causes 
happiness, in other words, what factors in our lives, or aspects of our attitudes result 
in happiness. These claims, of course, depend on the author‘s knowledge of what 
happiness is. This is knowledge that we currently lack.
1
 
Not only do we currently possess only a very weak understanding of what 
people mean when they say they want to be happy, but we also lack terminological 
clarity in discussions of happiness. The current state of discussion on this subject 
includes contributions in which authors believe they are in disagreement with others, 
when in fact they are not, and other contributions in which authors believe they agree 
with others when in fact, they do not. Further, when theoretical confusion exists, it is 
not surprising to find that confusion magnified in the populace as a whole.  
                                                 
1
 In the hopes of making this essay accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, I have in some places 
chosen to depart from traditional philosophical methods of citation, especially of ancient authors, as 
some traditional methods might not be immediately understood by someone unfamiliar with the 
practice. I believe that the bibliographic needs of philosophers are, nonetheless, well served in this 
essay.  
 8 
Oftentimes the nature of happiness is simply ignored by members of the 
linguistic community in answers to the question ―What is happiness?‖ and only the 
purported causes are elucidated. Thus, when the average person is asked what 
happiness is, we would not at all be surprised to hear that happiness is ―being in good 
health,‖ ―having a loving family,‖ or ―being engaged in a fulfilling job.‖ Happiness 
may even be ―a walk on a beach on a quiet afternoon.‖ Yet we can imagine many 
situations in which these conditions obtain, and yet the individuals offering these 
answers are the furthest thing from happy.  
Although they differ in some very important respects, in this respect at least, 
our thoughts on happiness are similar to the thoughts of some members of the ancient 
Greek populace on the term eudaimonia. Aristotle noted that the masses always 
defined eudaimonia as that thing which they currently lacked, be it health, wealth, or 
love.
2
 After the attainment of one of these, presumably the next deficit is primed to 
be crowned eudaimonia. 
In this introduction, I will attempt to make the case that this theoretical and 
practical confusion is an unfortunate state of affairs that by all means should be 
righted in the coming years. Thankfully, and as we shall see shortly, I am not alone in 
viewing the state of discussion on happiness—within philosophy and without—as 
very problematic.  
On several levels, it is incumbent upon us to achieve clarity in discussions on 
happiness. Although philosophers have an overriding interest in clean theory, this is 
far outweighed by the strength of the practical interest shared by millions in 
understanding what we want when we say that we want to be happy. In the absence 
of such knowledge, the danger exists that in our ignorance we might miss our goal 
entirely.  
 
Whose Territory is this Anyway? 
While I have never met any academic who has denied the importance of 
increasing understanding of happiness, I have met quite a few who have claimed that 
                                                 
2
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. T. Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 
1999), 1095a. References to Aristotle‘s works in this essay will take the customary form (e.g., 1095a), 
referring to Bekker‘s marginal line numbering. 
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their field is not the one that bears responsibility for the answering of the question. 
From the beginning of the century up until the 1990s one of humankind‘s central 
goals was tossed like a hot potato from one academic discipline to another. 
Psychology, in which behaviorism dominated until the beginning of the ―cognitive 
revolution‖, did not view happiness as a mainstream psychological issue for a variety 
of institutionally-based reasons elaborated below. Economics had long since given up 
the emotional or hedonic concept of experienced utility in favor of the preference-
based approach of decision utility, and so were also not in the business of talking 
about happiness.
3
 Philosophers, having always been interested in the ancient terms 
that they translated as ‗happiness,‘ made occasional forays into the discussion of our 
modern conception of happiness, and although some of these were of high-quality, 
their number was surprisingly small and did not result in a high-profile systematic 
debate with unambiguous terminology.  
Some of this passing of the buck may be a result of what Lawrence Sumner in 
his Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics sees as the less than clear boundary between 
science and philosophy when it comes to determining not in what way or why 
welfare matters, but what it is.
4
 This diffusion of responsibility is even more 
prominent in the case of happiness, with several contemporary philosophers offering 
strangely superficial characterizations of ―feeling‖ happiness, or to paraphrase Julia 
Annas in her recent article in Daedalus, ―smiley-face happiness‖: 
Being happy is easily taken to be feeling happy . . . a kind of smiley-face 
feeling. . . . And this kind of happiness does not matter to us all that much 
once we start to think in a serious way about our lives. As we bring up our 
children, what we aim for is not that they have episodes of smiley-face 
feeling, but that their lives go well as wholes: we come to think of happiness 
as the way a life as a whole goes well, and see that episodes of happiness are 
not what we build our lives around.
5
 
As Daniel Haybron points out, implicit in this statement as well as the entire article is 
the idea that if happiness is a purely psychological affair, then it could amount to no 
                                                 
3
 D. Kahneman and R. Sugden, "Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation," 
Environmental and Resource Economics 32, no. 1 (2005): 162. 
4
 L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 5. 
5
 J. Annas, "Happiness as Achievement," Daedalus 133, no. 2 (2004): 44f. I feel obliged to note that 
Annas‘ article is almost irresponsibly polemical and seems to be based on a near-total ignorance of the 
state of psychological research on happiness. 
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more than ―smiley-face happiness.‖6 Fortunately, this way of viewing 
―psychological‖ happiness in philosophy has changed over the last several years, 
thanks in part to the efforts of scholars like Sumner and Haybron. Haybron‘s name, 
in particular, will come up repeatedly in this essay and with good reason: He has 
published nine major articles on the topics surrounding happiness in the last seven 
years and the manuscript of his forthcoming book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness
7
 
contains the most systematic treatment of theories of our modern conception of 
happiness to date. The influence of Haybron‘s groundbreaking work will be seen 
repeatedly this essay.  
 The renewed interest in happiness in philosophy has been accompanied by a 
similar phenomenon in psychology. Academic psychology had long avoided areas 
that were centerpoints of interest in what might have been called psychological 
inquiries in previous centuries, such as virtue and happiness. The reasons for this 
include the absurdly reductionist paradigm of behaviorism already mentioned, 
academic psychology‘s wish to distance itself from the humanities and establish its 
right to exist along a natural science model, as well as national funding priorities 
which emphasized the research and treatment of psychological disorders. 
 Thus, with a few notable exceptions, virtue, character strengths, happiness, 
and related issues of healthy mental functioning were sadly neglected. Although the 
momentum against this state of affairs had been building for a few decades, in 1998, 
the then president of the American Psychological Association, Martin Seligman, and 
his colleague Mihaly Czisksentmihaly wrote a galvanizing article that emphasized 
the regrettable absence of and the urgent need for research on ―positive‖ human 
functioning, not least because of evidence that certain character strengths and virtues 
protected against the development of mental illness.
8
 
                                                 
6
 D. M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press), Ch. 1, p. 4. 
Currently, chapters of Haybron‘s manuscript are only available in electronic form 
(http://www.slu.edu/~haybrond/) and without continuous pagination, for which reason citations of his 
manuscript in this essay will take the form: Chapter X, p. X.  
7
 Ibid.  
8
 M. E. P. Seligman and M. Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology [Special Issue]," American 
Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000); ———, "Happiness, Excellence, and Optimal Human Functioning 
[Special Issue]," American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000). For indications that the character trait of 
optimism prevents against certain affective disorders see: M. E. P. Seligman, Learned Optimism: How 
to Change Your Mind and Your Life (New York: Vintage, 2006). 
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 The cogency of this appeal led to a resounding echo in the world of academic 
psychological research and spawned major projects in areas that psychologists have 
traditionally seen as the territory of philosophers.
9
 This rejection of a strong focus on 
the study of sick, problematic, and disordered aspects of the human psyche has also 
had a strong impact on happiness studies. Whereas in the past there often seemed to 
be an implicit negative definition of happiness in academic psychology that was little 
more than ―the absence of significant disorder,‖ many more researchers began to 
think seriously about how one should best characterize happiness positively. This has 
led to a rich literature on the subject of happiness, but, unfortunately, this literature is 
plagued by terminological turbidity and a lack of philosophical insight. 
Although sensitivity to philosophical considerations has greatly improved, 
several years ago it was not uncommon for empirical researchers to quote both 
Aristotle and Bentham on happiness and assume that they were talking about the 
same thing. Psychologists also lack extensive experience with the benefits and perils 
of linguistic analysis, in other words, that experience that is the hard-won legacy of 
philosophy‘s efforts in the twentieth century.  
This legacy has put philosophy in an excellent position to examine socially 
constructed and semantically messy phenomena like happiness. Happiness has a 
vernacular currency, to borrow a phrase from Lawrence Sumner,
10
 and it is this 
meaning of happiness that people use in the making of many of their most significant 
prudential decisions that matters to them, and not a meaning of happiness defined, for 
example, because it is easier for social scientists to measure.  
 
Why is Happiness a Philosophical Topic? 
Even given that happiness is not dealt with skillfully in other disciplines, and 
that philosophy is in the position to do this better, why is happiness a philosophical 
topic? To avoid confusion about the answer to this question at the very beginning, it 
is helpful to distinguish between happiness, on the one hand, and well-being or 
                                                 
9
 E.g., C. Peterson and M. E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and 
Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
10
 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, 10.  
 12 
welfare, on the other. Indeed, it seems that our current use of ―being happy‖ or 
―happiness‖ is strongly psychological. Daniel Haybron offers a few examples of this:  
When parents say that they want their children to be ―happy and healthy,‖ 
they obviously aren‘t using ‗happiness‘ to mean well-being. If you seek a 
friend‘s advice about your son‘s future, saying ―I only want what‘s best for 
him,‖ and your friend says, ―Then you should encourage him to do what 
makes him happy,‖ your friend is probably not suggesting, most unhelpfully, 
that what‘s best for him is to do whatever is best for him. She is offering a 
substantive piece of advice. The psychological notion likewise occurs in 
many ordinary comparatives, as when a student asks herself, ―Will I be 
happier as a lawyer or a teacher?‖ Subjective well-being researchers often 
make claims about happiness: how happy people are and so forth. These 
researchers normally do not take themselves to be making value judgments 
about people‘s lives when describing them as happy; nor are they in a 
position, as empirical researchers, to make value judgments. They are simply 
attributing states of mind.
11
 
This ordinary usage of happiness should be clearly marked off from the use of 
‗happiness‘ by some philosophers as a translation of words such as ‗eudaimonia‘ that 
really do mean something like well-being, welfare, flourishing, or living (or having 
lived) a good life. A good amount has been written about whether to translate 
eudaimonia as ‗happiness,‘ and I do not intend to engage the debate at this point. I do 
think, however, that this translation is, at best, misleading for a modern reader. On 
the other hand, as will be clear in the ―short history of happiness‖ presented in the 
following chapter, eudaimonia is one term on a continuum that is, indeed, best called 
the history of happiness, a history made up of many terms that have constantly 
shifted positions along the dimensions of this semantic continuum through the 
centuries. 
 What makes us hesitate to call this continuum a history of happiness and what 
presents us with this translation conundrum is the fact that our contemporary 
conception of happiness has resulted from a comparatively extreme movement on a 
few of the dimensions along which conceptions of happiness have moved since the 
birth of the first thing that we might translate as ‗happiness.‘ This movement has 
been so extreme that our concept of happiness is, for most, clearly not the highest 
individual good and therefore bears a much fainter resemblance to previous concepts 
                                                 
11
 Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Ch. 1, p. 13. 
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than most of the previous concepts do to each other. For us, to say that happiness is 
well-being or our highest individual good, is not to make a strictly descriptive claim. 
Instead, it is to make a claim about the value of happiness that requires argumentative 
support.  
 Not so, however with eudaimonia: This term was from the beginning 
intended to indicate the best one could hope for one‘s life. With some notable 
exceptions such as the Cyreniacs, the Greeks theorized about eudaimonia as the 
highest good describing a life of flourishing, complete in every significant respect. 
Although our conception of happiness is no longer that of a highest good, the roots of 
the term such as ‗hap‘ meaning luck or good fortune made ‗happiness‘ at some times 
in the past the word that came closest to describing a life going well in all respects. 
Today, however, the word has come to mean something more specific, internal, and 
subjective. It is for this reason, that when freshman students read Aristotle for the 
first time in a text that translates ‗eudaimonia‘ as ‗happiness,‘ a good deal of 
explanation as to what eudaimonia really means and really meant for the lives of the 
Greeks is always necessary. Such explanation would not be necessary if ‗happiness‘ 
did refer to something like total well-being.  
In any case, should philosophers wish to use ‗happiness‘ in a well-being 
sense, then it might be wise to develop two distinct terms to avoid confusion. In 
earlier writings, Haybron advocated talking about psychological happiness and 
prudential happiness, the former being the meaning common in current vernacular 
and the latter being the equivalent of well-being or flourishing.
12
 In his latest 
manuscript,
13
 he seems to have distanced himself from this suggestion. I think well-
being or flourishing are acceptable terms for what is meant by ―prudential 
happiness,‖ and, in the interest of clarity, I think it best to follow common usage of 
‗happiness‘ as well as the usage of the term in other disciplines to refer only to a 
highly internal and subjective social construct that is not clearly equivalent with well-
being. Most philosophers view happiness in this way as well, and it is for this reason 
                                                 
12
 D. M. Haybron, "Happiness and Ethical Inquiry: An Essay in the Psychology of Well-Being,"  
(Ph.D. diss., Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 2001), 2ff.   
13
 Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness. 
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that terms like ‗well-being‘ and ‗welfare‘ are most commonly used for referring to 
something like a ‗good life.‘  
 Happiness in the psychological sense, is a good which could be a component 
of well-being, but there also may be sound reasons why it might not be. Recent 
history is full of people (many of them artists and ‗continental‘ philosophers) who 
have eschewed happiness as a goal. A certain artist could believe that he could create 
great works only through great suffering, and might claim to renounce happiness as a 
goal, while still believing that what he is doing is that which is best for himself. He is 
rejecting a specific good that could be a part of well-being, but that he believes is not. 
In our usage, the pursuit of happiness is something that can be renounced without any 
hint of a corresponding renunciation of a pursuit of what is best for oneself.  
   That said, what is meant by happiness in our usage is believed by most to 
have a place as one of the goods that make up well-being. Some have even argued 
that psychological happiness (with some qualifications) is well-being or welfare.
14
 
But, well before such a wide-reaching proposal that would certainly be challenging to 
defend, happiness should be studied in the course of developing what Haybron calls 
―prudential psychology‖ or the psychology of well-being, akin to moral 
psychology.
15
 The strong interest in well-being, flourishing, and welfare in 
contemporary philosophy suggest that our lack of analytical understanding of 
happiness as a likely constituent of well-being cannot be ignored.  
 Since Elizabeth Anscombe‘s polemic, ―Modern Moral Philosophy,‖ the task 
of ethics has been seen more broadly. Interest in flourishing, well-being and certainly 
virtue ethics is a result of this wider focus and studies of our contemporary concept 
of happiness should be as well. It does seem difficult to ignore happiness if ethics 
takes seriously the answering of Socrates‘ question, ―How ought I to live?‖ 
Moreover, happiness is de facto a philosophical topic. In the last three decades, 
dozens of articles on our contemporary conception of happiness have appeared in 
reputable philosophical journals and a fair number of books on the topic have been 
published.  
                                                 
14
 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.  
15
 Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Ch. 1, p. 3ff. 
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 Above all, happiness should be studied independently of its role in a given 
moral theory. Since the Enlightenment, countless moral theories have offered an 
account of happiness on the side, viewing it as an important building block, but 
seldom treating it systematically and independently from its role in the moral theory 
from which it arose. The Utilitarians are the most obvious example of this, but Kant, 
for all of the rest of his piercing psychological insight, is guilty of this as well.
16
 
Others such as Haybron have offered very extensive justifications for 
delivering a philosophical treatment of our concept of happiness. I feel that the 
burden of excuse and apology lies less on those active in philosophy who wish to 
deal with this subject than on the part of the disciplines which up until now have 
given scant treatment to a phenomenon whose importance for many people is 
unparalleled. 
 
The Purpose of this Essay 
At present, a large number of views on the nature of happiness exist. These 
views are repeatedly disposed of and resurrected, both in philosophy itself and in 
related fields. This is partly a result of the haphazard and disconnected manner in 
which philosophy and other disciplines have treated happiness in the past century. 
One of my hopes for this essay is to contribute to a delineation of the major types of 
theories and a standardization of the terminology used to discuss them (although I 
would also be satisfied if I succeeded in simply drawing awareness to the 
terminological and methodological difficulties facing the field of happiness studies). 
In so doing, I hope to contribute to a structure whose use will enable both philosophy 
and the social sciences to think about these theories in an ordered manner. 
One way to accomplish this is to place the topic of this essay, namely, our 
current usage of ‗happiness‘ and ‗being happy,‘ in a historical context. Chapters Two 
and Three attempt this and, in the process, work out seven dimensions along which 
things that we have called or translated as ‗happiness‘ have moved throughout the 
centuries. This widens our view and assists us in not falling prey to an impression 
                                                 
16
 See V. S. Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics, SUNY Series in Ethical Theory (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994).  
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that the shape of our current conception of happiness is inevitable and unchanging. 
As mentioned above, our conception of happiness is simply one result of a 
combination of values on these dimensions. 
In addition to placing our conception of happiness in a larger context, 
Chapters Two and Three attempt to reframe our knowledge of the development of 
various conceptions of happiness according to that which we now know about the 
evolutionary forces that shaped our psychological systems of emotion and 
motivation. One central thesis of these chapters is that the forces shaping our 
psychology placed us in a difficult situation, and that the history of happiness after 
what I will call the philosophical turn is best seen as a revolt against certain things 
that humans had been shaped to want and to value as well as ways in which the 
wanting and valuing occurred. I offer an explanation why certain problems existed 
(and continue to exist) with our conceptions of happiness and our striving to attain 
them as well as an explanation of how differing conceptions of happiness attempted 
to solve these problems.  
The colorful ancestry of ‗happiness‘ also serves to help explain the 
difficulties that traditional analyses of the term ‗happiness‘ and related terms have 
faced. With such a rich history, it is no surprise that linguistic intuitions vary, both 
regarding the usage of cognates of happiness and the phrases in which they are 
employed. Linguistic intuitions to ostensibly similar phrases such as ―living a happy 
life,‖ ―being happy with one‘s life,‖ or simply ―being happy‖ are by no means 
identical. Chapter Four deals with the issue of the various meanings of cognates of 
happiness and the phrases in which they are used. Once the various meanings are 
separated, Chapter Four also examines answers to the question of how we are to 
decide among competing linguistic intuitions, and how to decide which phrase to 
analyze if competing phrases deliver opposing intuitions. 
Another problem of method is dealt with in Chapter Four, namely, the 
multiple meanings of the term ‗subjective‘ when applied to theories of happiness. 
‗Subjective‘ is often used in conflicting senses in the discussion surrounding theories 
of happiness. On the one hand, ‗subjective‘ is used to mean something along the lines 
of being ―dependent on the judgment of the agent,‖ and on the other hand ―pertaining 
 17 
to mental states.‖ I argue that for the purposes of this essay and perhaps for happiness 
studies in general, ‗subjective‘ should be reserved for expressing the sense of ‗being 
dependent on the judgment of the agent‘ while ‗pertaining to mental states‘ be 
rendered by the term ‗internal.‘ 
Chapter Five offers an elucidation of the two traditional theories of our 
contemporary conception of happiness, namely, hedonistic theories and life- or 
desire-satisfaction theories. I discuss their strengths and name the weaknesses that 
eventually prove fatal to these theories. I also review claims that matters other than 
mental states (i.e., ‗external‘ matters) are relevant to happiness, and that moral or 
ethical considerations play a necessary role in our ascriptions of happiness.  
The theory of happiness introduced most recently, Daniel Haybron‘s 
emotional-state theory, forms the basis of Chapter Six. Haybron‘s approach is one of 
the most plausible of the extant theories of happiness and bears systematic 
similarities to the psychologist Daniel Kahneman‘s construct of ―objective 
happiness.‖ Objective happiness and other major positions in empirical psychological 
research on happiness find their elaboration in Chapter Seven. Chapter Seven 
concludes with an implicit call from some psychologists for an alternative to the 
extant theories of happiness, a call that I attempt to respond to in Chapter Eight with 
the creation of the dynamic affective standard theory of happiness.  
Although conducted at a level of necessary abstraction, I believe that it is 
important to keep in mind that in discussions of happiness, a responsibility exists 
beyond the normal dedication to the principles of academic debate. In the case of 
many issues discussed in philosophy, an author‘s primary responsibility is to the 
forthright presentation of a theory for a small group of academics. Knowing what we 
want when we say that we want to be happy is not simply the concern of happiness 
theorists. Instead, it is the concern of each person who wants to be happy and isn‘t 
quite able to explain what it is that he wants. 
 18 
Chapter 2: Emancipation from Evolution I – The 
Advent of Philosophy 
 
 The history of happiness is a long story of a tenacious pursuit of mastery over 
our elusive final ends. Whether we can speak of progress in the course of this pursuit 
is questionable. One thing is certain: For many today, a desire for happiness seems as 
basic and natural as a desire for sex or for food. However, happiness, at least after the 
point in intellectual history that I will call the philosophical turn in happiness, has 
always been much more of a human or a social construction than other desires that 
seem to be equally self-evident. For example, for a purportedly basic, natural, and 
self-evident desire, it is strikingly odd that in contemporary philosophical and 
psychological writings and even in discussions with people on the street, so much 
disagreement exists about what exactly it is that we want, when we say that we want 
to be happy. 
 One needs only to look to our intellectual progenitors to find even more 
confusion. When we compare the competing views of what we mean today when we 
use the English word ‗happiness,‘ with all of those things that the English word 
‗happiness‘ once meant and all those things that we choose to translate into English 
as ‗happiness,‘ the self-evident nature of this desire becomes more doubtful still. 
 19 
That confusion exists about the nature of our aim when we profess to aim at 
happiness is, of course, not a new insight.  
More than two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant commented that ―the concept of 
happiness is such an indeterminate one that even though everyone wishes to attain 
happiness, yet he can never say definitely and consistently what it is that he really 
wishes and wills.‖17 It is one consequence of human psychology that we tend to take 
the most bizarre things for granted if they have always been that way. Is it not 
exceedingly strange that we are so unclear about that thing that we purportedly spend 
much of our energy—and in some cases most of our lives—pursuing? And if it really 
is difficult to imagine human life without this supposedly basic desire, then the 
supporters of the contention that the desire for happiness is a basic and naturally 
occurring desire should at least be able to say what it is that humans cannot be 
without. 
 I argue in this chapter that our modern conception of happiness is anything 
but natural. Indeed, it is highly unnatural. This has some problematic consequences 
for its pursuit that we would regard as tragic, were they not so common as to be 
almost universal and if we were even able to recognize these problems. In the course 
of the next two chapters, I build on existing work to make the claim that it served the 
purposes of differential reproductive success that we not recognize these problems 
with the pursuit of happiness. As further examples will show, astute students of 
human nature such as Immanuel Kant recognized this tragic situation over two 
centuries ago, albeit without having the means to explain the reasons for it. Now as a 
result of the immense progress in understanding of evolutionary processes, we are in 
the position to uncover the causes of the tragedy of happiness as well as its nature. 
This portion of the history of happiness will be elucidated in the second evolutionary 
interlude at the end of this chapter. 
The history of the denotata of words that bear a semantic relationship to our 
word ‗happiness‘ does not pertain directly to the ultimate end of this undertaking, 
namely, to understand what members of the English linguistic community, today, 
mean when they say that they want to be happy. Nonetheless, a glimpse into the 
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evolution of the variety things called happiness is very helpful in order to understand 
both the divergence in our linguistic intuitions (on which so many philosophical 
theories of happiness have foundered), as well as the possible divergence in things 
that we actually do mean when we say that we want to be happy.  
In spite of the wide variety emphasized above, and although no single 
element of their content is common to all, descriptions or definitions of happiness do 
seem to share at least one relatively loose formal characteristic. From the beginning, 
things called happiness have been a record of individual humans‘ greatest hopes for 
themselves or for their lives as a whole. This is not to say that the greatest hopes of 
some may not have included happiness in any meaningful way. Instead, it is simply 
to say that where we find things that we deem best to translate into English as 
happiness, then they usually have to do with the greatest hopes either for the 
individual or her life. Beyond this very general characterization, there are (at least) 
seven dimensions along which things we call happiness have moved since the 
philosophical turn, all of which were in place (to a greater or lesser degree) by the 
time ancient Greek philosophy had run its course. To work out these dimensions, I 
will portray selected aspects of the conceptions of happiness of the major figures of 
ancient Greek philosophy in a very concise fashion.  
Again, things that we choose to translate into English as ‗happiness‘ have 
almost always been those things that individuals most wanted from their time on this 
planet and often for their projected existence afterwards. Ironically, the modern or 
contemporary conception of happiness as it is used in English is the one that shares 
this characteristic in the weakest way. This is the result of a historically extreme 
movement on several of the dimensions mentioned above. Our highly subjective 
conception of happiness that in no way represents a highest good for the individual 
(the vast majority of those who profess that happiness matters most will, when 
pressed, admit that other things, e.g., moral concerns, are more important to them) is 
fairly unique. Even for us moderns, however, happiness, if not our highest good (as it 
was for many cultures in the past), often serves as a proxy for such a good.
18
 This 
role is most evident in our decision-making processes. Very often when confronted 
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with life decisions, people ask, ―Will taking the job in Singapore make me happy?‖ 
or ―Will marrying John make me happy?‖  
Although contemporary English speakers do not use happiness to refer to a 
highest, all-encompassing good (i.e., at a birthday celebration they might wish 
someone happiness and health), as a guide to prudential choices, ‗being happy‘ plays 
a large role. Many terms from ancient times that contemporary philosophers often 
translate as ‗happiness‘ (e.g., eudaimonia19) did not serve as a proxy for well-being, 
welfare, or flourishing; they were well-being, welfare, or flourishing. This is strongly 
evident in the writings of the (questionably titled) father of Western history, 
Herodotus, shortly before the beginning of a radical change in things called 
happiness. Before turning to Herodotus‘ happiness, it is worthwhile to review the 
purpose of this chapter. The goal here is by no means an exploratory analysis of each 
of the thinkers mentioned, but instead the delineation of aspects of ancient 
conceptions of happiness, both to uncover the dimensions along which happiness has 
since moved and to re-examine the historical movements of ideas about happiness 
within the framework of what we now know about the role of evolution in shaping 
the mental life of human beings.
20
 
 
Pre-Philosophical Happiness 
Herodotus bequeathed us a discussion between Croesus, famed at that time 
for being the wealthiest man alive, and Solon, a traveling Athenian sage and 
lawgiver.
 21
 The discussion centers on Croesus‘ attempt to convince Solon that he, 
Croesus, is also the happiest man alive. Croesus supports his claim by commanding 
his servants to show the wise man of Athens the massive extent of his treasures. 
                                                 
19
 Throughout the course of the discussion of ancient Greek thought, I will occasionally use 
‗eudaimonia‘ as a mental reminder that it is not our contemporary concept of happiness that is under 
discussion, but instead one that functions quite differently than ours, encompassing much more of that 
which is of value to us.  
20
 There is a mountain of literature that extends back over several centuries—and in certain cases 
millennia—on the topics in this chapter and the next. As the goal of these two chapters is to place 
general knowledge about the ancients and their philosophical descendants in a new framework, only 
those works have been cited that I believe do an especially good job of working out the point in 
question. They serve as examples from which the interested reader can further explore the literature. 
21
 Herodotus, The History, trans. D. Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1.30.  
 22 
Croesus‘ strategy is to show Solon that he, Croesus, lacks nothing, and therefore 
must be the happiest man in the world. This strategy fails for a reason other than that 
which modern readers might suspect. 
To Croesus‘ great dismay, Solon informs him that a certain Tellus is the 
happiest man. Tellus was a father of brave sons who lived in a wealthy city, and his 
children and grandchildren had survived childbirth and were healthy. Tellus himself 
was wealthy and found an honorable end to his life on the battlefield. Solon does not 
take issue with Croesus‘ claim that his vast wealth contributes strongly to his 
happiness. Instead, Solon famously claims that Croesus should be wary that no man 
can be called happy until he is dead. He reminds Croesus that his admittedly 
extremely favorable circumstances could change drastically before or at the moment 
of his death. 
While a modern might press the case that Croesus‘ wealth contributes to his 
happiness only insofar as it affects him positively in one way or another, Solon does 
not because Solon believes that happiness consists in favorable circumstances which 
continue to the end of one‘s life (and beyond). Wealth, social success or honor, the 
success of one‘s family, not to forget the circumstances of one‘s death and one‘s 
fame after death are all essential components of happiness.
22
  
In his magisterial Happiness: A History, Darrin McMahon points out that 
Herodotus uses more than one word to describe the state that Croesus desires.
23
 Not 
only does Herodotus use makarios and oblios, the closest approximation of which 
might be ―blessed,‖ but also eutychia, or ―luck,‖ and to capture the subtle differences 
in meaning among these three terms he employs the word eudaimon (eudaimonia in 
its noun form). At the time in which Herodotus was writing, eudaimonia was rapidly 
becoming the preferred term for indicating the presence of a flourishing, favored life, 
akin to our notions of individual welfare or well-being. Eudaimonia comes from the 
idea of a life having a good daimon (or spirit, god, demon)
24
, and this means having a 
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blessed, praiseworthy, life that conforms to one‘s wishes and has generally turned out 
well.  
Solon‘s conception of eudaimonia corresponds in its broad strokes to other 
pre-philosophical sources, such as the happiness or blessedness of the Homeric hero 
as depicted by Terence Irwin as well as Martha Nussbaum‘s view of the values 
implicit in ancient Greek tragedy.
25
 Unsurprisingly, it is also not too far off from that 
of many pre-philosophical, pre-agricultural cultures.
26
 In these cultures, happiness is 
a collection of things whose importance for survival and reproduction are clear: 
Wealth, honor, and social success are all ways of securing one‘s continued survival 
(as well as that of one‘s offspring) in times of scarcity of material goods, and all three 
contribute significantly to one‘s level of attractiveness as a mate, and consequent 
success in attracting other highly valued mates. This is especially true in non-
industrialized cultures where death, disease, etc. are a more constant companion than 
they are in industrialized cultures.  
Further components of one‘s eudaimonia include a wife (the pre-
philosophical Greek history of happiness is unfortunately framed only in terms of the 
eudaimonia of a man), healthy children, and the flourishing and success of one‘s 
family (i.e., obtaining for themselves the abovementioned goods of wealth, honor, 
and social success). In short, these components of pre-philosophical happiness 
describe the optimal external package for fulfilling what we to expect would be a 
male human‘s goals shaped by evolutionary processes. The background for these 
goals and the collection of desires with which early Greek philosophers were faced is 
best understood after a short detour through contemporary evolutionary theory. 
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The Evolution of Desire 
What the human being understands as happiness…would still never be attained by 
him; for his nature is not of the sort to call a halt anywhere in possession and 
enjoyment and to be satisfied. – Immanuel Kant27  
 
Many extremely gifted philosophers in both the distant and relatively recent 
past have struggled with the strange problems that human desires and goals 
(especially happiness) produce. Without an understanding of the processes that 
shaped our species, they often coupled impeccably acute psychological and 
anthropological insight with a flailing effort to explain the origins of the perplexing 
desires and behaviors they were describing. With the coming to light of our 
evolutionary origins for the first time in the late 19th century, much speculation 
about the origins of behavior before that time revealed itself to be just that: 
speculation. This did not prevent observers like Kant from recognizing the tragically 
bizarre situation in which humans find themselves. The evolutionary interludes in 
this chapter serve to explain the reasons for our predicament. For this purpose a 
general understanding of evolutionary thought about how our species was shaped is 
of great importance.  
It has often been asked why homo sapiens developed abilities that so 
exceeded those of other beings shaped by natural selection. More than one theory 
exists, of course, but each of them posits unique combinations of existing humanoid 
skill coupled with persistent environmental challenges. These challenges 
subsequently shaped not only our skills, but importantly for our topic, also our 
desires and goals. Basic principles of the functioning of natural selection form a 
crucial background to the understanding of these theories.  
Classical fitness theories, of the kind that Darwin propounded, involve the 
differential reproductive success of the individual only. David Buss explains 
differential reproductive success as ―brought about by the possession of heritable 
variants that increase or decrease an individual‘s chances of surviving and 
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reproducing‖ and as being ―the ‗bottom line‘ of evolution by natural selection.‖28 
Two elements were seen to be central to this success: the survival of the individual 
and successful mating, although the first is always subordinate to the second. W.D. 
Hamilton turned the classical Darwinian conception on its head in the 1960‘s by 
introducing the concept of inclusive fitness, which involved a new different view of 
differential reproductive success.
29
 Hamilton pointed out that statistical increases of a 
gene in the gene pool depend on more that just mating. To begin with, one‘s brothers 
and sisters share just as much genetic material with an agent as her children do 
(50%), so seen statistically, genes (and perhaps cultures) will develop that encourage 
behaviors that will strongly favor the survival and reproductive success of an 
individual human‘s brothers and sisters. This interest in the success of our siblings, of 
course, includes the fate of other relatives as well (the degree diminishing in direct 
relation to the percent of genetic material shared with the individual in question).  
Far from being an all-inclusive explanation of the meaning of the family or 
love, inclusive fitness merely explains how the statistical tendencies toward the 
increase of an individual‘s genes in the gene pool are determined by more than her 
survival and mating success. Given that differential reproductive success in the sense 
of inclusive fitness is the general evolutionary mechanism, how did this mechanism 
shape the specific development of humankind‘s comparatively immense mental 
capacities? 
One theory focuses on the fact that humans are the group of primates that 
consume far more meat that any other group. This is true in the present, but more 
importantly, many indications point to far larger consumption of meat than other 
primates in our ancestral environment.
30
 The ―hunting hypothesis‖ proposes that it 
was tool-making and use, in tandem with the need for language skills for purposes of 
cooperation on the hunt that spurred the development of human mental capacity.
31
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Other theorists propose that the development of tools, not for hunting, but for 
gathering provided the impetus.
32
  
Robin Dunbar takes a slightly different approach. His innovation lies in the 
attempt to map brain size onto social group size. In doing so, Dunbar has 
demonstrated impressively that within a selected group of vertebrate species (e.g. 
primates, carnivores, ungulates, birds, reptiles and fish) the logarithm of brain size is 
almost exactly proportional to the logarithm of social group size.
33
 While other 
theorists claim that human brain development was spurred by demands to understand 
and manipulate the world, Dunbar claims that the real impetus was the evolutionary 
advantage bestowed upon those who could understand and manipulate (in both a 
positive or cooperative and in a negative sense) others in their social group or tribe. 
As human brain size has tripled since our last common ancestor with chimpanzees,
34
 
one could go further and postulate a kind of evolutionary arms race in intelligence. 
As intelligence and ability to manipulate increased, so did the complexity of the 
object of manipulation (the workings of others‘ minds), and thus a further increment 
in intelligence proved again to be of great advantage.  
Dunbar emphasizes not only the advantage of understanding others in one‘s 
social group, but also the passing on of that information, specifically with regard to 
their value as partners in reciprocal relationships.
35
 Haidt, following Dunbar, points 
out that gossip very often involves stories about transgressions and concludes that 
humans have used language (and gossip in particular) to create an ultrasocial world 
―in which we refrain from nearly all the ways we could take advantage of those 
weaker than us, a world in which we often help those who are unlikely ever to be 
able to return the favor. We want to play tit for tat, which means starting out nice 
without being a pushover, and we want to cultivate a reputation for being a good 
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player.‖36 While Dunbar‘s explanation seems compelling, I have thus far framed it 
only in terms of an explanation of human intelligence as an undifferentiated mass.  
Evolutionary theorists, however, emphasize the content-specificity and the 
modularity of intelligence. David Buss‘ discussion is congruent with Dunbar‘s 
general arguments and explains the specific content of the challenges early humans 
faced in more detail. 
It is unlikely that our huge brains—the 900 cubic centimeter advantage we 
have over chimpanzees—have evolved to help us pick better berries or avoid 
snakes. These survival problems are all solved by chimps with a much 
smaller brain.  
It is far more likely that humans evolved such large brains as a consequence 
of the complexities of social living and social competition that includes 
forming coalitions, executing a rich repertoire of short-term and long-term 
mating strategies, negotiating the intricacies of complex kin networks and 
social hierarchies, forming long-term reciprocal alliances, and socializing 
children for years or decades.
37
 
 
In Buss‘ characterization, we begin to get a feel for the specific social challenges our 
brains evolved to meet. But the specificity and modularity go even further. Take the 
example of phobias. A phobia is a ―disrupting, fear-mediated avoidance that is out of 
proportion to the danger posed by a particular object or situation and is recognized by 
the sufferer as groundless.‖38 The most prominent examples are extreme fear of 
heights, closed spaces, snakes, and spiders. Interestingly, as David Buss and many 
others have pointed out, extreme fears develop much less often in response to very 
frequent causes of serious harm and death in urban environments such as cars, 
swimming pools, and electrical outlets than to the dangers present in humans‘ 
ancestral environment such as spiders, snakes, cliffs, and tall trees with valuable 
fruit.
39
 This imbalance in our fear responses to things which pose little threat to us in 
modern urban environments and things that pose comparatively very great threats to 
us is, of course, present at pre-phobia levels and speaks for very specific content-
oriented emotional and motivational responses.  
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Kenrick and Simpson, in concord with virtually all other evolutionary 
theorists, state that the evolutionary models ―posit that humans do not possess a 
single, monolithic psychological mechanism designed to maximize their general 
fitness (which would be very difficult to program and highly inefficient to use). 
Instead, humans likely have several specific psychological mechanisms, each of 
which evolved to solve specific adaptive problems.‖40 This is true not only of 
emotion and motivation, but of highly content-specific cognitive abilities. In fact, a 
huge body of scientific evidence supports the domain specificity view of human 
cognitive abilities, emotions, memory, desires, etc.
41
 For example, our power of 
discernment and memory for human faces is an ability that is probably unequalled in 
any other area of our pattern discernment and memory.
42
 Tooby and Cosmides call 
the relevant specificity in the realm of goals and desires a ―motivational domain.‖ 
They emphasize that  
Cases of motivational incommensurability are numerous and easily identified 
via careful analyses of adaptive problems. Distinct and incommensurable 
evolved motivational principles exist for food, sexual attraction, mate 
acquisition, parenting, kinship, incest avoidance, coalitions, disease 
avoidance, friendship, predators, provocations, snakes, spiders, habitats, 
safety, competitors, being observed, behavior when sick, certain categories of 
moral transgression, and scores of other entities, conditions, acts, and 
relationships.
43
 
Emotions, according to Tooby and Cosmides, are the ―solution to the problem of 
mechanism coordination‖ between competing domain-specific motivational 
programs.
44
 It is also widely agreed that pleasure and pain, regardless of how one 
wants to define them, are part of evolved regulatory systems that encouraged or 
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discouraged the pursuit of certain external goods, events, and/or situations.
45
 Pleasure 
(in the widest sense of the word, including that which I will later term positive affect) 
became the motivational carrot to encourage humans to pursue goals that were 
generally evolutionarily advantageous, and pain (in the widest sense) formed the 
motivational stick that discouraged us from outcomes that were evolutionarily 
disadvantageous.  
Therefore the early Greek philosophers were confronted with many widely 
varying things that it seemed that we just wanted, period. Many attempts to reconcile 
them were undertaken, but what early philosophers were unable to know is that there 
is an ultimate and irreconcilable tension in the universe of things that we want: ―The 
systems that regulate our emotions were shaped not to benefit individuals or the 
species, but only to maximize the transmission of the genes themselves. Thus, every 
species experiences a tension between efforts to maintain individual welfare and 
efforts to maximize reproductive success.‖46 This tension served as part of the 
background for the philosophical turn in happiness. The thinkers of the Greek city-
states instigated a great debate that continues up to the present concerning what to do 
with this chaotic collection of desires and goals, what really is good for the 
individual, and what our ultimate good really is.  
 
The Advent of Philosophy and the Philosophical Turn 
The advent of philosophy marked a signal change in conceptions of 
happiness. Initially, however, the natural philosophers, those Greeks considered 
today to be the first philosophers, busied themselves comparatively less with 
questions of eudaimonia or its linguistic cousins than with explanations of the natural 
world. Although some of them did turn their analytical tools on the question of well-
being, their distinctive contribution was to initiate philosophy as a method of inquiry 
through reason and observation. Some of their specific strategies for understanding 
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the natural world, such as monism
47
, were also employed in their attempts to 
understand happiness. The application of the monistic strategy with regard to 
happiness is not limited to the natural philosophers; on the contrary, the pursuit of 
unity in eudaimonia became a cornerstone of much of the thought of the classical 
philosophers who became active in their wake. Understanding why these strategies 
and why philosophical conceptions of happiness as a whole were so different from 
what came before requires an understanding of what made philosophy as a whole so 
different. For these reasons (and for their thoughts on happiness), it is helpful to 
sketch a crude picture of some of the views and tactics of the natural philosophers.  
In contrast to the likes of natural philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, 
Xenophanes, and Parmenides, giants of Greek thought such as Homer and Hesiod 
sought access to cosmological information through appeal to the muses. Many 
natural philosophers avoided (and occasionally belittled) such tactics and instead 
developed explanations for the composition of the world based on little more than a 
combination of their reason and their sense experience.
48
 This led them to overthrow 
many beliefs about the nature of the world that had existed until this point. 
Interestingly, as mentioned above, their speculations often involved forms of 
monism. In other words, they attempted to explain the manifest image of the world in 
terms of only one substance. One possible motivation for the pursuit of monism is the 
desire for parsimony in explanation, a core value in scientific exploration of the 
world.  
Parsimony in explanation quickly also became a core value of those 
philosophers who first turned the analytical method to the question of the nature of 
happiness. Democritus and Heraclitus were two natural philosophers who addressed 
this question and with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, among others, they instigated a 
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philosophical turn in thought on happiness that severed it abruptly from conceptions 
that came before.
49
  
We have seen that the process of development through evolution can lead to a 
multifarious collection of desires, goals, and values and a concomitant concept of 
happiness that is external, materialistic, and reflects the components of this 
collection. This, however, is a very unsatisfying state of affairs for a being conscious 
of its self, its conflicting desires and, above all, its recurrently tragic free choice 
among them. The messy collection of often conflicting goals that developed in homo 
sapiens is certainly not unique to our species. The twin evolutionary goals of survival 
and reproduction engender conflicting individual goals and desires in all species. 
However, the intellect of the human being, our freedom to deviate from our instincts 
(often by calling into question whether the desired action really is good for us), and 
our concomitant grasp of causality is far greater than any of the other known 
products of natural selection.  
This combination results in a behavior and an intellectual desire that seems to 
be as basic a need as any: the pursuit of the causal or reason question, often phrased 
simply as ―Why?‖ Anyone who has spent time with small children knows how 
relentless and stubborn this need can be. Of course, this ―Why?‖ extends not simply 
to physical causation, but to justifications or reasons for action as well.
50
 Children 
naturally develop a potentially endless chain of ―reason questions‖ with regard to 
actions.  
If one looks at an individual exemplar of species other than homo sapiens in 
terms of the causal question
51
, one would suspect the best linguistic approximation of 
their relation to the things they pursue could be nothing more than ―because they 
want X.‖ Perhaps one could go as far as ―because X appears to be good to them.‖ 
Regardless of which locution is appropriate, other species seem to be driven by what 
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they desire and what they do not desire, as programmed through millennia of cycles 
of natural selection. Humans, on the other hand, have never been satisfied with a 
simple, ―I want X‖ answer. Before philosophy, however, many chains of justification 
led back to the will of gods in a clear and straightforward way. 
Similarly to the natural philosopher‘s occasional hesitance and often refusal 
to appeal to the Olympian gods as a simple final explanation for a chain of material 
causal questions, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle effectively, if not always explicitly, 
rejected the desires of the Olympian gods as ends of chains of justificatory questions. 
And even if these philosophers had no way of knowing that natural selection was the 
reason that many of our manifold conflicting desires and goals do not serve our best 
interests, it was clear to them that it certainly was the case that our best interests were 
often not served.  
In turning the reason or justificatory question loose on Herodotic or Homeric 
happiness, these philosophers emphasized that they wanted to use reason to uncover 
what really is good for us. Socrates was not the first philosopher to ask it, but he was 
the first to stubbornly emphasize the importance of the question, ―How should we 
best live our lives?‖ as he famously asks in Plato‘s early Socratic dialogue, the 
Euthydemus.
52
 It is not so much what Socrates says, as an assumption implicit in the 
question that marks another turning point for happiness. Socrates and some of the 
natural philosophers before him make the assumption that we have much more 
control over happiness than the pre-philosophical, largely external conception 
suggests. 
Unsurprisingly, when a conception of happiness is highly external and 
materialistic the influence of the gods and luck will be very strong. The relation 
between these two aspects and personal control over one‘s eudaimonia was a topic of 
great interest among Greek poets, playwrights, and, of course, philosophers.
53
 
Although traditionally the focus of much attention in this respect, Socrates was not 
the first philosopher to attempt to wrest happiness from luck or the whim of the gods. 
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The natural philosophers Heraclitus, Democritus, and Anaxagoras also made strong 
moves to instigate changes in the way the Greeks viewed happiness.
54
  
Heraclitus claimed that the character of a man is his fate
55
, a turning on its 
head of received opinion about the nature of eudaimonia. His statement ostensibly 
suggests that nothing (or little) else is responsible for eudaimonia other than that over 
which one presumably has some degree of control. Democritus describes happiness 
and unhappiness as phenomena of the soul
56
, thus beginning the shift from external 
goods to internal ones. According to Aristotle, Democritus and Heraclitus are joined 
by Anaxagoras, who claimed that the happiest person was not someone that you 
would ordinarily think of.
57
 According to Aristotle‘s interpretation of Anaxagoras, 
this meant a rejection of external goods as a measure of happiness in favor of a just 
and rational conduct of one‘s life.58  
In a similar vein, Democritus seems even to have anticipated Socrates‘ 
dictum that he who is done injury is better off than he who injures.
59
 This view of 
eudaimonia also means greater control over one‘s own happiness: one can avoid 
inflicting injury, but one has far less control over suffering injury at the hands of 
someone else. So emphasis on greater control seems to go hand in hand with a 
stronger internalization of eudaimonia. This is a clear shift in emphasis from the 
Homeric ideals of the hero such as renown, honor, power, property, wealth, noble 
lineage, and a successful family and successful children, which were primarily 
external to the agent, to internal factors such as psychic harmony and equanimity.
60
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That this truly represents a sea change in view is illustrated by K. J. Dover‘s 
contention that a Greek could easily have used the term eudaimon to describe a 
person who had a feeling of deep dissatisfaction with his life.
61
 Additionally, the 
criterion of psychic harmony and equanimity renders more difficult the most external 
(and uncontrollable) of all ideas about eudaimonia, namely that events after our 
deaths matter for our eudaimonia, a common part of the pre-philosophical Homeric 
conception and an element that will return most prominently in our examination of 
Aristotle‘s concept of happiness.  
There is no denying that the aspects of increasing internalization, increasing 
control, and decreasing emphasis on the effect of events after our death on our 
happiness all do move in the direction of our modern conception of happiness. 
However, one thing mentioned previously should always be kept in mind in these 
discussions: unlike our conception of happiness, eudaimonia is a highest good.
62
 
When Democritus claims that eudaimonia is a phenomenon of the soul, he is making 
a substantive ethical claim about what should be the focal point of our valuing – what 
is best for us. In contrast, when we today say that happiness is, for example, desire-
satisfaction, we are doing nothing more than making a descriptive claim about the 
nature of a phenomenon or a social construct. Additionally, eudaimonia is still a 
concept that generally extends over a whole life and is not, as our concept can be, 
episodic (however long the episodes may last).
63
 That said, the increase in personal 
control and the internalization of happiness had begun in earnest. Philosophers were, 
thus, slowly wresting the social construction of happiness from evolutionarily pre-
programmed goals and values in the direction of the considered good of the 
individual, independent of the evolutionary consequences of the goal, desire, or state 
that formed eudaimonia‘s content.  
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Although increased personal control, increased internalization, and aspects of 
ethical behavior are present in the pre-Socratic philosophers, Socrates makes them 
the core of his philosophical analysis of happiness. In one of Plato‘s Socratic 
dialogues, the Euthydemus, Socrates asks ―What being is there who does not desire 
happiness?‖ He continues: ―…since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be 
happy?‖64 Of course, whether or not we all desire happiness depends greatly on what 
definition of happiness we are discussing. It might be the case that it is a natural 
human desire to want eudaimonia in its abstract determination as ―the highest good,‖ 
but this is certainly not incontestably obvious. For some reason or another, one might 
want something that is good, but not the highest good. This might be irrational, or it 
might not be, but it does possible. More importantly, even if it is a natural human 
longing to want the highest good, whether the highest goods and the correspondent 
longings for those goods that Socrates and Plato delineate really are so self-evident is 
another matter altogether.  
In explicating his vision of the highest good, Socrates takes his lead from his 
natural philosopher predecessors. Especially in his attempt to unify eudaimonia 
Socrates attempts to uncover one single thing that provides an end to all of the chains 
of why-questions. Just as many of the natural philosophers believed themselves to 
have discovered the one material that lay behind the fabric of the universe, Socrates 
believed himself to have discovered the one ―material‖ that composes eudaimonia, 
namely, virtue (which for Socrates simultaneously meant a kind of knowledge). In 
other words, Socrates seems to have been a happiness monist.  
In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that a rich and powerful king only then has 
eudaimonia when he also has had a moral education and possesses the virtue of 
justice.
65
 Later in the dialogue he claims that only a person who lives an ethical life 
could be considered blessed and happy. In Euthydemus, Socrates completes this 
thought, saying not only that wisdom is necessary for happiness, but that it is also 
sufficient. He says that the only determinant of whether one has a good and happy 
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life is the attainment of wisdom.
66
 And wisdom involves virtue attained by living in 
accordance with reason and as a result of proper philosophical insights.
67
 
Again one can see that the determination of eudaimonia delivered by 
Socrates is highly internal (external goods seem to be completely irrelevant), extreme 
in terms of personal control (happiness is identical with being virtuous, something 
extensively if not completely under one‘s own control), and, of course, highly 
moralized (the moral aspect of living a good life is emphasized, seemingly to the 
exclusion of everything else usually deemed to be a part of it). This trend toward 
greater personal control, internalization, and moralization, which found its extreme 
formulation in the thought of Socrates, does not seem inevitable, nor is it even 
obvious why happiness should have developed in this way. Darrin McMahon speaks 
of the trend toward personal control of happiness as a result of the ―freakish 
exception‖ in the history of the world prior to the Greeks that Greek political life 
represented.
68
 He sees a connection between ―a society in which free men had grown 
accustomed, through rational inquiry and open deliberation, to decide matters for 
themselves, and the effort to extend the sway of self-rule ever further, even to the 
long-standing domain of the gods.‖ This is a play on both the idea of happiness as a 
gift from the gods (i.e., the shades of meaning of happiness that move towards luck, 
blessedness, and being fortunate) and the opinion prominent in Greek society that the 
only ones who are truly and reliably happy were the gods. The experience of being 
able to better control their environment through politics may well have encouraged 
the Greeks
69
 to attempt to gain greater control over that which was inarguably most 
important to them—their individual eudaimonia.  
Perhaps internalization, as suggested above, is best seen as a partial result of 
a desire for greater control over happiness; internalization is certainly the most 
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effective way of protecting one‘s happiness from the vicissitudes of the external 
world. But it would be wrong to see this as behind-the-scenes scheming to subjugate 
eudaimonia. Instead, the movement to internalization began a long and deep-rooted 
debate about what is really important for us, things external to ourselves (i.e., goods 
that we obtain and other states of affairs in the world), things internal to ourselves 
(e.g., virtues, or—more hedonistically—the feelings we have as a result of the 
abovementioned goods and states of affairs), or a combination of both.  
If the answer is, for example, the feelings themselves, then it makes sense to 
aim directly at them without taking a detour through the external world. In fact, many 
of the later schools of ancient thought go in just this direction, advocating extreme 
modesty or even renunciation of the pursuit of external goods in favor of the 
attainment of inner peace. Humanity would continue to move its conceptions of 
happiness back and forth on this internal-external continuum all the way up to the 
Enlightenment, when the pendulum went very strongly in the direction of positive 
feelings and other internal states. Thus far three of the seven dimensions along which 
human happiness has moved since the philosophical turn have been introduced: 1) 
degree of personal control, 2) position on an internal-external continuum, and 3) 
degree of correspondence with morality or virtue.   
Before we move on to by far the most prominent of Socrates‘ students, Plato, 
it is worthwhile to pause and examine the views of one of Socrates‘ less prominent 
pupils, Aristippus of Cyrene. His views introduce another dimension along which 
happiness has wandered through the centuries: the role of happiness in a larger 
system of value. Aristippus is noteworthy because he does not share the common 
Greek view that eudaimonia is the highest good. Although none of Aristippus‘ 
writings survive, Diogenes Laertius maintains that Aristippus thought that individual 
pleasures were the highest good and that eudaimonia could only consist in the 
accumulation of individual pleasures. However eudaimonia is not choiceworthy in 
itself; it is only choiceworthy because of the individual experiences of pleasure, 
which were choiceworthy in themselves.
70
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Interestingly, and unlike other Greek authors, Aristippus‘ description of 
eudaimonia is very similar to some theories of what we now call happiness. 
Hedonistic theories of happiness capture fairly exactly what Aristippus intended: 
happiness is an accumulation of individual pleasurable episodes. Only, unlike most 
moderns, Aristippus rejected happiness as a goal and advocated instead the pursuit of 
individual (on his view) happiness-constituting moments of pleasure. In any event, 
the thought of Aristippus introduces another dimension along which happiness can 
move, namely, the dimension of value. In other words, what place does happiness 
hold in a hierarchy of goods? Happiness‘ position in a system of values would turn 
out to be a source of great strife in the philosophical debate following the time of the 
Greeks.  
Although Aristippus‘ view represents a rejection of the pre-eminent place of 
happiness in the pantheon of human values, it still does represent a strong 
internalization of the highest good and, thus is congruent with the movement seen in 
Socrates, Heraclitus, Democritus, and Anaximander. Whereas the pre-philosophical 
conception of the highest good referred to external goods (and thus to subjective 
states only by proxy), Aristippus, akin to his intellectual compatriots in the 
Enlightenment, thought he would be best served theoretically by going to the 
―source‖ of happiness, in other words, by concentrating on feelings themselves.  
Even more so than Aristippus or Socrates, it is left to Plato to develop a 
conception of happiness that is radically different than anything that has come before 
and in doing so, engender a desire that has returned to haunt and provoke Western 
thinkers and mystics. Plato‘s point of departure is not far from that of Socrates, in 
that Plato, too, believes that happiness is, or is the result of, a just and ethically 
oriented lifestyle.
71
 And Plato‘s Politeia makes the argument that this is, indeed, the 
case, despite the obvious difficulties, disadvantages, and even pain and suffering that 
could—in certain tragic situations—be the direct result of living a just life.  
Plato makes at least three major arguments for his identification of justice 
with happiness, the first of which is a bit more understandable than the other two. 
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First of all, Plato argues that justice is equivalent to a state of harmony in the soul, 
and therefore claims that justice involves a special sort of mental health or psychic 
well-being. This psychic pleasure is so great that it is never overcome by any 
problematic conditions external to the agent.
72
 Plato delivers several arguments for 
this, including the fact that the unjust man places no limit on his desires, and as a 
result of their limitless nature, they can never be fully satisfied. An orientation 
towards the world characterized by injustice pre-programs and guarantees 
dissatisfaction.
73
  
However, Plato‘s psychic harmony claim seems to result partly from his 
conviction that knowledge of the Form of the Good is necessary to be just and that a 
life dedicated to such knowledge brings with it the highest level of pleasure (although 
such a life is also choiceworthy in itself).
74
 This brings us to Plato‘s second 
argument. The first and the second argument, while concentrating on differing 
aspects of the relation of justice to happiness, really cannot be entirely separated from 
each other, but this second justification of his thesis is the one that Plato thinks most 
important.  
Plato‘s argument can be summarized in three major steps. Because Plato, like 
Socrates, has a highly intellectual view of virtue, being just and thus possessing 
harmony in one‘s soul involves a form of knowledge. This knowledge, like all 
knowledge according to Plato, is only possible through coming to know the Forms, 
and in this case specifically the Form of the Good. This equivalence between being 
just and knowing the Forms indicates that only philosophers can be truly just, for 
only philosophers have knowledge of the Forms. So what exactly is the relationship 
between the Form of the Good and our good?
75
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One answer to this question involves the relationship between our desires and 
knowledge of the form of the good. Horn proposes that by using this framework, 
Plato develops a teleological theory of happiness for the first time in the history of 
philosophy.
76
 Horn‘s interpretation runs as follows: Plato is interested in the relation 
of striving or desiring, an interest exhibited in his extensive treatment of the concept 
of eros in the Symposium. There he describes striving as always desiring something 
beautiful.
77
 Later ‗beautiful‘ is replaced by ‗good‘ in another formulation78 and in 
this formulation it is easier to see what Plato is up to. Plato sees striving as 
necessarily meaning striving towards something good. This does not necessarily 
mean morally good, but instead simply advantageous in some regard. The Form of 
the Good is that which is absolutely desired and thus the fulfillment of all striving. 
Attainment of knowledge of the Form of the Good is the point at which all striving 
and desiring ends. And this, claims Plato, can be called nothing other than 
eudaimonia, or happiness. Happiness is the final fulfillment of all human striving.  
Although (as one can imagine) such an occurrence results in pleasure (similar 
to that which Plato described in the first argument for the confluence of happiness 
and justice), this really is not the point. When confronted with that which ends all 
striving, additional pleasure means nothing because we, by definition, no longer have 
any desire for it – striving no longer exists for that pleasure. This is clearly an almost 
otherworldly conception; the average Greek would hardly have been able to imagine 
what it is like to have no further desires, let alone Plato‘s description of how to get 
there. It is not surprising that Plato resorted to analogy when pressed to describe the 
Form of the Good – this demand formed the impetus for his famous analogy of the 
cave, in which the role of the Form of the Good is described in almost mystical 
terms. 
So, too, in the Symposium where we find the ascent of the lover of knowledge 
described as moving from the love of the particular to the general and finally to the 
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Form of Beauty itself. Only then does the philosopher understand what true beauty is. 
As a result of the otherworldly feel of Plato‘s view of happiness, it may not come as 
a surprise that as a third argument for a tight relationship between justice and 
happiness, Plato indeed posits a maximally happy life after death for those who live 
justly.
79
 In this world and the next, Plato‘s central conception of happiness might be 
termed the ultimate desire satisfaction theory of happiness. Happiness is not attained 
when certain central desires are satisfied, as is the case in contemporary theories, but 
instead only when a state is reached in which all desires find their completion.  
Plato‘s radical and otherworldly vision introduces another dimension that was 
present in previous conceptions, but never with such importance: the temporal 
horizon of happiness. Plato‘s conception of eudaimonia is so demanding that its 
complete fulfillment is easiest to imagine in the afterlife. The issue of happiness after 
death was present in Herodotus‘ recounting of Solon‘s admonition to Croesus, but in 
contrast to Plato, the issue there was whether one could call Croesus eudaimon 
before he died, or whether one had to know the manner of his death before one could 
render a judgment. Following Plato, Aristotle will claim that events after one‘s death 
can affect one‘s eudaimonia as well. But in both the case of Solon and of Aristotle 
the issue is the question of the continuing of a currently excellent state to death and 
beyond. Plato‘s maximally demanding conception causes one to wonder if one can 
only be happy in the afterlife, and that things that are called eudaimonia before that 
are only weak approximations. This question foreshadows a great debate in the 
Christian church (and eventually among the Christian churches) about the temporal 
horizon of happiness.  
In much of his philosophy, Aristotle, Plato‘s most famous student, reacted to 
Plato and especially to some of the more otherworldly aspects of his thought. In fact, 
Aristotle seems to be targeting Socrates and Plato when he says, ―Some maintain, on 
the contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on the wheel, or fall into terrible 
misfortunes, provided that we are good. Whether they mean to or not, these people 
are talking nonsense.‖80 In contrast to this ―nonsense,‖ Aristotle elects to rehabilitate 
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a part of the Herodotic, Homeric, tragic vision by including external goods as 
essential to happiness.  
Nonetheless, happiness evidently also needs external goods to be added, as 
we said, since we cannot, or cannot easily do fine actions if we lack the 
resources. For, first of all, in many actions we use friends, wealth, political 
power just as we use instruments. Further, deprivation of certain [externals]—
for instance, good birth, good children, beauty—mars our blessedness. For we 
do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive 
or are ill-born, solitary, or childless; and we have it even less, presumably, if 
our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died. 
And so, as we have said, happiness would seem to need this sort of prosperity 
added also. That is why some people identify happiness with good fortune, 
and others identify it with virtue.
81
  
Thus, it appears that Aristotle is saying here that external goods belong to happiness 
both as enablers of fine or noble actions and as goods that simply belong to 
happiness, period.
82
 Whatever its role, Aristotle does regard good fortune (i.e., the 
presence of certain external goods) as essential for happiness – in consonance with 
Homer and Herodotus and in contrast to Plato and Socrates. This discussion 
regarding the worth of externals for fine action might appear strange without an 
understanding of how Aristotle conceives human happiness. Aristotle, like Plato, 
views happiness as the highest and final end. It is useful to detail his careful 
depiction of the formal characteristics of a final end, as this characterization also 
makes clear the difference between our conception of happiness and that of many of 
the ancients.
83
  
Aristotle characterizes happiness as the most complete or most perfect good, 
the self-sufficient good, and the most choiceworthy good.
84
 Happiness is the most 
perfect or complete good because it is never chosen for the sake of another good, but 
instead is always chosen for its own sake. Aristotle claims that we often choose 
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honor, virtue, and pleasure, among other things, both for themselves and because we 
think that they will make us happy.
85
 So although there are other intrinsic goods, 
happiness is the only one that is chosen for its sake alone.  
Happiness is self-sufficient according to Aristotle because it makes a certain 
life choiceworthy and not deprived of anything.
86
 This means that happiness alone 
causes a life to be fulfilled completely, causes a life to ―succeed.‖ And happiness is 
the most choiceworthy good because it cannot be added to other goods to make 
something better than itself. Happiness already includes everything that is 
choiceworthy and cannot be improved upon.
87
 
In sum, Aristotle characterizes happiness as the final end of striving in a 
human life, as sufficient for a good life, and as incapable of further improvement 
once it is in place. Aristotle‘s efforts to characterize a final end represent the most 
systematic attempt to simultaneously unify the divergent desires shaped by evolution 
mentioned earlier in the chapter and to take those desires and our valuing of the 
corresponding external goods seriously. It is the most systematic attempt because 
other philosophers like Socrates and Plato, who followed the natural philosopher‘s 
material monism with their own attempts at the construction of happiness monism, 
did so by ignoring large swathes of human desires and goals, either by saying that 
they were irrelevant to the truly virtuous, and thus, wise man (Socrates) or by saying 
that they were miniscule in comparison to the magnitude of the final end (Plato). 
Aristotle‘s attempt at unification centers on a form of activity that provides an 
explanation of why each external good forms a part of human happiness.  
Aristotle bases his argument on the human function, or the characteristic 
activity of a human being. Aristotle believes that a human being is above all, or 
uniquely, a rational agent, and for most of the Nicomachean Ethics this means that 
the function of a human being is living a life under the guidance of practical reason.
88
 
A life that is good for a human must be a life that is good for a being with such a 
function. For this reason, it must be a life well guided by practical reason, and thus a 
life lived in consonance with the virtues that are needed for achieving this good: 
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―…the human good proves to be an activity of the soul in accord with virtue‖ in a 
complete life.
89
 Important here is that Aristotle is the first to view eudaimonia as an 
activity. While Socrates, Plato and the Stoics, to name but a few, all view eudaimonia 
as a state of the soul (the possession of virtue, for example), Aristotle emphasizes 
that the possession of virtue or the virtues has never made anyone happy—only their 
practice does so. Aristotle‘s view of happiness as activity (energeia), in contrast to 
many others before and after him, also explains one of his reasons for claiming that 
someone who lacks certain external goods cannot be happy: this person is prevented 
from acting in accordance with virtue.
90
 
But this is not the whole story. In a strikingly Platonic twist, and after having 
spent virtually an entire book devoted to a very earthly and practical human 
happiness, Aristotle declares that the happiness he has expounded for most of the 
Nichomachean Ethics is a kind of secondary happiness. Primary happiness consists 
in philosophical or theoretical study, as this is the activity of the soul in accord with 
the highest virtue, namely sophia, the intellectual virtue.
91
 Because understanding is 
something divine, undertaking an activity of the soul in accordance with sophia 
allows one to raise oneself above the human level.
92
 Unlike Sophia, the 
corresponding highest practical virtue, phronesis, makes use of only a part of the 
soul, specifically the part that has to do with moving objects.
93
  
One result of Aristotle‘s great attempt to reconcile the disparate goods that 
we value or desire by appeal to their role for our characteristic activity was a 
considerable amount of interpretative confusion. One central debate involves the 
question of whether Aristotle sees eudaimonia as an inclusive good or as a dominant 
good. At issue is the relationship between happiness itself and the individual goods 
that Aristotle sees as belonging to, or being necessary, for happiness. Aristotle 
characterizes eudaimonia as the most complete or most perfect good, the self-
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sufficient good, and the most choiceworthy good; understandably, interpreters have 
since asked how such a good might be structured. Although the rough division of 
interpretations of this good into either dominant or inclusive positions is neither 
entirely accurate nor entirely clear, it serves as a good approximation to illustrate a 
few of the interpretative difficulties surrounding Aristotle‘s project of unification.  
Interpreters who more or less fall into the dominant camp are those who 
believe that, in the end, there is only one final answer to the child‘s chain of 
justificatory ―Why?‖ questions: every chain ends with the same justification – we do 
it for eudaimonia or happiness. Those of the inclusivist camp, on the other hand, 
argue that there are a number of differing ends to such a chain and all of those ends 
belong to eudaimonia or that eudaimonia itself is a package of aims, much like a 
successful vacation. J. L. Ackrill, a leading proponent of the inclusivist 
interpretation, thus argues that it makes little sense that we do everything for the sake 
of one single thing. To say that we have friends, or go on a walk, or do anything else 
because we want to be eudaimon simply means that we value each of these things as 
part of the all-inclusive package.
94
 Richard Kraut, who argues for the dominant 
interpretation, claims that Aristotle would not have thought of eudaimonia as 
something so unstructured. To use Gerald Hughes‘ example, we do not ―mow the 
lawn for the sake of [mowing the lawn and having a cup of tea and watching TV] or 
any other such unstructured collection.‖95 Kraut believes that Aristotle means that 
each part of eudaimonia has a causal effect on the achievement of the whole.
96
  
The existence of this debate, which is more involved than the oversimplified 
characterization that I have delivered here, is a tribute to the immense challenges 
involved in uniting the collection of evolved goals and desires handed down to us by 
the evolutionary successes of our ancestors. Because virtually no one accepts the 
function argument in its metaphysical form (i.e. few, if any, philosophers today 
believe in a project of unifying goods around the function of a human being), 
Aristotle‘s bold unifying attempt appears to fall short of the mark.  
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Before we turn to the fascinating conceptions of happiness offered by the 
Stoics and the Epicureans, it is important to emphasize that the positions now given 
the most attention in philosophy were not the only ones floating around in Athens at 
the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Aristotle himself mentions and rejects 
several alternatives drawn from what he calls endoxa, received views which are 
either widely held, or held by the wise.
97
 These include the idea that pleasure, or 
money, or honor is what comprises eudaimonia. Plato, too, shows a sensitivity to 
these views, usually represented by an interlocutor of Socrates.  
In the Gorgias, for example, Callicles argues for allowing one‘s appetites or 
desires to balloon and expand, and to be practically intelligent enough to satisfy all of 
them at their height.
98
 Like many desire satisfaction theorists, Callicles does not 
make a clear distinction about where the origin of value lies in his system: Is the 
satisfaction of desires intrinsically valuable, or does the satisfaction of desires merely 
represent the means to obtain that which truly comprises eudaimonia, namely, 
pleasure?
99
 In the same dialogue that bears his name, Gorgias maintains that the 
supreme good is freedom, and freedom is the power to satisfy all of one‘s desires. It 
is perhaps no accident that the two positions resemble one another as Callicles and 
Gorgias, are said to have both belonged to the sophists, a group of rhetoricians and 
ostensible teachers of aretê, or virtue.  
Although these desire-satisfaction theories of eudaimonia might remind us of, 
and are often framed in terms of, the desires and goals of the Homeric hero, their 
presentation by the sophists also represents a step away from the pre-philosophical 
happiness and from the pre-programmed goals that arose through the course of 
human evolution. The reason for this is a characteristic that belongs to the kinds of 
discussions in which the sophists were involved, in other words, a reason that 
belongs to philosophy proper. Their theories are a step away from Homeric happiness 
because the demands of the philosophical discussion created a level of abstraction 
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that clearly separated a theory of happiness as satisfied desires—regardless of 
whether the content of those desires includes specific external goods—from a theory 
that stipulated specific external goods to be obtained, regardless of the desires of the 
agent.  
Terence Irwin gives the example of Achilles to illustrate this: ―For a while 
Achilles seems to prefer the security of the divine life, even if he has to sacrifice 
honour and power to get it; but in the end he chooses the other elements of the divine 
life over security, and Homer leaves no doubt that this is recognized as the right 
choice for a hero to make.‖100 Again, the philosophical representation of desire 
satisfaction theory might appear to be close to the pre-philosophical conception, but 
in reality it is categorically different because it does not stipulate external goals to be 
attained. 
Even if the definitions of Callicles and Gorgias resulted in the same set of 
goods (honour, etc.), their abstract definition allows for a decision that one does not 
want certain of these things. So even in those theories that most closely resembled 
Herodotic happiness, the pursuit of the answer to the question of one‘s individual 
good was being answered at a reflective level that would allow for goals that were 
quite different from the external goals of Herodotic happiness and entirely contrary 
to goals one would expect to have arisen through natural selection. So, for better or 
for worse, the general atmosphere of philosophical discussion in Athens allowed for 
a rational emancipation from evolutionarily preprogrammed goals in all directions.  
The classical opponents of the sophists, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, 
had created grand visions of happiness, often described by their creators as divine. 
Yet precisely this description betrayed a disturbing fact about their theories: the 
outlook for attaining these ―godlike‖ states was, by all appearances, extremely bleak. 
Many scholars have seen the teachings of the Stoics and the Epicureans in part as a 
reaction to the inaccessibility of their predecessors‘ views of happiness. And in the 
teachings of both of these schools, the movement towards the internal in things called 
happiness solidified. Both schools took an earnest interest in the emotional states of 
their followers and much of their practical teachings involved ways of alleviating 
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human suffering. Like Socrates and Plato (and Aristotle to a slightly lesser degree), 
both schools made an attempt to increase human control over happiness, to wrest our 
fate from the fates. This control, however, was preached and practiced in a more 
accessible way than the philosophical high road advocated by Plato, Socrates and, in 
the end, Aristotle as well.  
Epicurus, for example, admitted unabashedly that ―pleasure is the beginning 
and goal of a happy life,‖101 while the Stoics remained true to the Socratic idea that 
virtue, and virtue alone, is determinative of happiness. Happiness for the Stoics is 
living in accordance with nature, and this is, for them, equivalent to living in 
accordance with virtue. This involves a distancing from one‘s normal concerns and 
adopting a somewhat more objective view of one‘s own desires, and, according to 
some Stoics, as equivalent, or nearly equivalent to the desires of others. Living in 
accordance with nature also meant freedom from suffering, or apatheia.
102
 Unlike the 
Epicureans, the Stoics reject the value of pleasure and pain as witnessed by Seneca: 
―The happy man is content with his present lot, no matter what it is.‖103 Thus it 
seems that two elements are in play in Stoic discussions of happiness. Happiness is 
living virtuously, or living in accordance with nature. Such living, however, also 
results in a ―contentment with one‘s lot‖ or a kind of life-satisfaction or desire-
satisfaction – being content with one‘s life, or what one has, no matter what external 
circumstances obtain.  
What unites the two doctrines of Stoicism and Epicureanism is, perhaps 
surprisingly, their asceticism. Epicurus does not wish his followers to pursue the 
pleasure of the debauch, but instead advocates the pruning of desire. He believes our 
true desires to be very limited in nature and exclaims that he who is not satisfied with 
frugal food and drink, shelter, and a modicum of security ―is satisfied with 
nothing.‖104 In this sense his Stoic counterparts might almost be able to agree with 
him; both schools saw a problem in unsatisfied desires (even if the Stoic difficulty 
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was more morally motivated) and expounded on practices to distance oneself from 
one‘s desires or to reduce them in number and intensity.  
The Stoics and the Epicureans are best placed to draw attention to another 
dimension along which happiness would shift after the end of the classical period: the 
extension of the group of people ―eligible for‖ or addressed by any given theory of 
happiness. While for Socrates and Plato the highest happiness was equivalent to the 
highest sort of philosophical insight, Aristotle was a bit more generous to non-
philosophers. Although he maintained that philosophical activity was the means of 
highest happiness, virtuous activity held out hope for those of a non-philosophical 
bent to achieve a kind of secondary happiness.  
The Stoics and the Epicureans provided a conception of happiness accessible 
to an even wider circle of people, offering to cure them of their desires and so render 
them eudaimon.
105
 These two schools drove the internalization of eudaimonia 
forward among a wide group of people by concentrating in a straightforward way on 
the internal states of the persons it offered to help. Not only was a wider circle 
addressed by the dramatic lowering of the intellectual bar, but the formal 
requirements for taking part in Epicurean and Stoic schools were also loosened. The 
Stoics preached the universal kinship of all humankind, and, like Epicurus, opened 
their doors to women and slaves.  
This principle of eligibility for happiness would also be a major feature of the 
view of happiness that rapidly overtook the successes of Epicurean and Stoic 
thought: Christianity. And, although it seems that one might not be able to internalize 
happiness in a more radical way than was done by Socrates or some of the Stoics 
(Cicero did, indeed, argue that the Stoic with perfect virtue would be happy even on 
the rack
106
), Christianity took the internalization of happiness to a never before 
imagined extreme.  
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Chapter 3: Emancipation from Evolution II – 
Christianity and the Tragedy of Enlightenment 
Happiness 
 
 While Stoic and Epicurean invocations on leading a good life were well-
received, their success as doctrines and their success in helping their followers cope 
with a life rife with pain and suffering paled in comparison with the wild success and 
the transformative power of Christianity. Darrin McMahon claims that some of this 
success arose as a result of Christianity‘s facility with regard to what psychologists 
now call hedonic inversion.
107
  
Hedonic inversion, a new term in the vocabulary of psychology, refers to the 
enjoyment of feelings or emotions normally avoided or feared. A harmless example 
is the enjoyment some people feel watching horror movies. Many of them really do 
report being scared, but also report enjoying the experience of being scared. The 
Stoics claimed that one could be happy despite being on the rack (Socrates and Plato 
might have claimed this or something like it as well); astoundingly, Christianity 
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wielded the power of convincing people that one could be happy because one was on 
the rack. McMahon‘s interpretation follows.  
McMahon begins with an account of the early Christian martyrs Perpetua and 
her personal slave, Felicitas. He recounts the day of their death in the Ampitheatre of 
Carthage in which—before uncomprehending crowds—the martyrs rejoiced in being 
scourged and taunted and went joyfully to their deaths. They saw their pain as a 
blessing because it enabled them to partake in the suffering of their savior, Jesus of 
Nazareth, and so attain the salvation that he promised. Jesus‘ promise of eternal 
felicity in a life after this one made possible a radical reinterpretation of the meaning 
of external events, one seen most explicitly in the beatitudes. The appeal of the 
apatheia of the Stoics paled in comparison.  
Makarios, the word that forms the beginning of each of the beatitudes can be 
translated as ―blessed,‖ but just as easily as ―happy.‖ Indeed, many of the Greek 
philosophers mentioned above, including Plato and Aristotle, used makarios and 
eudaimonia interchangeably. Turning the eudaimonia of the Homeric hero on its 
head, Christianity proclaims: 
Happy are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 
Happy are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. 
Happy are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. 
Happy are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be 
filled. 
Happy are the merciful, for they will receive mercy. 
Happy are the pure in heart, for they will see God. 
Happy are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. 
Happy are those who are persecuted for righteousness‘s sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven. (Matthew 5:3-11) 
Many of the elements that played a role in the strongly external happiness of 
Herodotus and Homer are renounced here in favor of their opposites. Through the 
promise of eternal happiness after death, and the narrative of achieving such 
happiness through temporal suffering, Christianity, the foremost symbol of which 
was an instrument of torture, surpassed the appeal of the classical schools as a way to 
deal with the vicissitudes of the world.  
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Together with original sin as an explanation for the suffering of this world, 
the hedonic inversion of Christianity reached even such intellectually world-weary 
scholars as Aurelius Augustinus of Hippo, better known as St. Augustine. Augustine 
was one of the first to give Christ‘s narrative a theoretical foundation and to put a 
Christian spin on the classical question of the degree of control an individual has 
over his own happiness. He emphasized that eternal happiness was a gift from God to 
the chosen few at the time of their death. Thus the cycle on the issue of personal 
control seems to have come full circle, this time having even more weight than in the 
discussions of the Greeks and Romans, for whom the issue was chiefly a question of 
personal control versus the influence of the gods in this life. Since much more was at 
stake for Christians (namely, an eternity), it is not surprising that the debate about the 
amount of personal control one had over eternal happiness arose time and time again, 
and that it did so with increasing vehemence and venom. The pendulum was pushed 
in one direction or the other, developing numerous heresies and eventually (in 
combination with other factors) causing a permanent rift in the church at the time of 
the Reformation.  
However, the rise of the post-life emphasis in the Christian concept of 
happiness forced the question of what to do with things that look like happiness in 
this life. Despite the rejoicing one should do about the prospect of eternal life, and 
the power of hedonic inversion that Christianity offered the faithful, Augustine, 
himself, was pessimistic about the prospects for happiness in this life. He saw 
original sin as a transformative act that forever barred our way to earthly happiness. 
Christians could only take comfort in the ―happiness of hope,‖ the thought that this 
suffering was in the end leading them to God. 
The question of earthly happiness came to a head in the thought of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, who, confronted with the intellectually powerful system of 
Aristotle and his emphasis on worldly happiness, held out the answer of imperfect 
happiness in this life and perfect happiness in the next. This duplex felicitas formed a 
kind of compromise between the schools of classical philosophy and the headlong 
dive into (occasionally hedonically redeemed) suffering of early Christianity. A great 
many further developments occurred in conceptions of happiness between late 
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Christianity and the Enlightenment, but to the best of my knowledge, no further 
significant dimensions were introduced until the very subjective conception of 
happiness developed in the Enlightenment.
108
 I now turn to the Enlightenment, as its 
conceptions of happiness provide the basis and the background for our current use of 
the word and thus the background for the project of this essay. Enlightenment 
conceptions of happiness also provide the backdrop for an elucidation of the tragic 
nature of our contemporary conception of happiness.  
  
The Enlightenment 
The Enlightenment and its intellectual progeny pushed happiness strongly 
toward the subjective end of the scale, and, through their stubborn insistence on 
happiness as a highly internal and subjective phenomenon, they successfully 
unseated happiness from its position as the highest individual good.
109
 This was not 
their intention. Many (though certainly not all) Enlightenment philosophers 
continued to see happiness as the highest good, a view expressed most explicitly by 
those following in their immediate intellectual wake, namely, the Utilitarians. The 
Utilitarians stated explicitly that happiness was the bearer of value and, as such, was 
the good that was to be maximized. Eventually, the theories of the earliest 
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Utilitarians ran into the hard wall of practice, and it became unavoidably clear (even 
to some of them) that people care deeply about external goods as well.  
Nonetheless, the ancient human dissatisfaction with a collection of divergent 
external goals and internal desires, as well as no real way to decide among them, 
provoked many Enlightenment philosophers, like some of the ancients, to again try to 
create an internal unity among all of our disparate goals and desires. In making the 
internal the point of departure for their theories of happiness, Enlightenment thinkers 
often did not distinguish clearly between the actual satisfaction of desires, the 
contentment or positive emotional state (sometimes reduced to a very coarsely 
conceived pleasure) that was supposed to result from desire satisfaction, and a 
judgment about whether enough of our desires have been satisfied.  
Immanuel Kant‘s writings provide a good example of this. He defines 
happiness as ―the satisfaction of all our desires [Neigungen].‖110 In a similar vein, 
Kant says the following about happiness: ―All inclinations [Neigungen] taken 
together (which can be brought into a fairly tolerable system, whereupon their 
satisfaction is called happiness)…‖111 Other definitions of Kant‘s, however, go in the 
direction of positive emotional states. In the Groundwork, for example, he says that 
happiness is complete well-being (Wohlbefinden) and contentment (Zufriedenheit) 
with one‘s state.112 It is unclear if he means a feeling of contentment, or a judgment 
that one is content, or both. These elements are clear in another definition from the 
Metaphysics of Morals in which he claims that happiness includes ―constant well-
being, a pleasant life, [and] complete satisfaction [Zufriedenheit] with one‘s 
condition…‖113 Many Enlightenment figures shared Kant‘s orientation to the 
question of happiness, writing as if fulfilled desires were equivalent to or 
automatically corresponded with positive emotional states.  
Kant is also a good example of a philosopher who understood that, contrary 
to some of his utilitarian counterparts, emotions cannot be all that matter to us. As far 
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as happiness as the highest good, Kant clearly rejects this in favor of a complex 
position in which happiness plays several roles, the clearest of which might be 
rendered in an oversimplified manner by saying that happiness is a good that can 
cause evil, but only when the desire for it, through the fulfillment of our inclinations, 
takes precedence over the obedience to the moral law.
114
 But Enlightenment 
happiness clearly could not possibly exhaust all that we value, and the priority of the 
moral law illustrates this in Kant‘s thought.  
Kant‘s thoughts on the subject represent a clear example of happiness losing 
its place as the highest good. As mentioned above, however, the Utilitarians held 
views similar to Kant‘s on happiness, yet continued to see in it the origins of all 
value. At least one of those who in his theory and personal life attempted to aim at 
the highly subjective happiness of the Enlightenment famously ran into considerable 
trouble. John Stuart Mill was the son of James Mill—a Utilitarian and a formidable 
thinker in his own right, as well as a close friend of Jeremy Bentham.
115
 John Stuart 
Mill claims to have been brought up without religion, but in his Autobiography, he 
says the following about his experience of reading Bentham‘s thoughts: 
When I laid down the last volume…I had become a different being. The 
―principle of utility,‖ understood as Bentham understood it…fell exactly into 
its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary 
component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my 
conceptions of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; 
in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; in the inculcation and 
diffusion of which could be made the principle outward purpose of a life.
116
 
For a time it seemed that this discovery did indeed lend purpose to Mill‘s life, but 
then a rapid turnaround occurred, and Mill fell into a state of despondence that 
probably had multiple causes. Mill asked himself if all of his hopes and dreams for 
reform and the happiness that would result from such reform were to be realized, 
would it be a ―great joy and happiness‖ for him. He had no choice but to conclude 
that it would not. After this realization: ―My heart sank within me: the whole 
foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to 
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have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, 
and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have 
nothing left to live for.‖117 After losing faith in happiness as an end, Mill found 
comfort (and rich feeling beyond the pleasure and pain espoused by Bentham) in 
Romantic poetry. Despite Mill‘s claims to have fully recovered his old faith in 
happiness, McMahon argues that this seems not to have fully been the case. Many 
philosophers have agreed with him, seeing in Mill‘s ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ pleasures a 
criterion other than simply hedonic quality or intensity.  
 Indeed, after Mill‘s confession of doubt in the faith of utilitarianism, another 
striking passage makes his ―recovery‖ unclear: 
I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all 
rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only 
to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I 
thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own 
happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even 
on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means but as itself an ideal end. 
Aiming thus at something else they find happiness by the way….Ask yourself 
whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, 
not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life….This 
theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life.
118
 
If not contradictory, Mill‘s assertion that he ―never wavered in his conviction that 
happiness is…the end of life‖ and his statement that the only chance to achieve this 
was to treat some other end as ―the purpose of life,‖ at the very least raises the 
question why this should be and whether the value of that other external end really 
can be entirely derivative of the value of happiness. Similarly, in a comment on 
Bentham published shortly after Bentham‘s death, Mill claimed: 
At present we shall only say, that while, under proper explanations, we 
entirely agree with Bentham in his principle, we do not hold with him that all 
right thinking on the details of morals depends on its express assertion. We 
think utility, or happiness, much too complex and indefinite an end to be 
sought except through the medium of various secondary ends…119  
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And the statements of Mill‘s own theory cast even more doubt on the hegemony of 
feeling in a system of values: ―It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.‖120 Given all of these 
statements, it is difficult to understand why the ends by which happiness is pursued 
are secondary, and why they do not have a value in themselves, even if happiness is 
the purported result of their achievement. 
As Mill‘s conundrum hints, many Enlightenment thinkers went too far in 
their espousal of a highest good composed simply of hedonic states. And it was only 
in the past century that elements central to the thought of many figures of the 
Enlightenment, such as psychological hedonism, have been rejected through widely 
accepted counterarguments like that involving Robert Nozick‘s ―experience 
machine.‖121 The consequence of this, however, was not a rehabilitation of an earlier, 
more inclusive conception of happiness.  
Because of the plurality of values in modern society, a coherent concept of 
one‘s highest good has been difficult to formulate. Most philosophers share the view 
of Richard Kraut when he says that a concept of the highest good for an individual, in 
other words, something akin to Aristotle‘s conception of eudaimonia, would require 
us to know things that we do not (and perhaps cannot).
122
 For this reason, the concept 
of happiness has retained its strong overtones of internality and subjectivity while 
losing its position as a highest good. With psychological sophistication typical of his 
writings, Kant foresaw the tragedy of the pursuit of Enlightenment happiness in a 
more extensive way than Mill. More of his thoughts on happiness form the starting 
point for our second evolutionary interlude. 
 
The Evolution of Desire (and not Happiness) 
 The evolutionary interlude in the previous chapter began with the following 
claim of Immanuel Kant: ―What the human being understands as happiness…would 
still never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the sort to call a halt anywhere 
in possession and enjoyment and to be satisfied.‖ It ended with the widely disparate 
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package of goods that we seem to desire and the attempt of the Greek philosophers to 
find or create unity among them. Now that the Enlightenment conception of 
happiness has been outlined, this evolutionary interlude will explain the tragedy 
involved in the conception of happiness that the Enlightenment bequeathed us. John 
Stuart Mill cast doubt on the efficacy of a direct pursuit of happiness; Kant‘s 
pessimism goes even further in doubting the feasibility of the pursuit of happiness in 
its entirety. Although a bit overstated, there is a great deal of truth in Kant‘s claims 
about our nature, and the explanatory background for this truth involves a series of 
evolved mechanisms in humans, that, were it not for the lack of intentionality of 
natural selection, one would have to describe as devious.  
 Kant‘s pessimistic view of the pursuit of happiness is situated in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment and his observations do not end with the quotation above. 
After expressing his pessimism concerning the possibility of the attainment of 
happiness, Kant also rejects happiness as a possible final end of humanity: ―The 
production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of 
his freedom) is culture. Thus only culture can be the ultimate end that one has cause 
to ascribe to nature in regard to the human species (not its own earthly 
happiness...)‖123 Culture is also defined by Kant as ―the aptitude and skill for all sorts 
of ends for which he can use nature…‖124 Clearly, culture is a broad concept for 
Kant, but it includes among others things our knowledge and ability to manipulate 
the world (as well as our moral freedom). Although according to Kant culture can be 
seen as the ultimate end of the human species (as it clearly is not made for 
happiness), culture is not truly our end: ―But with the progress of this culture….the 
end of nature itself, even if it is not our end, is hereby attained.‖125 So, bizarrely, 
although culture or the building up of culture is ―our‖ ultimate end, this is a purely 
descriptive assessment of the human species – it is a description of what humans tend 
to do, as opposed to what they intend to do as seen from the perspective of the 
individual agent.  
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When viewed from the perspective of the agent, things can look quite 
different. Even in the case of those agents who do not have the intention or goal of 
building up culture, their individual undertakings to acquire skills and create tools 
that allow us to manipulate the world are often justified as a means to achieve their 
true intention of being happy. However, Kant‘s contention seems to be that even 
when we aim at happiness (either directly as Mill described himself before his crisis, 
or indirectly by pursuing skills, objects of value, knowledge, etc.), it is difficult, if 
not impossible to attain. In the process of striving, the tactics that we employ to attain 
happiness serve to build up culture.  
Take John, for example. John believes that having a partner, a family, and a 
decent house in a good neighborhood will make him happy, and he pursues these 
goals by studying engineering. He earns money by developing newer, better, sleeker 
ball bearings, he weds his partner, has children, and buys a good house in a decent 
neighborhood. However, through the difficulties that seem to almost inevitably come 
with marriage, he and his wife irritate each other frequently, one of his kids is being 
disruptive at school and might have a drug problem, and his work has grown 
monotonous. Kant‘s point is fairly clear: culture is often progressing as a result of the 
efforts of individual agents, and individual agents cause that progress through their 
efforts often because they believe that it will bring them happiness. In terms of 
Kant‘s Enlightenment view of happiness, which is highly subjective, highly internal, 
and often strongly affective, the anticipated payoff for the achievement of these 
external goals is frequently disappointing, if not downright awful. 
 Kant puzzles at this – why should a creature exist which believes to be 
pursuing one thing and from the outside almost seems to be pursuing another. And 
although it is extremely successful in its pursuit of its non-goal, its pursuit of its 
actual goal is very often unsuccessful: ―It would be possible for the happiness of 
rational beings in the world to be an end of nature, and in that case it would be its 
ultimate end. At least one cannot understand a priori why nature should not be so 
arranged, since at least as far as we can understand this effect would be quite possible 
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by means of its mechanism.‖126 One goal of the rest of this chapter is to provide an 
explanation for nature‘s recalcitrance so well captured in Kant‘s elaborations above. 
In the first evolutionary interlude, I introduced one role of the emotions as 
specific, content-oriented, emotional and motivational responses to situations that 
recurred again and again in our ancestral environment (e.g., a large predator running 
at us (fear), the (potential) infidelity of a mate and corresponding danger of lack of 
support and resources (jealousy), etc.). Tooby and Cosmides added that emotions are 
the ―solution to the problem of mechanism coordination‖ between our competing 
domain-specific motivational programs.
127
 I also mentioned the conception of 
pleasure and pain, as parts of evolved regulatory systems that encouraged or 
discouraged the pursuit of external goals that were either advantageous or 
disadvantages for our differential reproductive success.
128
 This might not come as a 
surprise to anyone, but an important realization is missing from this picture.  
A prominent evolutionary theorist, Randolph Nesse, describes this idea as the 
one that people have the most trouble accepting of the many that he explains: ―More 
difficult still is the recognition that selection does not shape emotion regulation 
systems for our benefit, and that the motives we experience often benefit our genes at 
the expense of the quality of our lives.‖129 In other words, what is advantageous or 
disadvantages for our differential reproductive success can sometimes benefit us and 
sometimes harm us, and therefore the process of natural selection does not 
necessarily result in qualities that are good for us as agents, that is to say, good from 
our perspective.  
Indeed, Nesse co-founded the field of Darwinian medicine which, among 
other things, illustrates how a good many adaptations can be harmful to one‘s 
health.
130
 Nesse put it succinctly in an address to the American Psychiatric 
Association, ―If there is ever an adaptation that increases differential reproductive 
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success at the cost of health and happiness, then too bad for health and happiness.‖131 
This may seem bizarre at first glance as health (if not happiness) seems to be 
important for differential reproductive success. However, health, for itself, is not a 
end that is selected for by natural selection. Instead, health is selected for because it 
allows the individual to survive long enough to reproduce (as well as to attract a mate 
in the case of more highly developed animals). Health is only selected for because of 
its value for differential reproductive success. 
But because health does correlate strongly with differential reproductive 
success, it suffers little under its hegemony. The happiness of the Enlightenment 
philosophers, on the other hand, is a different story altogether. The feelings (such as 
anxiety) and corresponding thoughts that seem to most often conflict with 
Enlightenment happiness are actually parts of motivational systems that cause 
organisms to leave evolutionarily disadvantageous circumstances and to avoid harm 
in the future. So the aversive nature of anxiety and other negative feelings is actually 
very advantageous (often, but not always, both from the point of view of the agent 
and for the agent‘s differential reproductive success).132 This fact alone, obviously, 
does not provide difficulties for happiness, but the need for such defenses in the 
ancestral environment (and possibly ours as well) was so extensive that negative 
emotions make up a large part of our emotional repertoire.  
Daniel Nettle points out that of Paul Ekman‘s widely hailed six basic 
emotions of anger, fear, surprise, joy, disgust, and sadness (basic because they are 
recognized the world over simply by observing facial expression produced by the 
emotion),
133
 four are negative, one can go either way (surprise), and one is positive. 
This distribution has to do with the more specific roles of the basic negative emotions 
as compared to positive emotions. Fear, for example, is a response to an occurrent 
danger and results in fight or flight tendencies. Disgust is a response to potential 
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contamination with damaging substances and results in avoidance, vomiting, and 
spitting out.
134
  
This numerical superiority of negative emotions combines with another fact 
widely cited in evolutionary theory called ‗the smoke dectector principle.‘135 Coined 
by Randolph Nesse, this principle attempts to explain why ―we are all designed in 
ways that leave us likely to experience negative emotions, often for no apparent 
reason.‖136 Nesse explains that the fear response in the ancestral environment, even if 
it erupts into a panicked flight from the area of berry-picking, are relatively 
inexpensive biologically, and crucially, very inexpensive compared to the harm 
against which they protect.  
Nesse uses the example of being ―clawed by a tiger‖ and the potential damage 
(up to and including death) that such an incident could create as compared with the 
circa 200 calories that a flight reaction would cost. In a rough estimation, he claims 
that it will be worthwhile to flee in panic whenever there is a greater than 1% chance 
that a tiger is in the vicinity. This means that a normal fear system will engage 99 
times for every one time a tiger is actually present. In this way our fear system is akin 
to our preferences for the design of a smoke detector. As with false fear responses, 
we are willing to accept a smoke detector‘s many false alarms from smoking toast, 
cigarettes, and matches because we want a smoke detector that gives us sufficiently 
early warning about every actual fire.
137
 This is the reason, then, why we are 
designed to experience frequent and multifarious negative affect: because in our 
ancestral environment (and in many cases today as well) such affect was extremely 
useful for survival, reproduction, and for the reproductive success of those who share 
one‘s genes. Of course, frequent and multifarious negative affect is not what one 
would wish for in a being striving to attain highly subjective and affect-oriented 
Enlightenment happiness.  
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Even greater problems exist with those emotions that play a key implicit or 
explicit compositional role in an Enlightenment conception of happiness: positive 
emotions. The realm of positive emotions is what gives Kant‘s pessimism its 
credibility. In comparison with fear or disgust, for example, it is less immediately 
clear what role positive emotions evolved to play. Eckman‘s only basic positive 
emotion, joy, for example, can be experienced in many different circumstances, but it 
does not necessarily lead to any specific behaviors. Why would someone with a 
capacity for joy have a selective advantage over someone who lacked such a 
capacity?  
Another answer that Nesse and many others have provided involves the 
regulation of approach related behaviors. When an opportunity for something 
beneficial arises, several decisions have to be made: 1) whether to pursue the 
opportunity, 2) how to pursue the opportunity (e.g. walking vs. running), 3) at what 
point to stop pursuing the opportunity (e.g. when rate of return on gathering does fall 
below calories expended), and 4) what subsequent activity to undertake.
138
  
This goal-approach model of positive emotion has been carefully worked out 
by numerous psychologists over the course of decades. This work is too extensive to 
be elaborated on here, but suffice it to say that Nesse‘s view of positive affect as less 
of a response to domain-specific situations, but instead as a general response to a 
wide variety of situations in which goals of the agent are relevant and pursuable, has 
considerable empirical backing.
139
 Goals in this sense should not be conceived too 
narrowly, and certainly do include social goals of being loved, feeling trust, feeling 
important, etc. However, positive feelings‘ linkage to goals has an interesting—and 
for those interested in Enlightenment happiness—disturbing effect on our experience 
of positive feelings.  
The basic principle is: positive emotions involved in the pursuit and the 
attainment of goals should not last very long. There were very few situations (in the 
ancestral environment) in which no further attempts to improve one‘s situation would 
have resulted in a positive impact on differential reproductive success. And if 
positive emotions exist to encourage us and to provide a reward for pursuing goals, 
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then they should diminish quickly afterwards to encourage us to pursue other goals 
and attend to other concerns. Using this logic, Daniel Nettle argues that our 
motivational program would be very dysfunctional if it did not have a built in shut-
down mechanism after a period of time. This is, in fact, exactly what we find in 
human beings.  
Using this perspective, it is possible to bring together much of the most 
interesting work currently being undertaken in psychology. Psychologists have long 
known about habituation (becoming accustomed to a certain stimulus involved 
diminished response), but the area in which habituation has been especially striking 
has been in the area of the positive emotions. When researchers now talk of a 
‗hedonic treadmill,‘ what they mean is this: People strive for external material goods 
and the realization of events. When they achieve the wished-for object or outcome, 
they experience a rush of positive affect. Within a very short period of time, 
however, they return to their baseline level of affect, in the case of almost all goods 
that can be attained. Be it gaining tenure at a university, earning significantly more 
money as a result of a promotion, or even winning the lottery, individuals‘ affective 
state rapidly returns to baseline.
140
 There are some exceptions to this, like getting 
married (mostly for men), but with the vast majority of events, this hedonic 
adaptation to the new situation occurs (and of course, even in marriage this can and 
does occur).  
This state of affairs has led some to postulate a ‗happiness set-point,‘ a level 
of happiness to which we always return after significant life events.
141
 A correlate of 
this is the finding that many demographic factors, including some for the attainment 
of which we exert a great deal of effort such as income, have little effect on one‘s 
level of happiness.
142
 Nettle describes the workings of our emotions in the following 
way: ―Therefore evolution should (a) never make us completely happy, or not for 
long; and (b) make us quickly adapt to the baseline of the best thing we have at the 
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moment, and focus on the possibility of getting something better in the future, even if 
we don‘t know what that is yet.‖143 It would be troublesome enough if this 
represented the extent of the workings of the behavioral approach system. 
Regrettably, there is an added twist: we, from the perspective of the agent, fail to 
understand the system in a way that, were the system intentionally designed, would 
be quite cruel. 
A great deal of research has been done on a phenomenon called affective 
forecasting, a concept introduced by Tim Wilson and Daniel Gilbert. What they have 
shown is that we greatly overestimate the effect a positive or negative event will have 
on us emotionally.
144
 Not only do we expect more from our successes than we 
actually receive, but we also fail to learn from repeated experiences with this 
phenomenon. By virtue of what Wilson and Gilbert call a retrospective impact bias, 
we believe even after the fact that events had a far greater positive affective impact 
on us than they actually did. This has been shown for a wide variety of 
phenomena.
145
 
To sum all of this up, a situation exists in which happiness returns to a 
baseline level shortly after the attainment of something good in order to keep us 
wanting more. And, to make matters worse, it seems that we have a built-in 
mechanism that keeps us from realizing the extent of this habituation; we know this 
because people from all walks of life, and at all ages, predict that positive events will 
result in a positive emotion of greater intensity and of far greater duration than is 
actually the case. Part of this mechanism also keeps us from learning that we are 
again and again getting much less in terms of positive affect than we always expect, 
and so many of us remain trapped in the illusion that around the next corner, after the 
next success, with the next partner, after the next promotion, lies happiness – a 
devious system if ever there was one. 
In this way, Kant‘s (often underappreciated) piercing psychological insight 
finds its long sought after explanation. Compare Kant‘s statements from the Critique 
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of the Power of Judgment with that of contemporary evolutionary psychologist 
Daniel Nettle: 
I…argue…that these effects are probably not faults in the happiness 
programme; they are the way it is designed. That is, the purpose of the 
happiness programme in the human mind is not to increase human happiness; 
it is to keep us striving. That is why it tells us so clearly that if we just had a 
£30,000 salary, we would be much happier than we are now on £20,000, but 
as soon as we achieve that goal, whispers that perhaps it was actually closer 
to £40,000 that is really needed to guarantee lasting bliss.[italics mine]
146
  
This is why the pursuit of the Enlightenment conception of internal, subjective, and 
affective happiness is so problematic: Not only was what Nettle calls the ―happiness 
motivational system‖ not designed for this purpose, but this system also possesses 
built-in mechanisms to work against just this long-term positive feeling for which 
many of those who seek happiness strive.  
Using the same logic one can also understand why someone like Mill might 
have such difficulty taking direct aim at happiness. Although, as Nettle suggested, 
the system would certainly be dysfunctional if it did not return to a base level and 
encourage us to seek our happiness in further things and situations, it would be 
doubly dysfunctional if agents could successfully manipulate their feelings directly. 
If this were possible, then there would be no need to pursue the external goods (in the 
widest sense), whose acquisition is the entire point of the development of the 
motivational system.  
In fact, psychologists have long known about a phenomenon called brain 
stimulation reward, which models something like this attempt to aim directly at our 
happiness. James Olds was the first to show that when rats have the opportunity to 
stimulate some brain regions, for example the lateral hypothalamus, they will prefer 
to do so rather than to attend to their bodily needs such as drinking water, even after 
fluid deprivation.
147
 This effect, known as brain stimulation reward, has been found 
in all vertebrates studied.
148
 The detrimental effects of boundless access to brain 
stimulation reward runs parallel to the detrimental effects on the health, well-being, 
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and differential reproductive success of one of our ancestors who could manipulate 
his emotions without taking the detour through the world of evolutionarily 
advantageous external goods.  
Returning to the point Nesse made at the outset of this interlude, not all of our 
desires are good for us. In addition to the systematic psychological barriers to 
Enlightenment happiness illustrated above, many of the things that we are strongly 
motivated to pursue often have almost no, or even a negative impact, on our 
happiness. We persist in their pursuit, all the while thinking that their attainment will 
affect our happiness positively. The goals of survival, reproductive success, and the 
survival and reproductive success of those closely related to the individual in 
question are the ―goals‖ that have most clearly influenced the content of those things 
that we are motivated to want. Nesse again:  
The systems that regulate our emotions were shaped not to benefit individuals 
or the species, but only to maximize the transmission of the genes themselves. 
Thus, every species experiences a tension between efforts to maintain 
individual welfare and efforts to maximize reproductive success…We 
humans experience the situation much more acutely, feeling ourselves drawn 
into status competitions, driven to pursue sexual partners, and subject to envy 
despite our very best intentions. Many of these tendencies benefit our genes 
but not our individual selves. The dissatisfactions arising from these unending 
pursuits drain our capacities for happiness; however, even many people who 
know this still find themselves unable to enjoy what they have because of 
their efforts to get what their genes motivate them to want.
149
 
 
Although a feeling of envy, for example, was probably useful in our ancestral 
environment as an impetus to attain goods that could increase one‘s probability of 
survival or attractiveness as a partner, the same feeling of envy is not going to be 
advantageous to the survival of the vast majority of people living in industrialized 
western democracies. It will, however, cause a great deal of psychological distress 
and time and effort spent striving after things that clearly do not bring happiness. 
Nesse continues: ―The competition for scarce elite social roles requires not only 
extreme efforts, but also extravagant displays whose significance is proportional to 
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their expense.‖150 David Buss, in pointing out one of what he calls the ‗original sins‘ 
of natural selection, emphasizes that it is important to remember that in a closed gene 
pool, reproductive differentials comprise the engine of evolutionary change. Because 
selection operates on proportion and differences, ―one person‘s gain is often another 
person‘s loss…humans have evolved psychological mechanisms designed to inflict 
costs on others, to gain advantage at the expense of others, to delight in the downfall 
of others, and to envy those who are more successful at achieving the goals toward 
which they aspire.‖ And Buss concludes that ―These competitive functions have 
come at the cost of conflict.‖151 
In sum, our current predicament does seem to qualify as tragic: we are caught 
in the pursuit of an Enlightenment-inspired conception of happiness when our system 
of desiring, being motivated, acting, and achieving is premised on the rapid 
deterioration of just those positive feelings whose presence are often a large part of 
the criteria for such happiness. We are designed to a large extent to continue striving 
and a grab bag of evolutionarily advantageous psychological tricks very often 
prevents us from realizing this and modifying our actions. 
  
Conclusion 
 The happiness motivational system seems to have been working exactly as it 
should have before the first philosophers arrived on the scene. The purpose of the 
system was to motivate us to pursue goods and situations external to ourselves that 
were advantageous for our differential reproductive success. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that pre-philosophical happiness was an ideal representation of just this: a 
collection of external goods, all of which had very directly to do with an individual 
human male‘s differential reproductive success. Through time, the increase in 
intelligence that brought us the unusual evolutionary success that we now enjoy also 
gave birth to a conflict of a unique kind.  
While this increased intellectual capacity gave us unprecedented advantages 
in creative problem-solving (creation of tools, development of hunting, social, and 
                                                 
150
 Ibid. 
151
 D. M. Buss, "The Evolution of Happiness," American Psychologist 55, no. 1 (2000): 18. 
 69 
war strategies), it also had the revolutionary consequence that we alone, among the 
species of this planet, were able to reflect on what is really good for us. We, in 
contrast to all other known products of natural selection, found ourselves in the 
position of being able call our evolutionarily preformed ends into question. Precisely 
this is what the founders of western philosophy did. 
As a result of many factors, not least among them a desire for unity in the 
disturbingly cluttered collection of goods that are our genetic inheritance, as well as a 
stubborn inborn urge to find an ultimate end to the chain of ‗why questions‘ that are 
potentially precipitated every time we act in a less than habitual fashion, philosophers 
attacked this question of what was really good for us in a rational, systematic, and 
radical way. The elusive end of all of our actions, freed from a straightforward, 
―because the gods will it,‖ found itself in wild (and wildly differing) places in the 
thought of the early Greek philosophers. A conception of happiness that puts the 
pursuit of philosophy at its center diverges radically from the function that the 
happiness motivational system was designed to serve.  
I do not claim that ancient Greece was the only place where this rational 
reconsideration of the evolutionarily shaped goals of the happiness motivation 
system occurred. Instead it represents one example for such an occurrence; other 
examples may well (and probably have) existed in other times and places. What I 
attempt to point out is the structure of the change from a conception of happiness that 
includes what we would expect to be the product of the happiness motivational 
system (i.e., things straightforwardly beneficial to the spread of the genes of the 
individual), to a rationally chosen happiness based on what an individual believes to 
be her highest good. I also do not intend to claim that certain phenomena that are 
antagonistic to the individual‘s differential reproductive success, like celibacy 
(although celibacy is not necessarily antagonistic to differential reproductive success: 
see inclusive fitness discussion above) did not exist before the philosophical turn. 
The difference is the widespread and systematic rational reconsidering of our final 
good and our methods of pursuing it. 
Although consensus certainly did not arise as a result of this systematic 
reconsideration, this process did effect an emancipation from the highly external 
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conception of eudaimonia that the happiness motivational system was designed to 
produce, and so, also a human emancipation from evolution. This emancipation is 
represented by our attempt to escape both the strictures the external world placed on 
our happiness as well as the trickery of the happiness motivational system itself. It is 
now taken for granted that we can, in the name of happiness, choose things that 
oppose in a powerful and total way any behavioral pattern that could conceivably be 
a ―goal‖ given us by natural selection. It is often far from easy to pursue these goals, 
however. And in our attempts to pursue our individual good against those things that 
natural selection shaped us to want, we owe much to these early imaginings of the 
Greek philosophers. The philosophical turn in happiness, then, involves the rational 
re-examination and revision of the conception of happiness that most closely 
represents the external goals that were produced by the happiness motivational 
system and that are, therefore, also that collection of goods that are most beneficial to 
the differential reproductive success of the individual, or, more precisely, her genes.  
Interestingly, the main dimensions along which conceptions of happiness 
would move in the centuries since the Greeks were established fairly quickly. With 
no claim to completeness the following seven dimensions are introduced in this 
chapter: 
 
1. Internal/External dimension: mental states (in the widest sense) vs. external 
goods  
2. Subjective/Objective dimension: dependence on a judgment of the agent vs. 
no such dependence 
3. Personal Control dimension: complete to none 
4. Temporal Horizon: this life or the next life 
5. Position in a System of Value: highest good to no relevant position 
6. Extension of circle of eligible individuals: for example, exclusion of women, 
slaves, members of other religious communities, etc. 
7. Role of morality/virtuousness/the interests of others: for example, identity 
with happiness, part of the content of happiness, a partial cause of happiness, 
no relationship to happiness, or even an oppositional relationship to happiness  
 
Our contemporary conception of happiness, the main subject of this essay, is a 
descendant of the highly subjective, internal, and affective conceptions of the 
Enlightenment. Such a conception of happiness is as far removed from evolutionary 
goals as a conception of happiness based centrally on the practice of philosophy and 
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is fraught with perhaps even more problems. This highly subjective and highly 
internal conception of happiness resulted in an irreconcilable tension with the other 
role of happiness as some sort of highest good. Because it is so clear that things other 
than the internal matter to us, this tension, seen most clearly in the writings of John 
Stuart Mill, ultimately became untenable. However, instead of returning to a content-
rich conception of happiness for which many feel we have no axiological traction, 
happiness retained its newly won highly affective and subjective nature while being 
deprived of its role as a highest good. Through the Enlightenment, happiness became 
one good among many others – albeit, for most, an extremely important one.  
Many Enlightenment figures, like some hedonists before them, also took the 
happiness motivational system head on. They recognized the carrot and stick 
approach of our emotional reactions to the world, and decided to go directly to what 
they saw as the ―source‖ of our valuing and desiring instead of tiptoeing around the 
external goods that this system was motivating us to pursue. Pleasure and other 
positive internal states were what mattered; if they could be obtained without 
reference to external goods or situations, so much the better. Unfortunately for this 
Enlightenment conception, the direct pursuit of feelings seems to be highly 
counterproductive because of the protections built into the happiness motivational 
system against just such tampering. Not only is it not effective, it seems that the 
direct pursuit of feelings often has undesirable affective consequences as illustrated 
in the case of Mill.  
Indirect pursuit of happiness is more promising, but the second evolutionary 
interlude has provided us with good reasons to believe that Enlightenment happiness 
runs into a far greater problem in its realization than the pre-philosophical ―natural 
happiness‖ ever did. The difficulty, as recognized by Kant in an act of impressive 
psychological insight and scientific prescience, is that the happiness motivational 
system is explicitly designed not to produce a high level of continuing positive 
feelings, but instead to keep us striving for external material goods, events, or states 
of affairs (or striving for the progress of culture as Kant in his teleologically tinged 
interpretation claimed), many of which are not good for us but were at one time good 
for our differential reproductive success. This ―devious‖ system also leads to strong 
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overestimations of the impact of external events on our affective state (poor affective 
forecasting is a good way to keep us striving), but as if that were not enough, we are 
also prevented from learning from the experiences we have with affective results of 
our strivings that are much smaller than expected. This retrospective impact bias 
ensures that we will continue with our extremely poor affective forecasting and 
continue to hunt for our happiness over the next hill.  
Very lucky and usually extremely disciplined people have developed ways of 
beating the happiness motivational system. Ironically for many proponents of 
Enlightenment happiness, one of the most radically effective and quickest ways of 
overcoming the link between negative external events and emotional suffering is a 
narrative or a world view such as the one Christianity offers. For those of strong 
convictions, the Christian narrative of redemption through suffering has the power to 
turn the emotional significance of events on their head.  
Contrast this with Mill, who, raised without religion to pursue his happiness 
and the greatest happiness of the greatest number, ran into considerable emotional 
difficulties with the direct pursuit of his own happiness. The protections of the 
happiness motivational system against those attempts to aim directly at one‘s feelings 
are easy to understand. If we could manipulate our feelings directly, i.e., in a 
straightforward way, to the point that feelings of the same high quality could be 
induced by us as those that we experience as a result of the achievement of important 
external goals (fleeting as these feelings may be) then, like all vertebrates with 
control over Brain Stimulation Reward, we would be in danger of neglecting the 
goods, events, and situations which provide us with our differential reproductive 
success.  
So Enlightenment thinkers, by going to what they saw as source of 
evolution‘s carrot and stick approach to human motivation, attempted to co-opt the 
happiness motivational system for a purpose for which it was not designed and, thus, 
may have passed on to us something of a fool‘s errand. While seeming to offer us 
more control as a result of its strong internality, a strongly affective conception of 
happiness often results in frustration, as we come to see that many things that we are 
motivated to want simply do not result in our ultimate goal of happiness. This does 
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not mean that the goal of enduring positive emotional state is unreachable, but it does 
mean that what we usually and very naturally believe to be the best way of attaining 
this state, namely, by acting through the goal-oriented happiness motivational 
system, is not the most effective means to our end. The tragedy of all this is that we 
seem to have an inherent and, thus, natural belief that the achievement of happiness 
is best pursued through things that are not conducive to it at all.  
From the vantage point of the end of this chapter and in light of the numerous 
dimensions along which happiness has moved throughout the centuries, it is easier to 
understand why ‗happiness‘ may be the bearer of multiple meanings and remnants of 
meanings. ‗Happiness‘ and its cognates do call forth linguistic intuitions that conflict 
in obvious ways. In the next chapter I explore the question of whether or not it is 
possible to untangle our collection of linguistic intuitions concerning happiness. I 
believe that this is possible, although, in the end, there may be two things that we 
want to call ‗happiness‘ for the purposes of philosophical and psychological research. 
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Chapter 4: How to Begin a Philosophical 
Investigation of Happiness: Methodological Issues 
 
The previous chapter brought to light the great historical variation in things 
called or translated as ‗happiness.‘ In the face of such diversity, it might be thought 
that the determination of what we mean when we say that we want to be happy might 
be as hopeless a cause as any. Indeed, this conclusion has been reached by some 
philosophers
152
 who have consequently turned their attention to other matters. This 
conclusion is unacceptable for several reasons; chief among them is the practical 
importance of the concept for our lives. As long as the vast majority of people in 
Anglophone societies claim that one of their major, if not their main, goal is to ―be 
happy,‖ this desire and correspondent striving possesses a magnitude of importance 
that should not be ignored. Although this burden is shared by many disciplines, the 
task of the first level of analysis of the use of phrases employed to refer to happiness 
falls to philosophy. 
It may be that, as skeptics claim, the method of linguistic analysis will not 
result in a single meaning of the phrases or phrases that we ultimately choose to 
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analyze. Even if it should turn out to be the case that we cannot find the one thing 
that the relevant phrase refers to, it is incumbent upon us to identify these different 
meanings of the phrase, and label them to avoid the confusion that currently reigns in 
this area. Daniel Haybron, the contemporary philosopher who has made the most 
concentrated attempt at systematizing thought on things called ‗happiness‘ suggests 
that, in addition to clearing up the confusion, it is also possible to find what he calls 
the ―philosophically primary‖ meaning of happiness, or the conception among things 
that might be called happiness that has the greatest relevance for our philosophical 
interests in the subject.  
This suggestion is found in Haybron‘s essay ―What Do We Want from a 
Theory of Happiness?‖153 that is devoted solely to the elucidation of a 
methodological framework for developing and assessing theories of happiness. 
Haybron opens the discussion with the question of how we are supposed to tell a 
good theory of happiness from a bad one. Ordinarily we prefer theoretical 
explanations that best match the meaning of the ordinary language term. However, 
Haybron claims that this approach has not proved to be very successful in the 
exploration of the meanings of ‗happiness.‘154  
In light of the findings of the previous chapter, it should come as no surprise 
that Haybron, too, believes that the term ‗happiness‘ seems to admit of many 
meanings, some or all of which shade gradually into one another. Haybron believes, 
however, that the two philosophically interesting conceptions that intuitions about 
modern English use of ‗happy‘ seem to support most readily involve either a positive 
orientation to one‘s life as a whole (an implicit or explicit judgment) or a generally 
positive emotional state.
155
  
Although some uses of ‗happiness‘ and its cognates do deliver such 
philosophically interesting intuitions, there are a good many uses of ‗happy‘ and its 
cognates that have little to do with anything that might justly be called happiness. 
‗Feeling happy,‘ for example, can be used to designate a momentary surge of positive 
feeling. Even further from the realm of philosophical interest are other uses of 
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‗happiness‘ and its cognates, which, unfortunately, often find their way into the 
philosophical and psychological discussion about candidates for a theoretical 
explanation of our modern conception of happiness. In the interest of avoiding 
confusion in this essay and in the hopes of eliminating these problems in the 
discussion at some point in the future, it is best to review these uses now. 
 
Usage of „Happiness‟ and its Cognates  
‗Happiness‘ and its cognates bear a strong etymological relationship to the 
word ‗hap‘. Although since having fallen out of common usage, ‗hap‘ means chance 
or luck, thus calling forth visions of fortune (especially good fortune), an element 
shared by many of the conceptions of happiness outlined in Chapter Two. J. P. 
Griffen is one philosopher who has discussed the relationship of ‗hap‘ and 
‗happiness‘ and while emphasizing the strong drift in the use of the word, he also 
agrees with the thesis mentioned above that the modern use of ‗happy‘ contains a 
large etymological residue of things that came before.
156
 He also echoes virtually all 
contemporary happiness theorists in seeing a movement toward both the internal and 
the subjective in the modern conception of happiness. He explains the relation to 
‗hap‘ by saying that ‗happiness‘ has moved from referring to that which is fortunate 
(‗hap‘), to having a positive orientation towards a fortunate life situation. Griffen 
continues: 
There is no definition of ‗happiness‘, in the sense of a list of essential 
properties. Few words in a natural language, especially words covering as 
much ground as ‗happiness‘, allow definition in that form. We can use these 
words correctly; hence we know their meaning. But we know it by catching 
on to the use of the words, not by catching on to a set of defining 
properties.
157
 
Although this may be true of the term ‗happiness,‘ it is not true of the individual set 
phrases in which cognates of happiness are used. They can be clearly outlined, and 
after discussing the ones we should ignore in the course of analysis, one phrase will 
be chosen as particularly relevant for our practical and theoretical interests in 
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happiness. This phrase will be the starting point of the analysis, but first some of uses 
of ‗happy‘ and its cognates must be separated.  
 
Happy Persons vs. Happy Lives 
Lives are not things to which we ordinarily ascribe mental states. We don‘t 
say, ―the life thought, felt, believed that…‖ Instead, we refer to the agent living the 
life as having thought, felt or believed. We will see later that all empirical scientists 
and many philosophers do see a highly internal and subjective use of ‗happy‘ that, 
when using the term to describe a person, makes strong reference to mental states. 
However, because lives contain much more than mental states (lives might be best 
characterized by external events and the mental states with which they interact), it 
should not come as a surprise that the phrase ―having a happy life‖ or ―living a happy 
life‖ makes stronger reference to external goods than simply ‗being happy‘ does. As 
von Wright has pointed out, because the use of ‗a happy life‘ has a wider scope and 
necessarily encompasses more external goods than does the use of ‗a happy person,‘ 
the phrase ―living a happy life‖ comes closer to something like well-being or 
eudaimonia than simply ‗being happy‘ does. Although this could certainly be 
debated, Von Wright believes that it would thus be possible to say that someone had 
a happy life, even if for a long period of time he was a most unhappy person.
158
 
Others might argue that internal and/or subjective happiness is a necessary part of 
living a happy life; more plausible, perhaps, is an argument in the other direction, 
namely, that someone who is happy might not be leading a happy life (e.g., as a 
result of systematic deception). 
Thus, most happiness theorists agree that a happy life encompasses more than 
only psychological states. The concept of a happy life—as something akin to a 
sufficient amount of well-being, welfare, or flourishing over the course of a whole 
life—might turn out to be a philosophically interesting one. However, what most 
people claim to want is to ―be happy.‖ We never ask anyone ―Do you have a happy 
life?‖ But we do ask old friends and people who are important to us, ―Well, that all 
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sounds good, but are you happy?‖ ‗Being happy‘ is probably the usage most central 
to our interest in happiness, and it certainly pays to examine what it means. However, 
before a decision is made in its favor, a few other types of phrases containing 
cognates of happiness must be examined.  
 
Relational Happiness 
‗Happy‘ can also be used in a way that has little to do with the happiness of 
individuals (or their lives). For example, ‗happy‘ can be used with a complement, 
such as ‗with,‘ ‗that,‘ ‗about,‘ ‗to,‘ ‗at,‘ or ‗in.‘ Wayne Davis calls this usage 
―relational happiness‖ as opposed to ―non-relational happiness‖ or happiness 
occurring without a complement.
159
 Since other philosophers have taken up Davis‘ 
nomenclature, I will follow suit with the one reservation that ―relational happiness‖ 
often refers to things that have nothing to do with anything that we would call 
happiness (as will shortly become clear). In those instances when it does refer to 
things that we might call happiness, this relation is accidental and has nothing to do 
with the meaning of the relational happiness phrase itself. As such, it seems to be 
almost absurd to call this usage any kind of happiness, but in the interests of 
terminological continuity I will do so. 
D. A. Lloyd Thomas, agrees with Davis on relational happiness in substance, 
and claims that ‗being happy with‘ or ‗being happy that‘ have the meanings of 
‗contented with‘ or ‗satisfied with.‘160 Davis contrasts the relational use of ‗happy‘ 
with the nonrelational use of ‗being happy‘ in the following example: ―John may be 
happy on Friday that he is leaving town for the weekend, even though he is not happy 
(he had a bad week); and he may be happy on Sunday, even though he is not happy 
that he has to return to the drudgery tomorrow (he had a good weekend).‖161 Here 
one can see why it is the case that if relational happiness refers to something that we 
might call ‗happiness,‘ it does so accidentally. One can be ‗happy with‘ anything, 
even when deeply unhappy or deeply dissatisfied. A boss can report that he is happy 
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with the work of one of his employees, even when simultaneously contemplating 
suicide.  
An interesting twist occurs in connection with this phrase when social 
scientists ask individuals if they ―taking everything together, are happy with their 
situation right now‖ or are ―happy with their lives.‖ These examples of items found 
on psychological questionnaires often are interpreted as referring to the happiness of 
individuals, but they only do so in virtue of the questionable premise that life-
satisfaction theories of our contemporary concept of happiness are, indeed, correct. 
Why? Because although the social scientists posing these questions clearly think that 
by virtue of employing the word ‗happy‘ they are measuring the happiness of the 
individual in question, what they really are doing is simply asking individuals if they 
are satisfied or content with their lives. They are employing a phrase that includes the 
word ‗happy‘ and yet has no intrinsic connection to any meaningful conception of 
happiness, and instead means simply ―being satisfied with something.‖ This is but 
one example of the many pitfalls that careful philosophical analysis can help social 
scientists to avoid.  
 
Behavioral Happiness 
A less common use of a cognate of ‗happiness‘ exists and is termed the 
―behavioral‖ use of ‗happy‘ by Lynn McFall, Theodore Benditt and D. A. Lloyd 
Thomas.
162
 This variant is often signaled by the employment of the adverb ‗happily.‘ 
McFall‘s example: ―He happily demonstrated this to be the worst of all possible 
worlds.‖ Her explanation of the behavioral use is that it describes someone who is 
acting in a way that we would expect someone who is happy to usually act.
163
 But it 
could just as easily mean something along the lines of ―obliging.‖ An example: ―He 
happily opened the door for the maid of honor.‖ We do not necessarily expect 
someone who is ―happy‖ to open doors in a certain way, and in this context ‗happily‘ 
seems to mean ―glad to oblige.‖ In other words, ‗happily‘ can describe the state of 
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mind of someone who is, of course not necessarily happy, but ready and willing to do 
something for a guest or another person in need of assistance.  
The relational and behavioral uses of ‗happy‘ are important to an exploration 
of human happiness, not because they refer to anything that could plausibly be called 
happiness, but because social scientists as well as philosophers occasionally employ 
them in arguments about what happiness is. From the examples above it should be 
clear that these are the wrong usages to take as a starting point when trying to 
understand what we want when we say that we want to be happy.  
 
Being and Feeling Happy 
 The state referred to by the expression, ‗feeling happy,‘ is philosophically 
uninteresting, unless examined as a part of a general philosophical investigation of 
the emotions. General agreement exists that to say that ―I am feeling happy today‖ is 
simply to make a report of an occurrent emotional state. ‗Being happy,‘ on the other 
hand, can refer to something much more complicated. When crises arise in which life 
decisions must be made, it is not uncommon to hear parents say of their children, ―I 
don‘t care if Andy doesn‘t X, I just want him to be happy.‖ X may be getting a well-
paying, well-regarded job when the child would struggle under its demands, 
continuing the family tradition by joining the military, or engaging in a less than 
satisfactory but socially-desirable marriage. When making our own life decisions, we 
often appeal to being happy (or being happier) and ask ourselves questions such as, 
―Would I be happier as a professor or a high-school teacher?‖ We say to people 
about our newborn children, ―I just want him to be happy and healthy.‖  
More than ‗having a happy life‘ or ‗feeling happy,‘ ‗being happy‘ seems to be 
our predominant and most frequently appealed to (if not overriding) prudential 
concern. And because of its prudential importance, ‗being happy‘ is also the usage 
which most contemporary philosophical investigations of our contemporary 
conception of happiness use as a starting point. This essay, too, will follow others in 
using ‗being happy‘ as a point of departure. The focus of this essay, therefore, will be 
people who are happy, and not lives that are happy or a person simply ―feeling happy 
today.‖ Our topic is the far more prevalent use of ‗happy‘ as predicated of persons. 
 81 
Delving deeper into the use of ‗being happy‘ at this point would be to jump ahead to 
the discussion of classical theories of our contemporary conception of happiness, so 
instead one final relative of ‗happy‘ will be examined. 
 
‘Happiness’ 
 The noun ‗happiness‘ is a term from which it is extremely difficult to derive 
linguistic intuitions. One reason for this could be that ‗happiness‘ is used far less 
frequently than appeals to ‗being happy.‘ We seldom say, ―I want happiness‖ unless 
we mean something very special and unique, in other words, something that isn‘t 
encompassed in the ordinary desire to simply, ―be happy.‖ For this reason, virtually 
no theorists begin their investigations with linguistic intuitions of what ‗happiness‘ 
means. The question that is usually asked is ―When do we say that someone is 
happy?‖ or ―When can we say that someone is living a happy life?‖ The question, 
―When can we say that someone is in the possession of happiness?‖ is not frequently 
encountered in the literature.  
There is one context in which this noun form does enter the discussion, and 
this, unfortunately, represents more of a stumbling block for serious analysis than 
anything else. The context is the following: an author paints a picture of happiness or 
being happy that corresponds to the demands of a rival theory of happiness and then 
asks something like the following question: ―But can we really say that a person in 
situation X is in possession of real (or true, or deep) happiness?‖ This question is also 
stated using the adjectival form: ―But can we really say that a person in situation X is 
really (or truly, or deeply) happy?‖ However the noun form is found more frequently 
in combination with the ―real, true, or deep‖ question.  
Attempting a philosophical examination of happiness by asking questions 
about ‗true‘ happiness is, in my estimation, about as helpful as attempting to 
undertake a philosophical investigation of love by asking whether something is ―true 
love.‖ As several commentators have remarked, asking about true or real happiness 
allows interpreters to pack just about anything into the concept. Wayne Davis 
describes this strategy as referring to ideal or perfect happiness. He argues that 
asking if something is ‗real‘ happiness can be interpreted akin to asking if a certain 
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person is a ―real man.‖164 One can see how drastically distorting the ―real happiness‖ 
formulation can be when one examines this latter question without the ‗real.‘ How 
different are the questions, ―What is a man?‖ and ―What is a real man?‖ One might 
feel invited in the first instance to describe a man as a human being with a certain 
physiology, in contrast to human beings who are women. One will find entries in 
dictionaries for ‗man‘ but none for a ‗real man.‘ And those who claim to know what 
a ‗real man‘ is, are liable to say widely divergent things, such as ―Real men don‘t 
cry.‖ This claim is likely to be answered by someone claiming that ―If you can‘t cry, 
then you‘re not a real man.‖ The qualifications ‗real‘ and ‗true‘ result not only in 
very different answers, but answers that are loaded with highly specific and highly 
individual value judgments.  
To see how far our semantic transformation of social constructs can go when 
they are modified by ‗true‘ or ‗real‘, consider someone with little to no prior 
knowledge of competition trying to define and analyze the concepts of winning or 
losing in sports. Tennis, for example, is played according to certain rules which 
clearly determine who wins or loses. However, if a person X violates social 
expectations that have nothing to do with winning or losing in the narrow sense and 
plays too roughly, to aggressively, without honor, only for money, behaves badly 
after the match, or has a personal life rife with qualities that are less than socially 
desirable (while the loser, Y, exhibits the opposite and socially desirable behavior), 
then some will say ―But Y is the real winner.‖ Y, in fact, actually lost, but the use of 
‗true‘ or ‗real‘ can go so far as to override the narrow definition of the word. We 
have a tendency not to want to accord socially valued titles to persons who violate 
social rules, whatever form they may take (e.g., ―He‘s not truly rich because he 
doesn‘t know the love of a good women‖ or hasn‘t found Jesus, etc.). This has 
something to do with the narrow meaning of the word only very tangentially, and can 
even lead to a complete inversion of the social construct we are searching to 
understand. How unfortunate for the outsider who seeks to understand what winning 
or losing means in tennis and is told that the winner is ―really‖ the loser. 
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In the case of ‗being happy‘ we are all still in the position of the outsider. 
While the ‗true‘ or ‗real‘ qualifications would be problematic enough if taken 
seriously by a philosophical analysis of terms that are relatively clear like ‗winning‘ 
and ‗losing,‘ the addition of these qualifications in the case of a concept as 
semantically divergent as ‗happiness‘ results in serious difficulties. Davis illustrates 
some of the conditions that interpreters could attempt to exclude on the basis of the 
―true‖ happiness question: ―if his happiness is due to the satisfaction of evil desires; 
if it is based on ignorance or false belief; if it is impermanent; or if he has no 
appreciation of the higher things in life.‖165 Davis goes on to say that the ascription 
of ―true‖ happiness is implicitly an evaluation of the person or of his happiness. He is 
correct in asserting this, but his list is somewhat tame. For many, ―true‖ happiness 
cannot be had without finding Jesus, or accepting Mohammed. Even if one has found 
the ―right‖ faith, one might not have true happiness unless one has reached nirvana 
(most likely in the life after this one). And, most significantly, ―true happiness‖ can 
be used to pack in just about everything described in the previous chapter in the 
widely varied history of things we translate as happiness. ―True happiness‖ can call 
forth any and all of these things, leaving us with an interpretative mess and little hope 
for meaningful discussion. In sum, there seems to be no end to the criteria that one 
can pack into ‗true happiness,‘ and for that reason, its use should be avoided in 
philosophical investigations of happiness.  
These distinctions are important, as many a writer on happiness has ignored 
them and moved swiftly from our intuitions about ‗being happy‘ to our intuitions 
about ‗happiness,‘ to our intuitions about ‗being truly happy,‘ to our intuitions about 
‗true happiness‘ without so much as blinking an eye. In this essay I pursue the 
comparatively modest aim of trying to understand what we want when we say that 
we want to be happy. 
 
                                                 
165
 Ibid. 
 84 
Methodology  
It is now possible to turn to the methodological issues that Haybron raises in 
―What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness?‖ in greater detail. As mentioned 
above, Haybron‘s starting point is his conviction that ‗happiness,‘ or even ‗being 
happy,‘ are neither univocal nor well-defined, and thus present problems for 
straightforward, traditional conceptual analysis. It is a solution to this difficulty that 
he seeks in his essay. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that philosophy has 
already used ‗happiness‘ extensively, and not in the sense of the folk psychological 
concept that is the focus of this investigation.  
 The word ‗happiness‘ is burdened in philosophical use as a result of its long-
standing function as the translation of many terms that bear an imperfect relationship 
to our contemporary conception of happiness, especially a term that definitely does 
refer to a highest individual good, namely, eudaimonia. While the great majority of 
contemporary philosophers who have written dedicated articles on happiness have 
accepted the folk usage of happiness to indicate some sort of psychological state, 
others, usually treating happiness in conjunction with a moral theory (most often 
ancient theories of ethics, or virtue-theories inspired by ancient conceptions) have 
mixed the two senses, or argued that our concept of happiness either is or contains 
weighty elements of well-being. As mentioned in the introduction, Haybron calls the 
well-being usage of happiness ―prudential happiness‖ as opposed to our conception 
of ―psychological happiness.‖166 While this division is helpful, I will call this kind of 
happiness ―well-being happiness‖ to eliminate confusion resulting from the fact that 
most people believe psychological happiness to have immense prudential value. And 
because ―psychological‖ happiness refers to our contemporary folk conception, I 
generally refer to psychological happiness simply as ‗happiness‘ in this essay. 
Haybron describes the two approaches in the following way.  
The theorist of prudential happiness stipulates at the outset that happiness is 
valuable, a kind of well-being, and then asks whether this condition is merely 
a state of mind. The theorist of psychological happiness, on the other hand, 
stipulates that happiness is just a state of mind and wonders what sort of 
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psychological state it is. Having answered this question, we may then ask 
how valuable this state is. Perhaps it is not valuable at all.
167
 
Haybron‘s examples of the psychological use of happiness in Chapter One should 
serve to illustrate that outside of philosophical usage, there is an important usage of 
happiness that is not equivalent to well-being, flourishing, etc. For example, if 
happiness were well-being, our wish for the ―health and happiness‖ of someone‘s 
children would be bizarrely redundant (or we would have a bizarre concept of well-
being that would in some way exclude health). It seems evident that the folk concept 
of happiness is not in any way clearly equivalent to well-being. In this regard, a 
comment of Haybron‘s about how not to develop a theory of happiness is highly 
relevant.  
 
Normative Adequacy 
 Haybron problematizes what he calls the ―pure normative adequacy‖ 
approach to happiness. Normative adequacy is a concept borrowed from Lawrence 
Sumner and describes the procedure of choosing a meaning for happiness in part or 
wholly based on its function in a specific moral system. Haybron‘s example is the 
utilitarian conception of happiness. Without becoming entangled in the actual facts of 
the matter, imagine that the early Utilitarians chose a strongly hedonistic theory of 
happiness in part based on the role that such a theory would play in their moral 
system. Or even better, say a virtue theorist were to introduce happiness into her 
moral system as a sort of final end, in which practice of the virtues play the most 
significant role (none to my knowledge have done this in so obvious a way). It is not 
unlikely that happiness was often a victim of such an approach as, at least in modern 
theories, definitions of happiness were often developed as an (albeit important) side 
note to the main action in the theory in question. 
Haybron rightly contends that while other concepts might be better suited to 
such treatment, ‗happiness‘ should not be approached in this way. ‗Happiness‘ is not 
a theoretical term to be employed and defined as we please; instead it is a folk 
concept with enormous value to the lives of the people who employ it. Concepts like 
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‗well-being‘ that are by nature more theoretical are more conducive to such an 
approach. ‗Well-being‘ is so theoretical that it might not specify any content at all on 
its own; it seems to simply mean that which is good for a person. Adding content to a 
theoretical term or even creating a new term and then explaining what one stipulates 
it to mean are both legitimate ways of enriching one‘s theoretical system; usurping a 
folk concept to make one‘s system more practically interesting is not. In short, 
happiness is not a term that is ―up for grabs.‖168 
 
Scientific Naturalism  
 A second approach that Haybron rejects is that of ―scientific naturalism.‖ 
This idea is present in many non-philosophical writings on happiness and claims 
explicitly or implicitly that happiness is whatever empirical science discovers it to be. 
The difficulty with this assumption is that our pre-theoretical notion of happiness is 
too vague and encompasses too many intuitions for empirical research alone to 
decide the question.
169
 Contrary to the tone of some social scientific articles, there is 
no experiment, survey, MRI procedure, etc. that could determine what happiness is. 
What is possible is that observations won from such procedures could put us in a 
position to refute certain theories of happiness by undermining their premises 
(Haybron makes this argument with regard to life-satisfaction theories of 
happiness)
170
, but the determination of what we mean when we say that we want to 
be happy must be sorted out philosophically before empirical scientists go to work on 
testing it. One can not legitimately make the claim that a certain empirical factor 
interacts in a certain way with happiness when one does not possess a definition of 
happiness in the first place. Social scientists have approached this problem by 
avoiding definitions of happiness and instead using technical terms such as subjective 
well-being, terms which they believe are wide enough to capture whatever it is that 
we really mean when we talk of happiness. However, it seems that in the end many 
empirical scientists cannot resist the temptation to drop the technical term they 
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employed in much of their research and inform their readers at the end of their 
articles what they have learned about ‗happiness.‘171 
 
Reconstructive Analysis  
 To explain what is actually needed to develop a theory of happiness, Haybron 
takes his lead from Ned Block. Block has famously described consciousness as a 
―mongrel concept‖, in other words, as a folk psychological concept that has more 
than one definite meaning. This state of affairs has led no philosopher (to my 
knowledge) to suggest that we should cease investigation of consciousness. Instead, 
many, including Block, have advocated reconstructing the concept in some 
systematic way. Block himself thinks that ‗consciousness‘ refers to three different 
types of phenomena, which he calls phenomenality, reflexivity, global availability.
172
  
 Haybron suggests a similar approach to happiness, one that I heartily endorse. 
He suggests we follow Block in pursuing what Haybron calls reconstructive analysis. 
It may be that ‗being happy‘ admits of multiple paraphrases and if that is the case, we 
should delineate each of them and perhaps, if possible, choose the one among them 
that is philosophically primary, a term that Haybron borrows from Lawrence 
Sumner. This means that if there is more than one phenomenon that we can call 
happiness, then we should choose a primary meaning based on 1) descriptive 
adequacy and 2) the practical interests of those who use the concept in their everyday 
lives.
173
 
 Descriptive adequacy is a term that Haybron again borrows from Lawrence 
Sumner, who introduced it in an exploration of welfare.
174
 Descriptive adequacy 
means basically that a conception of happiness should not violate too many of our 
linguistic intuitions. A theory of happiness should describe something that is 
recognizable as happiness. This is obviously a flexible criterion, but the goal, of 
course, is working out a core or philosophically primary meaning; as Haybron 
emphasizes, if too many intuitions are ignored, we risk changing the subject, or 
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sliding slowly into the development of an artificial construct in order to avoid 
controversy, a tactic employed by some social scientists as mentioned above.  
 Attending to our practical interests in the matter of happiness is a criterion 
that is not truly separate from descriptive adequacy, but it is helpful to address it 
separately. Haybron lists four practical interests that we have in happiness: we 
employ some form of the ‗being happy‘ question or contention in 1) deliberation 
about important decisions, 2) evaluation or assessment of our own or others‘ 
conditions, 3) prediction of others‘ thoughts and actions, and 4) explanations of 
others‘ thoughts and actions.175  
The first two interests are the most crucial in our dealings with happiness. In 
Chapter One I mentioned Haybron‘s claim that ‗being happy,‘ although it clearly 
does not exhaust all that is necessary for well-being, often serves as a proxy for well-
being in our practical reasoning.
176
 As mentioned above, well-being is an abstract 
and formal term; I have never heard anyone wishing someone else ―well-being‖ or 
asking ―and how is your well-being?‖ The one context with which I do associate it is 
concern about the state of a child‘s physical or mental health: ―The court is very 
concerned about the well-being of the child.‖ It is very unclear to both laypersons 
and philosophers what well-being actually entails (although we would be greatly 
surprised if someone developed a concept of well-being and excluded health, for 
example), and even how to go about investigating it.  
Happiness, on the other hand, seems to be clearly content-filled—at least this 
is the case I make in the remainder of this essay. We do know what direction we are 
hoping for when we wish someone happiness. And the best route to determining this 
direction lies in following our linguistic intuitions about the most commonly used 
phrase concerning happiness, namely, what it means to ―be happy.‖  
 
The Subjective-Objective Distinction  
Although the purpose of Lawrence Sumner‘s astute treatment of the subjective-
objective distinction in Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics is somewhat different than 
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that of this undertaking, his discussion of subjectivity and objectivity is 
comprehensive, and his solution in the form of a definition of the terms ‗subjective‘ 
and ‗objective‘ illustrates the difficulties involved in the attempt to define these terms 
in the context of theories of happiness.  
Sumner‘s aim in defining subjectivity and objectivity is to categorize theories 
of welfare. Welfare and happiness are not so far distant for his discussion not to be 
relevant to the current essay. Sumner points out that ‗subjective‘ and ‗objective‘ are, 
in fact, used in widely differing ways depending on the context. Sumner provides a 
non-exhaustive list of usages of the term ‗subjective,‘ a list that is worth quoting in 
full:  
Along with such other persistent offenders as the real and the natural, the concept 
of the subjective is one of the most treacherous in the philosopher‘s lexicon. In 
different contexts and for different purposes the realm of the subjective has been 
delineated by means of a number of features: privacy, immediacy, incorrigibility, 
unverifiability, unquantifiability, relativity, arbitrariness, reliance on judgment or 
intuition, and immunity to rational arbitration.
177
 
 
He makes the point that each member of this list is logically distinct from every 
other, and that the resultant boundary drawn around the subjective and the objective 
would be different in each case. As the authors of the current literature on happiness 
use varying definitions of ‗subjective‘ to classify their own and others‘ theories, it is 
unsurprising, given the length of the list, that some confusion results in the current 
philosophical (and certainly in the non-philosophical) discussion of happiness. 
Sumner‘s solution to the diversity of senses of ‗subjective‘, however, has not yet 
been mentioned. He claims that none of the abovementioned concepts is essential to 
subjectivity, but that there is a definition of the concept which explains why we 
sometimes use ‗subjective‘ to mean each of the terms in the list.  
This core definition has to do with the central meaning of the word subject, 
namely, ―anything capable of conscious states or processes.‖178 In this definition, 
‗consciousness‘ is used in a very liberal way, as opposed to its stricter use often 
employed by philosophers to mean only beings capable of language or self- 
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awareness. Sumner connects this to Thomas Nagel‘s condition for the ascription of 
conscious mental states: ―an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there 
is something that it is like to be that organism—something that it is like for the 
organism.‖179 According to Sumner, this criterion is, however, not sufficient for the 
characterization of a subject. Not only do subjects have conscious mental states, but 
these states must evince both unity and continuity. An individual subject is thus a 
―unique, enduring centre of consciousness.‖180 In addition, Sumner‘s criteria of unity 
and continuity cannot be grasped without recourse to personal indexicals. This means 
that for me as a subject, these conscious mental states have to be mine. The spatial 
and temporal indexicals, the here and now, are also essential aspects of our concept 
of a subject.  
At this point, Sumner transitions from what he views as the philosophically 
primary sense of ‗subject‘, to the philosophically primary sense of ‗subjective.‘ He 
relates that one of the definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary characterizes 
‗subjective‘ thusly: ―proceeding from or taking place within the subject; having its 
source in the mind; belonging to the conscious life.‖ In other words, while the mental 
not identical with subjective, it ―provides the content or substance of the subjective.‖ 
Sumner thus sees the subjective as mind-dependant and the objective as not mind-
dependant.  
Although one could follow Haybron in adopting Sumner‘s perspicuous analysis 
of ‗subjective‘ in the case of theories of happiness, a problem exists with this 
approach. This problem can be illustrated by a comparison with an argument by G.H. 
von Wright for the subjectivity of happiness. 
For von Wright, the person‘s judgment on happiness is ―final whatever we 
think we should say, if we were in his circumstances (because) every man is the best 
and most competent judge of his prospects of happiness.‖181 This evokes some of the 
other senses of subjectivity compiled in Sumner‘s list, especially the judgment 
dependant sense. This sense of subjectivity is well-established in the literature on our 
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current concept of ―being happy.‖ For example, it is this sense of ‗subjective‘ that is 
primarily operative in Richard Kraut‘s classic essay ―Two Conceptions of 
Happiness.‖182 The difficulty with the sense of ‗subjective‘ that Sumner proposes and 
Haybron, following Sumner, also adopts is that it is not a particularly useful way of 
characterizing theories of happiness. Our contemporary use of happiness is so widely 
accepted to be primarily (if not only) concerned with mental states that Haybron 
admits that all contemporary theories of happiness are subjective theories, as they all 
primarily point to one or another mental states as that which constitutes happiness. 
Viewed from the perspective of the welfare/well-being debate, something in 
which both Sumner and Haybron have a strong interest, this might seem 
unproblematic, but, as mentioned above, it conflicts strongly with the terminology 
used by many in the debate on our concept of happiness. Additionally, and perhaps 
more importantly, not only has the judgment-based use of the word ‗subjective‘ 
played such a central role in the contemporary discussion of happiness, but in the 
course of this essay the case will be made that it is an intrinsic part of our ordinary 
concept of happiness as well. Similarly, in virtually all discussions of life-satisfaction 
theories of happiness, ‗subjective‘ is used in this judgment-dependent way. Clearly, 
because of its (often overlooked) ambiguous use in the literature, a decision must be 
made about how to use it in this essay. Because other fairly straightforward options 
for referring to a theory‘s dependence on mental states are available, and because 
judgment-dependency marks an important difference in theories of happiness, I 
believe it better to employ ‗subjective‘ in its sense of ―dependent on judgment of the 
agent.‖  
This determination of ‗subjective‘ has the added advantage of meshing nicely 
with some uses of the terminology in the social sciences as well. Since happiness has 
long been taken to be a primarily mental affair in the social sciences, and because it 
is useful to distinguish theories that are judgment-based from those that are not, 
‗subjective‘ in the work of social sciences on happiness has long been seen as 
meaning ―judgment-dependent.‖ For example, when the Nobel-prize winning 
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psychologist Daniel Kahneman attempted to remedy several recall biases in 
emotional memory in the realm of happiness by introducing a model of timed 
samples of the emotional states of a person, he calls the result, if sufficiently positive, 
―objective happiness.‖ In this case, Kahneman clearly makes use of the judgment-
dependant sense of ‗subjective.‘183 This determination has the effect of rendering 
certain theories of happiness, such as hedonistic theories, emotional state-theories, 
and many desire-satisfaction theories, objective theories of psychological happiness. 
Such theories must be categorized as objective because no judgment is passed in the 
process of determining whether a given individual is happy.  
Hedonistic theories, for example, are often characterized by something like a 
preponderance of pleasure over pain. Some stipulate a specific ratio as a criterion for 
happiness, such as spending more than 50% of one‘s time in a pleasurable state. For a 
given individual, this ratio exists independent of their judgment and determines their 
happiness whatever they, themselves, may judge their own state of happiness to be. 
One reason for the continuing confusion about subjectivity and objectivity in the 
discussion of our concept of happiness is that many theorists unfortunately neglect to 
differentiate between subjectivity in terms of mental states and subjectivity in terms 
of judgment-dependency. Often, theories of happiness are underdeveloped in the 
sense that their creators talk as if they rely both on an individual judgmental standard 
and on the exceeding of a threshold set for all individuals independently of the 
opinion of any one specific individual. Hedonistic theories are a good example of 
this. In many hedonistic theories, the issue of someone making a judgment about her 
happiness that is contrary to the actual balance of pleasure over pain is simply 
ignored.  
As for emotional-state theories, the premier proponent of such a theory, Daniel 
Haybron, writes that, ―Those who have spent much time gaining the perspective of 
living outside mainstream civilization know well that many of us may not have a clue 
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how happy, or unhappy, we really are.‖184 Rejection of judgment-dependency in 
happiness determinations forms the crux of Haybron‘s article, ―Do We Know How 
Happy We Are?‖185 Thus, although Haybron‘s theory would clearly be classified as 
subjective according to the mental-state criterion of subjectivity, it is clearly not 
subjective according to the criterion that will be employed in this essay, namely, 
judgment-dependency.  
However, a term must also be employed to designate dependence on mental 
and extra-mental states in theories of psychological happiness. For a theory of 
happiness to have an objective qualification in the sense of mental-state subjectivity, 
the fact of the matter concerning an agent‘s happiness must be partly reliant on 
something other than mental states. One example of this would be a theory that uses 
a hedonistic criterion for happiness (i.e., strongly equates happiness with pleasure), 
yet demands that the agent must not be deceived with regard to those things which 
most centrally cause his happiness (e.g., having an unfaithful wife, when he receives 
great comfort from his belief in her fidelity). Although centrally reliant on mental 
states, such a theory incorporates demands on extra-mental states. Because 
‗subjective‘ cannot be used to refer to mental states, another term must be found. For 
the purposes of this essay, the term ‗internal‘ will stand for theories or elements of 
theories that make reference to mental states, and the term ‗external‘ will stand for 
elements of theories that make reference to extra-mental states.  
 
Conclusion 
 Our use of happiness and its cognates do not possess one distinct meaning, 
but instead result in many different meanings depending on their linguistic form and 
the context in which they are used. After dealing with the relational and behavioral 
uses of cognates of happiness, I made the case that the usage ‗being happy‘ in its 
various forms represents our primary practical interest among all of the usages that 
might refer to something that could conceivably be called happiness. The focus of 
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this essay is therefore people who are happy and not the leading of happy lives or 
feeling happy. Additionally, as a result of the function of ‗true‘ and ‗real‘ that allows 
members of the linguistic community to depart drastically from the core definition of 
the word in question for the purposes of sanctioning members of the community who 
exhibit behaviors generally deemed undesirable, the use of phrases involving ‗true‘ 
or ‗real‘ happiness should be ignored in a linguistic analysis. 
 It is also clear that our contemporary conception of happiness is not in any 
obvious way equivalent to flourishing or well-being. Two approaches to the 
investigation of our conception of ―psychological happiness,‖ normative adequacy 
and scientific naturalism are misguided (if pursued intentionally) and 
counterproductive (if, as is usually the case, pursued unintentionally). Reconstructive 
analysis along the lines of Ned Block‘s reconstruction of ‗consciousness‘ is the 
proper way to proceed. Even when only examining ‗being happy‘ it may well be the 
case that more than one definition answers to the use of variations of this phrase. If 
so, then in the interest of progress in this field, the different senses should be worked 
out and named. A final stumbling stone to clarity in the discussion of happiness must 
also be eliminated: the ambiguous use of ‗subjective‘ and ‗objective.‘ For the 
purposes of this essay, ‗subjective‘ will be used to indicate dependence on the 
judgment of the agent in question, and ‗objective‘ will be used to indicate an absence 
of such dependence. An alternative meaning of subjective, namely, mind-dependence 
or dependence on mental states, will be rendered by ‗internal,‘ and ‗external‘ will be 
used to indicate the absence of such dependence. 
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Chapter 5: Traditional Theories of Happiness 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that ‗being happy‘ is the best place to begin to 
look for something unitary that we can reasonably call happiness. Many authors have 
remarked that even ‗being happy‘ seems to have two senses: an occurrent sense, 
which basically is equivalent to ‗feeling happy,‘ and a longer-term sense186. 
Contextual cues usually make it clear when the occurrent sense is the one in play. 
After achieving a great athletic feat, for example, winning a gold medal at the 
Olympics, it would not at all surprise us to hear the winner say ―I can‘t tell you how 
happy I am right now.‖ And if we were to ask her right after winning, ―So, are you 
happy?‖ it would be obvious from the context of the conversation that we are 
referring to her occurrent emotional state, and not to any long-term reflective 
assessment (something that given the tumultuous state of her current emotions 
probably would not even be possible for her).  
Contrast this with meeting an old friend whom you haven‘t seen in a while 
and, after talking for half an hour, asking him, ―So, things seem to be going well with 
your job and the family, but how are you? Are you happy?‖ You would be quite 
disappointed if, like our Olympic athlete, he did nothing more than report his current 
emotional state. How he is feeling in this moment is something in which you 
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probably aren‘t even interested. What interests you and provokes you to ask this 
question is something longer-term in nature.  
The relation between the occurrent and the longer-term senses of ‗being 
happy‘ explains some of our practices in answering these sorts of questions, such as 
qualifications for atypical current mood. Because of the existence of the occurrent 
use, we don‘t simply answer yes when we are happy in the long-term sense, but are 
currently in a bad mood. To avoid confusion we would probably explain the 
situation. To our old friend, we might say something like, ―Well, right now I‘m really 
ticked off about being passed over for the partnership at work, but generally, yeah, I 
am happy.‖ 
All of the traditional theories of our concept of happiness take this longer-
term happiness to be the phenomenon in need of explanation, and all agree that this 
longer-term happiness is more than just feeling happy (or the occurrent use of ―being 
happy‖). The three most prominent types of theories of our concept of happiness are 
hedonistic, life-satisfaction, and emotional-state theories. Beyond this categorization, 
two general conditions exist that theorists sometimes apply to any theory inhabiting 
one of these categories. First of all, they sometimes require that external 
circumstances not be in conflict with the beliefs that result in an individual judgment 
of happiness (or similarly, the beliefs that produce pleasure or feelings of happiness 
not be based on deception or an illusion). Secondly, some argue that happiness has an 
evaluative or an endorsing character. Most of these latter arguments move in the 
direction of prohibiting ascriptions of happiness to people who have a morally bad 
character. I believe both of these concerns are exaggerated, and although it is not 
possible here to refute all arguments made in defense of these two propositions, at the 
end of this chapter, I will deal with examples of each.  
The following text presents general difficulties with hedonic and life-
satisfaction views of happiness. Because Daniel Haybron has very recently produced 
excellent, thorough, and lengthy critiques of hedonism and life-satisfaction theories 
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of happiness, I refer the interested reader to them
187
; only the most problematic 
aspects of such theories find a place here. 
 
Three Theories of Happiness  
Hedonistic Theories 
Hedonistic theories represent happiness as a ―balance of pleasure over pain‖ 
(e.g. Parducci, 1995, p.9). To avoid terminological confusion, it should be made clear 
at this point that ‗hedonism‘ as used in philosophy ordinarily refers to something 
other than hedonism about psychological happiness. Two other basic types of 
hedonism exist, namely, ethical hedonism (a normative theory) and psychological 
hedonism (a descriptive theory). Ethical hedonists maintain that one should seek 
pleasure or that pleasure is the only thing worth seeking. Psychological hedonists 
claim that pleasure is the only thing that humans (and presumably other creatures) 
ever do seek. Psychological (or motivational) hedonism has been largely discredited 
and because of similar implausibility, crude forms of ethical hedonism find few 
defenders today. Not so, however, with hedonism about psychological happiness; it 
is alive and well, and is not nearly as implausible as its normative and motivational 
counterparts.
188
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Hedonistic theorists claim that one is happy when one experiences more 
pleasure than pain. So what is pleasure? Daniel Haybron distinguishes three 
categories of theories of pleasure, the first two of which he borrows from Lawrence 
Sumner and the last from Fred Feldman. Sumner categorizes theories of pleasure as 
either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic theories of pleasure claim that there is a 
common unanalyzable feeling tone to all pleasurable experiences. Extrinsic theories 
of pleasure claim that it is the subject‘s attitude towards a certain felt experience that 
makes that experience one of pleasure.
189
  
Confusingly, Fred Feldman‘s view of pleasure is called the ―attitudinal view.‖ 
However, unlike extrinsic theories of happiness, Feldman‘s attitudinal view does not 
require any occurrent feeling at all. On his view (which does not gel with our usual 
talk about pleasure) the propositional attitude itself constitutes the pleasure and the 
object of the propositional attitude is a fact or a state of affairs and not a feeling. To 
support his argument that pleasure does not require a feeling, many of his analyzed 
sentences or phrases are similar to this one: ―being pleased that you live in 
Massachusetts.‖ The reader might be reminded of our discussion of the relational use 
of happiness. In my opinion, ―being pleased that‖ and ―being pleased with‖ bear as 
little relation to something that we call pleasure as ―being happy with‖ and ―being 
happy that‖ bear to happiness.190  
These usages sometimes describe situations in which one could have a 
positive feeling, whether one does or not, but more often they represent nothing more 
than ways to describe conformity with values or standards. The discussion in the 
previous chapter of ‗relational happiness‘ and the example of ―being happy with his 
work‖ run exactly parallel to what we might call ‗relational pleasure‘ and the phrase 
―being pleased with his work.‖ And these two locutions may represent only the 
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smallest uptick in standards met from ―being satisfied with his work.‖ Saying that I 
am pleased with his work means only that his work meets a certain standard that I 
hold completely independently of how I feel at the time of the assessment of his 
work. If I want to get a confederate of mine into the position that the industrious 
worker currently occupies, I might have very negative feelings about the fact that he 
has been working so well. 
Whatever theory of pleasure predominates in a given hedonistic theory of 
happiness, two main problems exist with all theories of this kind. The first is that 
pleasure and pain (or ―unpleasure‖ as some prefer) are simply the wrong criteria to 
use for determining one‘s happiness. It seems strange to say that people‘s happiness 
or unhappiness is the experiencing of either a great deal of pleasure or unpleasure. 
Haybron splits this objection into two parts, the problems of irrelevant pleasures (the 
fact that very many pleasures, even very intense ones may fail to have any impact on 
one‘s happiness), and the problem of psychological superficiality (the fact that 
pleasures fail to move one deeply). It seems to me that these are strongly related, so I 
will not treat them separately.
191
  
Haybron uses the example of a sufferer of chronic pain to illustrate 
psychological superficiality. He points out that if experiencing a great deal of 
pleasure or pain is happiness or unhappiness, then we should include a sufferer of 
chronic pain in our category of unhappy persons. While Haybron agrees that it is 
certainly very likely that someone suffering from chronic pain is unhappy, he 
emphasizes that pain does not constitute the sufferer‘s unhappiness – rather it is the 
source of his unhappiness. It is possible that he (being, for example, a highly 
disciplined Buddhist monk and thus being able to direct his awareness away from the 
pain) is indeed not unhappy
192
. The converse is true of pleasure: While a series of 
very pleasurable experiences could cause an individual to be happy, it certainly does 
not have to have this effect, and pleasure itself does not seem to constitute our 
happiness. In the use of the concepts of pleasure and pain, hedonistic theories are, at 
the very least, over-extended or overly inclusive in the states they take to be possible 
constituents of happiness. Depending on the definition of pleasure in the theory in 
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question, they may also be too narrow in that they do not include many states that are 
indeed constituents of happiness.  
A sufferer of chronic pain may be unhappy, but not necessarily so. She is 
unhappy only if the pain produces negative affect, if it ‗gets her down.‘ Being a kind 
of qualia, affect is, by its very nature, difficult to formulate in words, but is an 
unavoidable component of our mental lives. We see this when we take a closer look 
at emotions. As their name indicates, component theories of emotions recognize that 
emotions are composed of disparate parts. One of these, the cognitive component, is 
relatively easy to put into words. If a pet of ours dies, and someone asks what our 
problem is, we can answer, ―My pet hamster Scruffy died, and she was very 
important to me.‖ If emotions exhausted themselves in this cognitive component (as 
some theorists have suggested), then losing friends and family members – or pets for 
that matter – would be far less discomfiting than it actually is. For purposes of this 
essay, we can define affect as the characteristically felt aspects of emotions. By 
contrast neither pleasure nor pain need to be any part of any emotion or mood.  
That affect is something independent of physical pain can be seen in the 
concurrent experience of positive affect and physical pain. The example that Haybron 
chooses for this is enjoying (experiencing positive affect) the probing of one‘s 
painful tooth.
193
 More paradigmatically, one could think of positive affect produced 
by cognitions that run counter to the pain one is currently experiencing. For example, 
one could also think of the affect produced by the knowledge that one has saved 
one‘s child‘s life while simultaneously incurring serious physical harm (and, thus, 
physical pain) to oneself. The positive affect and physical pain associated with a very 
successful marathon is another example. Concurrent negative affect and physical 
pleasure is also certainly not uncommon. The most common example mentioned in 
the literature is solitary orgasm or orgasm with a partner about whom one has 
reservations. In such situations it is possible to experience physical pleasure while 
simultaneously being in a negative emotional state. In hedonistic conceptions of 
happiness, pain and pleasure are usually defined widely in order to encompass 
positive and negative affect. However, the only parts of the extension of the concepts 
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of ‗pleasure‘ and ‗pain‘ that are relevant for happiness are positive and negative 
affect. These concepts will be further elucidated in the discussion of the DAS theory 
of happiness.  
The second problem plaguing hedonistic theories is the question: What is the 
―balance‖ in the definition of happiness as a ―balance of pleasure over pain.‖ Is more 
than 50% pleasure required for happiness, or more than 60%? How about 80%? How 
is this choice to be made, and who is to make it? In Chapter Six, the case will be 
made that this determination cannot be carried out in the form presented in many 
hedonistic theories of happiness. This series of questions can be brought to a point in 
the following way. When a happiness theorist has decided on something that 
happiness is about – for example, hedonistic theories claim that happiness is about 
the presence of pleasure and relative absence of pain – how does one determine at 
what point happiness begins? This problem I will call the threshold problem
194
 of 
happiness. The threshold problem is a major challenge, not just for hedonistic 
theories of happiness, but for many theories, including psychological theories like 
that of Daniel Kahneman (1999). Because the threshold problem is the central 
difficulty facing Daniel Haybron‘s emotional-state theory, it finds its full elaboration 
in Chapter Six in which Haybron‘s theory is introduced. In the exposition of the 
DAS, I explain why the way we use ―happy‖ in terms of someone‘s ‗being happy‘ 
makes it impossible to designate an objective amount of either pleasure or positive 
affect above which we can say that someone is happy.  
 
Life-satisfaction Theories 
Life-satisfaction and desire-satisfaction theories comprise a second category 
of theories of happiness. These two types of theories are very difficult to distinguish 
from each other. Desire-satisfaction theories describe happiness as the satisfaction of 
certain central desires (rarely do its proponents claim implausibly that happiness is 
the satisfaction of all desires) for one‘s life. Life-satisfaction theories describe 
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happiness as the satisfaction of certain standards or goals for one‘s life. Well, this is 
really describing the same process: when we have standards or goals for our lives, we 
desire their satisfaction or attainment, and when we have a central desire for our 
lives, then inherent in this desire is a goal or a standard towards which we strive. For 
this reason the two types of theories are structurally identical, and simply describe 
this process either from the perspective of the end-state that is achieved (satisfaction 
of a standard or standards for one‘s life), or from the perspective of the desire that is 
extinguished through the satisfaction of the standard. For that reason, when I describe 
difficulties with one or the other, in most cases, the difficulties apply to both. Despite 
the difficulties with such theories, they retain great popularity among happiness 
theorists.
195
 
Now, there is hint in our linguistic usage that a problem exists with this group 
of contentions. Just as physical pleasure or pain could result in positive or negative 
affect, it seems that the satisfaction of these central desires could result in happiness, 
but the satisfaction is not itself happiness, even if it always were to result in 
happiness. It will become evident in the course of the ensuing discussion that even 
this last claim is not true.  
The basic problem with these conceptions is that happiness does not track the 
satisfaction of desires or standards; instead it tracks positive affect. We can easily 
imagine cases in which someone has satisfied all of their central desires and is not 
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happy – in fact, they might be extraordinarily depressed. The satisfaction of a goal 
often results in an elated feeling with a drop-off shortly afterwards as one wonders 
what one should do now. Disappointment with goal achievement or desire-
satisfaction is a common and well-known phenomenon.  
So, some satisfied desires bring with them positive affect, and some do not. 
This is even clearer in the case of desires that are not central. A vast universe of 
possible desires exists whose satisfaction brings with it no positive affect. Cheating 
on one‘s partner by having a one-night stand might be a good illustration. It is 
possible to strongly desire to spend the night with a person one barely knows and – 
when that desire is realized – to experience no positive affect during the experience 
or afterward. Perhaps one‘s guilty conscience ruined what positive affect one would 
have gained from the experience or perhaps it simply wasn‘t what one expected. 
Satisfied desires or standards and positive affect are, indeed, disparate elements. 
Now, since people whose desires are satisfied without any affective impact also do 
not claim to be happy, it seems that only those desires that bring with them positive 
affect could be legitimately thought to be relevant for happiness.  
It is also clear that our claims about whether or not we are happy can change 
without any intervening desire satisfaction. Take the example of an older man who 
has had a slight cold that he just can‘t kick. Of course he desires to be rid of the 
illness, but let‘s say he becomes deeply involved in an activity that isn‘t particularly 
pleasant for him (the activity does not provide a positive affective payoff that could 
affect his happiness) over several months and slowly recovers from the cold without 
really being aware of his gradual recovery. When asked after several months of being 
healthy again, he says that he is happy; whereas while he had the cold he reported 
that he wasn‘t happy. He isn‘t happier, however, because his desire to be healthy was 
satisfied – in fact, he doesn‘t even think about the fact that he was sick when he 
answers. He has simply been feeling better because he is in good health. In short, not 
only are desire satisfaction and positive affect disparate elements, but they also do 
not necessarily move in lockstep with each other.  
Perhaps the clearest example of the lack of necessary correspondence 
between satisfied desires and positive affect is postpartum depression. Becoming a 
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mother is for many a very central desire, or to phrase it differently, a central part of 
their standard for satisfaction with their lives. For some it might be their most central 
desire. Yet in some cases when this desire is realized, a disconnect occurs between 
the fulfillment of their strong desire or their central goal or standard and their mood. 
It is hypothesized that this is a result of rapid hormone changes after delivery.  
That happiness is not the satisfaction of central desires or standards is also 
evident in the cases of people who claim to be happy while very central desires or 
standards, even those for health, work, companionship, parenthood, etc, are not 
satisfied. Having a partner is for a great many a central desire, yet there are many 
people who claim to be, and most likely are, happy in spite of not having yet found or 
having, at some point in the past, lost a partner. This is not to say that unfulfilled 
desires cannot make us unhappy; they certainly can, but only insofar as they produce 
negative affect. It is also not to say that the fulfillment of central desires cannot 
contribute to our happiness (although the work of Gilbert and Wilson has called the 
extent of their role in happiness into question
196
). But again, when fulfilled desires do 
contribute to our happiness, they do so by playing a causal role in producing 
happiness by producing positive affect. Fulfilled desires might be a cause of 
happiness, but they do not constitute happiness.  
The disconnect between happiness and life satisfaction is evident in our 
linguistic usage as well. If we were to ask a person if she is satisfied with her life, we 
might get, after a thoughtful pause, an answer like this, ―Yeah, I‘m satisfied with my 
life.‖ Not only could we still ask her, ―And are you happy?‖ without being redundant, 
but she could then, again after a thoughtful pause, say, ―Hmmm…no I wouldn‘t 
really say that I‘m happy.‖ The opposite situation, mentioned at the end of the last 
paragraph, is probably even more common: people are often happy without being 
satisfied with their lives, in other words, with many desires, for partnership, children, 
a meaningful job, etc., still outstanding. This is not to say that there is no correlation 
between life-satisfaction and happiness. Indeed, people who are happy are very often 
satisfied with their lives, and they are often satisfied with their lives because they are 
happy. Happiness is for many an important criterion for life satisfaction. Conversely, 
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being very satisfied with one‘s life could be a source of positive affect and, thus, 
relevant to happiness. I am also not trying to call into question the value of life-
satisfaction as a measure of well-being or welfare. I am simply saying that life-
satisfaction and happiness represent disparate phenomena.  
Interestingly, empirical evidence underlines the fact that people do see life 
satisfaction and happiness as different concepts. Glatzer, for example, found that ―42 
to 49 percent of those rating themselves as ―completely satisfied‖ also reported 
significant symptoms of anxiety and related forms of distress. And six to seven 
percent of the completely satisfied reported that they were ―usually unhappy or 
depressed.‖197 Keep in mind, this isn‘t just those who are satisfied with their lives, 
but those who are completely satisfied with their lives. Needless to say, someone who 
is usually unhappy or depressed is not happy no matter how satisfied with her life she 
is. If not all of the ―completely satisfied‖ are happy, how many of those who are 
simply ―satisfied‖ with their lives also lack happiness? The conclusion that happiness 
and life satisfaction are disparate social constructs seems unavoidable. 
 
External Elements in Theories of Happiness 
While there are no defenders of complete externality of psychological 
happiness, there are those who qualify their internal theories of happiness with 
external criteria. If internal theories of happiness are bounded by external criteria and 
they are also subjective theories of happiness, then they also have objective criteria in 
the sense of judgment subjectivity. In other words, they are automatically dependant 
on something other than the judgment of the agent. This is the case in Richard 
Kraut‘s argument below. He argues that some external circumstances can limit the 
correctness of judgments of happiness. So his theory of happiness has external 
qualifications (i.e., elements external to the mental life of the agent do make a 
difference in happiness) and objective qualifications (the agent‘s judgment of her 
own happiness can be wrong given certain external events).  
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It does not have to be the case that qualifications of both kinds are made. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Daniel Haybron introduces limitations on the 
correctness of our judgments but does not do so by making reference to any extra-
mental states. His theory of happiness entails the conclusion that we may very often 
be wrong about our own happiness, simply because we have a flawed memory and 
understanding of our own mental states.
198
 Von Wright, on the other hand, claims 
that if an individual believes that he is happy, then he is.
199
 Jonathan Freedman might 
have meant this when he says, ―If you feel happy, you are happy, that‘s all we mean 
by the term.‖200 David Myers also seems to be of this opinion. After quoting 
Freedman, he writes, ―Moreover, if you can‘t tell someone whether you‘re happy or 
miserable, who can?‖201 The view that the agent is the ultimate judge of his own 
happiness is termed by Kraut, ―extreme subjectivism‖202 and though he does not 
name his own view, we could term it ―subjective with objective qualifications.‖  
Typically, proponents of life-satisfaction theories of happiness are the 
strongest supporters of objective qualifications in the mental-state sense, and it is 
fairly easy to see why. If the object of the happiness judgment is, indeed, a life, then 
cogent arguments are easy to make that the object of the judgment encompasses more 
than simply the mental states of the agent. If one were to claim that the object of the 
judgment does not extend beyond mental states, then (keeping in mind the discussion 
of ―lives‖ and their necessary external elements in the previous chapter), it would be 
questionable whether the judgment is about ―a life‖ at all. Even those philosophers 
who do not explicitly support a life-satisfaction view of happiness often slip into 
other usages to achieve their argumentative goals. It is at this point that many begin 
to talk about ―living happily,‖ ―living a happy life,‖ and ―being happy with one‘s 
life.‖ These phrases evince gradations in the degree to which they take one‘s life as 
the object of the happiness judgment. The closer a theorist gets to taking ―a life‖ as 
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the object of the judgment, the better the argument for external qualifications to an 
internal theory.  
Richard Kraut has provided one of the most well-known defenses of the idea 
that a subjective theory of happiness must be qualified by extra-mental 
circumstances, and that, in particular, deceived happiness is not true happiness. In the 
end he does not reach a firm conclusion, insisting that he is ―not denying that it is 
sometimes correct to call a person happy merely because he feels that way about this 
life.‖ Because his argument is typical of this viewpoint, it is profitable to examine its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Kraut uses many different phrases to describe happiness: ―living a happy 
life,‖ ―living happily,‖ ―being happy with one‘s life,‖ ―being happy,‖ and simply 
―happiness.‖ To some extent, he is entitled to switch between phrases like ―being 
happy‖ and phrases referencing an attitude toward one‘s life, as his position is clearly 
a life-satisfaction theory of happiness. However, he never specifies the relation of 
these different phrases to one another and tacitly assumes their semantic identity. 
Herein lies one of the stumbling blocks of his argument. Just one of the difficulties 
with this confounding of the different meanings goes as follows: The virtually non-
existent relationship between the relational use of happy (I‘m happy with the 
quarterly report) and anything we would call ‗being happy‘ has already been 
explained at length. It is deeply problematic to employ the relational use of ‗happy‘ 
with reference to one‘s life and, without further explanation, equate this with being 
happy. But such phrases are needed to achieve the intuitions that Kraut seeks to call 
forth. Kraut‘s initial thought experiment runs as follows: 
Suppose a man is asked what his idea of happiness is, and he replies, ―Being 
loved, admired, or at least respected by my friends. But I would hate to have 
friends who only pretend to have these attitudes towards me. If they didn‘t 
like me, I would want to know about it. Better to have no friends at all, and 
realize it, than to have false friends one cannot see through.‖ Suppose that 
what this man hates actually comes to pass. His so-called friends orchestrate 
an elaborate deception, giving him every reason to believe that they love and 
admire him, though in fact they don‘t. And he is taken in by the illusion.  
Kraut then asks, ―Is this a happy life? Is he a happy man?‖, clearly assuming that the 
questions ask the same thing. It is at this point that he introduces the term ―extreme 
subjectivism‖ to designate the view that assents to the above questions. Surprisingly, 
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he then begins to offer powerful arguments for the cogency of this kind of 
subjectivism:  
Just as unfounded fear is still fear, so unfounded happiness is still happiness. 
For consider what we would say if the deceived man became suspicious of his 
friends, and came upon an opportunity to discover what they really think of 
him. Would we say that he is finding out whether he is really happy? 
Wouldn‘t it be more natural to say that he is finding out whether his 
happiness has been based on an illusion?
203
  
Although this is, by all appearances, a strong argument, Kraut maintains that this 
analysis is too simple. His objection runs as follows: ―When a person is asked what 
his idea of happiness is, he quite naturally answers by describing the kind of life he 
would like to lead.―204 Now, ―What is your idea of happiness?‖ is hardly a common 
question; ―What is happiness for you?‖ might be a more innocuous stand-in for 
Kraut‘s purposes.  
Even granting Kraut his ―idea of happiness‖ question, the conclusion that he 
draws from it is exaggerated and results in a particularly weak form of life-
satisfaction theory. I have argued above that ‗happiness‘ is a word that evokes a very 
wide range of intuitions (e.g., up to and including attaining nirvana) far wider than 
the simple question ―Are you happy?‖ or ―Is she happy?‖ It is this comparatively 
simple use in which we have a great practical interest, and which I have argued 
should form the beginning of our investigations.  
Kraut concludes that ―Evidently, when we ask someone, ‗What will make you 
happy? What is your idea of happiness?‘, we are not requesting that he specify the 
conditions under which he will be in a certain psychological state.‖ Instead, 
according to Kraut, we respond with the standards we impose on our lives and the 
goals we are pursuing.
205
 Kraut is correct in asserting that we do sometimes respond 
with goals and standards to these questions, however, as mentioned in the life 
satisfaction section above, if these goals were to be achieved and these standards 
were to be met with no accompanying affective payoff, then we would not claim to 
be happy.  
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This cognitive-affective divergence is the Achilles‘ heel of all life-satisfaction 
theories of happiness. Considering this, perhaps our responses to Kraut‘s ―idea of 
happiness question‖ are more like predictions than standards. One way in which 
Kraut makes this sound implausible is in his description of what our answers are 
predictions of. When he says that they are predictions of the conditions under which 
we will be in a certain psychological state, he makes it sound like it is one occurrent 
state, as in ‗feeling happy,‘ or the occurrent use of ‗being happy.‘ However, 
happiness in its longer-term sense is much more than this. At the very least it is a 
series of psychological states linked by some overarching organizational structure. A 
prediction of the conditions necessary to find oneself in a ―state‖ like this does not 
sound implausible at all. This is especially clear in alternative phrasings of questions 
about happiness. For example, in the case of the question, ―What do you think will 
make you happy?‖, it is not clear why this question should be calling for standards 
(in the sense that Kraut uses the term, that is to say, standards for external goods or 
events) instead of predictions of what will put us in a specific long-term 
psychological state.   
How can we be sure that predictions and not standards for happiness result 
even from Kraut‘s question? One way would be to elaborate on the cognitive-
affective divergence by considering a case in which an agent is in a state that we 
would refer to as prototypical unhappiness and no deception is involved. Say we ask 
a college graduate embarking on a career in investment banking what his ‗idea of 
happiness‘ is. He responds with a paean to ―success‖ and elaborates on the goods he 
expects to acquire as a result of that success. When we visit him again two decades 
later, he has acquired all the goods he mentioned in his answer, but is nonetheless 
deeply depressed. His possessions give him no pleasure, and he is of the opinion that 
he has wasted the best years of his life with 16+ hour workdays. His marriage has 
collapsed and his ‗work friends‘ turned out to be no more than that. As a result of all 
this, he is contemplating suicide. In short, we would describe him as unquestionably 
unhappy.  
Throughout his career, his achievement of the goods he claimed composed 
his ―idea of happiness‖ did at no point bring with it the positive affective payoff that 
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he expected and at no time did he call himself happy. At our reunion, we ask him 
again what his idea of happiness is. He replies that he still thinks that happiness is all 
of those things that he has achieved, and he just does not understand what went 
wrong or why he feels the way he does. Now, if we agree with Kraut and view 
people‘s answers to happiness inquiries as standards instead of predictions, we would 
be in the absurd situation of having to call him happy even though he himself 
believes otherwise and even in the face of his thoughts of suicide. Imagine another 
variation on his answer to our second inquiry about his idea of happiness. This time 
he says, ―Well, I thought X, Y, and Z were happiness, but I was wrong. I‘m 
depressed as hell now and, right now, I have no idea what happiness is.‖ How would 
we, according to Kraut‘s theory, judge the happiness of someone who has no ―idea of 
happiness‖ for his life in terms of goals, standards, etc.? Would it be neutral despite 
his serious contemplation of suicide? The point is that an individual‘s idea of 
happiness in the sense that Kraut is talking about it is not determinative of his or her 
happiness; positive and negative affect is. Emotional state is determinative of 
happiness independent of standards for external goods or situations reached or 
missed. Our banker friend is unhappy when depressed and suicidal independent of 
his ―ideas‖ of happiness, and even when he has none at all. The time interval can be 
shortened as one pleases – at no point in time do goals achieved or standards met 
result in self- or other-described happiness unless a positive affective payoff exists. 
A modification of an example that Kraut uses in a different context is also 
enlightening in this regard: someone whose family is living abroad in a remote region 
of a war-torn country is deceptively informed that they have been killed. After 
another year passes she finds out the truth, namely that they are all alive and well. 
Would we say that during that year she really was not unhappy, because her 
unhappiness was based on a deception? Hardly.  
The purported dependency of happiness on extra-mental states stands and 
falls with the cogency of life-satisfaction theories of happiness. Because life-
satisfaction theories of happiness are inaccurate, appeals to ―a happy life‖ or the 
mutant ―being happy with one‘s life‖ are not informative regarding the phenomenon 
that we commonly view as happiness. 
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Evaluative Happiness - Happiness and Morality 
Many philosophers have argued (most very briefly and on the periphery of 
the grounding of a moral theory) that immoral people cannot be happy, or that we 
cannot ascribe happiness to them. These objections can be divided into three basic 
categories: 1) intuitions about human psychological makeup, 2) objections based on a 
well-being (as opposed to a psychological) understanding of happiness, and 3) 
general intuitions based on our use of words.  
The first of these is an empirical thesis. The basic idea of theorists arguing 
along these lines is that committing sufficiently evil acts either results in a disordered 
psyche, with feelings of guilt, anger, etc., that are incompatible with a kind of 
tranquility or deepness of positive feeling necessary for happiness; or that such acts 
result only from a disordered psyche, one filled with too many elements that 
contradict a positive judgment of a person‘s happiness. The psychological makeup 
thesis might well be true under certain conditions. Given the way the human mind 
works, it may be the case that certain evil acts are not compatible with a certain 
amount of stable positive affect. This certainly seems to be the case with many 
criminals with whom we are acquainted. There is a catch, however, with the first 
interpretation: The acts in question must be evil or very wrong not from an objective 
point of view, or from the point of view of third parties, but from the agent‘s own 
point of view.  
If having a bad conscience and experiencing guilt play a large role in this first 
interpretation, then clearly the agent must perceive herself to be have committed an 
evil act in order for psychological disorder to follow. This, unfortunately, fails to 
include a great many people who we normally take to have committed evil acts. Acts 
that are aggressive and result in pain and even death can be a source of great pride 
when the perpetrator of such acts believes that they were necessary to achieve some 
very fine and good end, such as justice, the achievement of an ideal state, the 
salvation of a community, town, city, state, nation through purification or ridding 
itself from dangerous or pestilential elements, etc. Heroes of past cultures include 
quite a few who initiated or carried out wars of conquest, including the rape and 
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pillage of civilizations and cultures considered to be ‗other.‘ The necessity of the 
perception of oneself as being a committer of wrongdoing places serious restrictions 
on the extension of those individuals who cannot be called happy as a result of their 
objectionable acts. Additionally, if the acts are not perceived to be evil, then perhaps 
they don‘t have to result from a disordered psyche either.  
Even if the perpetrator of evil acts is aware that the acts are wrong and sees 
them as wrong it seems that this knowledge must have the appropriate relationship to 
her emotional life to secure the kind of effect necessary for the withholding of a 
judgment of happiness. Think about the example of a corporate executive who knows 
very well that one branch of his company that he directs does something very bad. 
Maybe he likes this fact, maybe he delights in finding a legal loophole, tricking the 
authorities, beating out his competitors. Perhaps he likes the image of himself as a 
ruthless corporate executive. Examples are easy to construct in which the perpetrator 
bears a closer and more personal relationship to the wrongdoing, and perhaps enjoys 
his self-actualization, enjoys feeling his power, and enjoys being the sort of person 
who flouts morality, convention, etc. Although all of this seems highly plausible, no 
one has ever doubted that happiness comes in degrees, and it might be the case that 
unique psychological kinds of deep and reliable positive feeling exist that come only 
from certain virtuous or deep compassion for one‘s fellow beings, as Tibetan 
Buddhism, for example, strongly emphasizes. In the end, these are questions that 
only empirical studies can answer.  
The second appeal to morality in happiness involves descriptions of 
happiness that are based on a conception of happiness as well-being. Claims for 
morality as a condition for or as a part of happiness based on a conception of 
happiness as well-being as opposed to a psychological understanding of happiness 
are trivially true (assuming that well-being does include elements of other-concern, 
morality, or virtuous living), but do not jive with our very heavily psychological use 
of ‗being happy‘ as explicated up until this point.  
The third and strongest approach to this question claims that evil people 
cannot be happy based on general intuitions about our use of ‗happiness‘ or ‗being 
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happy.‘ The statements of J. J. C. Smart and R. M. Hare are cases in point. Smart 
claims: 
The notion of happiness ties up with that of contentment: to be fairly happy at 
least involves being fairly contented, though it involves something more as 
well…to call a person ―happy‖ is to say more than that he is contented for 
most of the time, or even that he frequently enjoys himself and is rarely 
discontented or in pain. It is, I think, in part to express a favorable attitude to 
the idea of such a form of contentment and enjoyment.
206
 
Hare‘s contribution is similar in tone: 
To be brief, we may say that, when somebody calls somebody else happy, 
there is a rather complicated process of appraisal going on; for the appraisals 
of both of them are involved, but in a different way…before we call a man 
happy we find it necessary to be sure, not only that his desires are satisfied, 
but also that the complete set of his desires is one which we are not very 
much averse to having ourselves.
207
 
These two statements are interesting because, although they may appear to, they do 
not actually deliver an argument for exclusion of evil deeds or evil people from the 
extension of people who are happy. It appears that they do, but only if the observer 
that Hare and Smart are talking about is actually a good person him- or herself. Even 
if they are correct in maintaining that our use of ‗happy‘ does have this evaluative 
touch, the evaluative touch itself is subjective in being dependant on the perspective 
of the person doing the judging. A racist might despise many desires of the non-racist 
and consequently withhold a judgment of happiness.
208
 
 Irwin Goldstein argues at length that in addition to the psychological use of 
happiness we have been dealing with here (which he calls a hedonic view of 
happiness), there is another one that is evaluative, prescriptive, and even moral. 
However, even Goldstein begins his analysis with a discussion of what ‗real‘ or 
‗true‘ happiness is.209 Among the six different things Goldstein claims we can mean 
when we talk about ‗true‘ or ‗real‘ happiness is a paradigmatic example of happiness. 
A sub-category of paradigmatic ‗true‘ happiness is moral happiness. It may also be 
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the case as Goldman claims, that this meaning also occasionally plays a role even 
when ‗true‘ is not used. However, as discussed earlier, I consider this usage to be as 
peripheral as the usage that denies that someone who won a tennis match is the ―true 
winner‖ of the match. And this is a move that we can (or at least often do) make with 
every term that has a relatively clear primary and narrow meaning and faces a 
potentially boundless set of conditions of approval that we might wish for someone 
who is in this social role or to whom a socially desired good (like happiness) is 
attributed. This applies to a leader (he‘s not a true leader; a true leader asks the 
opinions of those under him before he acts), a policeman (he‘s not a real cop, a real 
cop is willing to bend the rules and cut corners to get things done), a winner, and on 
and on. The same can be said of attributions of desirable characteristics such as 
success (he‘s not successful, to be truly successful one must be admired by one‘s 
subordinates) and of course ―being happy.‖ Our tendency to hesitate to ascribe 
positive evaluations to individuals that we do not like or approve of in some way 
does not necessarily have much to do with the narrow meaning of the specific 
positive evaluation that is in question. The reason for our hesitation to do this is most 
likely a form of social control, and might also include envy, or a pre-form of 
Schadenfreude.  
Whatever our motivation is, the result is that very often negative evaluations 
that have little to do with the core meaning of the positive evaluation that is to be 
ascribed cause us to hesitate to ascribe the rightly deserved positive evaluation. One 
move that we make to enable this is to resort to ―truly‖ or ―real‖ in front of the 
positive evaluation and to deny that the agent meets this new, higher bar. I will 
refrain from repeating all of the ways mentioned in Chapter Three in which one 
could be said not to be truly happy. Suffice it to say that my contention is that for 
happiness, there is a narrow, non-evaluative meaning that is indeed the most common 
sense of ‗being happy.‘ Many of the hedonistic and life-satisfaction theories of 
happiness agree with this statement, as do all of the theories that I will elaborate on in 
the next three chapters. Although I am skeptical of the claims of proponents of 
externality and morality in psychological happiness, I in no way regard my 
arguments here as a refutation of their claims. In light of the history of things called 
 115 
happiness, the possibility that residue exists in the meaning of the term that leans 
toward fortunate, lucky, and even moral is one to which we should be open if 
convincing arguments for it are brought forward. 
 
Conclusion 
Even the phrase chosen for analysis in this essay has at least two meanings. 
Depending on the context ‗being happy‘ can be used either in its occurrent sense, as 
an equivalent to ‗feeling happy,‘ or in its long-term sense. The meaning of the long-
term sense is the object of this essay and the explanatory target of the following two 
major categories of theories of happiness.  
Hedonistic theories of happiness are correct in claiming that happiness is 
divorced from external events, and that it has to do with the way that we feel. But 
pleasure encompasses far too much to be the ―substance‖ of happiness. Many 
pleasures, even very intense ones, are irrelevant for happiness, and the hedonistic 
―balance‖ formulas for determining happiness suffer from the threshold problem. 
Instead, positive and negative affect are the relevant determinants of happiness.  
Life-satisfaction theories emphasize the judgmental aspect of theories of 
happiness, but the proper object of the judgment of happiness is not ―our lives.‖ 
Happiness does not track objective changes in our lives or our attitudes toward them. 
Instead, it tracks the relative presence of positive affect and relative absence of 
negative affect. Cases of cognitive-affective divergence make this clear. Thus, life-
satisfaction and happiness are different concepts. 
Two qualifications made on theories of our contemporary conception of 
happiness are based on exaggerated concerns. Richard Kraut argues for the 
introduction of external qualifications because he claims that happiness involves the 
meeting of standards for one‘s life. However, these ―standards‖ are best understood 
as predictions of the relative presence of positive affect and the relative absence of 
negative affect. One indication that this is the case: people do not claim to be happy 
when the meeting of the ―standards‖ in question is accompanied by strong negative 
affect. Most arguments for the introduction of external qualifications on theories of 
happiness are based on life-satisfaction theories of happiness, and since life-
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satisfaction theories of happiness are deficient, these arguments fail as well. Several 
authors, including Hare and Smart argue for a different qualification by saying that 
happiness is an evaluative and not a purely descriptive phenomenon. I argue that the 
hesitance to ascribe happiness to people who violate social norms has little to do with 
the core meaning of happiness, but instead has to do with a general practice of social 
control through which we refuse to ascribe many terms that are generally viewed 
positively to individuals who do not meet our expectations. These arguments are not 
meant to end the debate, but instead to point out problems with existing 
argumentation for these two qualifications on happiness.  
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Chapter 6: Emotional-State Theory 
 
A more attractive approach to happiness than that which hedonistic or life-
satisfaction theories offer is found in Daniel Haybron‘s emotional-state theory.210 
Problematic talk of satisfaction of desires or standards for one‘s life is eliminated, 
and pleasure is replaced by a more plausible constituting factor of happiness, namely, 
positive affect. This move away from hedonistic theories marks the most important 
contribution of Haybron‘s emotional-state theory, so it is worthwhile, first of all, to 
get clear on what positive affect is not. Haybron emphasizes that when we talk of 
happiness, there is a temptation to think about positive affect in very simple terms. 
We can call this, as Julia Annas does, ―smiley-face‖ happiness. For the felt part of an 
emotion to be classified as positive affect, it certainly does not have to be expressed 
in excessive, canting smiles that many people find off-putting, if not downright 
revolting; instead, feelings of deep engagement, tranquility, meaning, and love are 
paradigm examples. Indeed, what upsets many people about smiley-faced happiness 
is its seeming artificiality, and the effort that goes into maintaining it. In other words, 
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it seems to be forced, and it remains an open question whether forced positive affect 
is positive affect at all. Take David Myer‘s borrowed description of Martha, a forty-
three-year-old wife of a physician who discovers that her husband had been having 
affairs. She remembered ―smiling and clutching my charge card on the way to the 
mall as I cheered myself by thinking he was just ‗working late‘ today.‖211 This kind 
of forced affect does not seem like a good candidate for something that is happiness-
constitutive and Haybron‘s explanation of the importance of the centrality of affect 
(outlined below) provides an explanation for this.  
In short, the widely varying felt parts of emotions that are categorized under 
the rubric of positive affect need not be accompanied by smiling, and when a 
superficial feeling is accompanied by smiling, it need not be positive affect. Haybron, 
in fact, makes the point that ―feeling happy‖ is just one of the many happiness-
constituting states collected under the rubric of positive affect. Many of the states 
that we would plausibly take to be happiness-constituting are characterized more 
accurately by terms and descriptions such as tranquility, feeling fulfilled, and a 
feeling of meaning, than by ―giddy exhilaration.‖212 
In his argument for positive affect‘s central role in happiness, Haybron claims 
that the establishment of positive affect as that state which is happiness-constituting 
is more important than the question of whether or not one is actually happy:  
My arguments will focus not on what it is to achieve happiness, but on the 
more fundamental question of what makes a state happiness-constituting: in 
virtue of what a state makes a constitutive difference in how happy or 
unhappy we are. This is the crucial issue: for we want to be as happy as we 
can be, consistently with the other things that matter. The further question of 
whether we will actually be happy, period, is less pressing.
213
  
Although Haybron believes positive affect to be happiness-constituting, he does not 
believe that happiness is an emotion or mood. Instead happiness is ―a condition 
consisting in (at least) the aggregate of a person‘s emotions and moods.‖214 While the 
term ‗condition‘ captures the intermittency and dispositionality that Haybron is 
aiming for, he refers to his theory as an ―emotional-state‖ theory for the most part, as 
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he believes that ―emotional condition‖ has negative connotations and is frequently 
used to refer to emotional dysfunction of some sort or another, such as depression. 
Nonetheless, ―emotional condition‖ is a helpful term to keep in mind when 
examining Haybron‘s theory, as emotional state can give the impression of referring 
to one occurrent and static cut-out of one‘s emotional life. Furthermore, Haybron 
often does compare the emotional condition that is depression and the emotional 
condition that is happiness, especially when explaining the dispositional nature of 
happiness. Thinking of happiness as the positive counterpart to depression is perhaps 
the easiest way to get a handle on what Haybron intends the emotional-state theory to 
be.  
Haybron‘s view is marked by three important differences between Haybron‘s 
emotional-state theory and hedonistic theories of happiness. The first is the rejection 
of pleasure as the category of states that constitute happiness and pleasure‘s 
replacement with positive affect. Secondly, emotional-state theory, through its move 
to positive affect, rejects superficial pleasures that do not move one or have an 
impact on one‘s central affective state (a term that will be explained in a moment). 
Thirdly, the determination of one‘s emotional condition does not simply include the 
sum of emotions that have occurred, but also their dispositional and unconscious 
aspects. In the following, we will see how these differences play out.  
Haybron begins the description of his theory by drawing a parallel between it 
and life-satisfaction theories. Whereas life-satisfaction theories ask the individual to 
judge that her life is going well for her—thus an endorsement of the intellect—the 
emotional-state theory thinks of the happy individual as ―responding favorably, in 
emotional terms, to her life—responding emotionally to her life as if things are 
generally going well for her.‖215 In parallel to life-satisfaction theory‘s endorsement 
of the intellect, Haybron claims that happiness involves the endorsement of the 
―emotional aspect of the self.‖216 He calls this psychic affirmation.217  
Haybron divides this sort of affirmation into three categories: 1) attunement, 
which describes a general feeling of being ―at home‖ in one‘s life, feeling safe, 
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secure, and able to let one‘s defenses down, 2) engagement, which describes an 
affirmation of one‘s activities, projects, and goals. Engagement answers the question 
if they are worth investing in, or if it would be better to disengage from them, 3) 
endorsement, which describes a relationship to life that is affirming, a view that one‘s 
life is ―positively good‖ and contains things that are to be sought again in the 
future.
218
  
The typical dimensions of folk psychological emotions that belong to 
attunement are peace of mind on the positive end as opposed to anxiety on the 
negative end, confidence as opposed to insecurity, and ‗uncompression‘ as opposed 
to compression.
219
 Engagement encompasses the dimensions of exuberance or 
vitality as opposed to listlessness, and flow as opposed to boredom or ennui. To 
endorsement belong the dimensions of joy as opposed to sadness, and cheerfulness as 
opposed to irritability. Haybron admits that this schema is somewhat oversimplified; 
its purpose is to give us a feeling for what he means when he says that the emotions 
that belong to positive affect are forms of psychic affirmation.
220
    
Haybron moves from this description of the various kinds of positive affect to 
a discussion about why he considers moods and emotions to be happiness-
constituting while other felt phenomena, such as some pleasures, are not. The 
difference lies in what he calls the centrality of the given affect. Haybron claims that 
all affect can be positioned on a dimension of central vs. peripheral. Amusements are 
peripheral and may have a very slight effect on our happiness, if any. Grief about the 
death of a loved one is central and will certainly have a great and lasting effect on our 
emotional condition.
221
  
Haybon rightly maintains that this distinction is made in folk psychology, 
even though there is no common term for it. Psychological deepness might come 
close; we often talk of a deep feeling of sadness or a profound sadness. In addition, 
the difference does not seem to be one of intensity. Haybron employs the example of 
orgasm to illustrate this point. An experience of orgasm could be very intense, yet 
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fail to ―move us.‖ In explaining the central vs. peripheral distinction, Haybron again 
emphasizes the inadequacy of pleasure as a constituting factor for happiness as well 
as the inadequacy of hedonic theories as theories of happiness in general; a low 
intensity cheerful mood, or even tranquility contributes more to our happiness than a 
high intensity, but peripheral experience like orgasm.
222
  
Central affective states have several characteristics: 1) they are productive, 
that is to say, they generate other affective states, cognitions, and physiological 
changes 2) they are persistent – after occurring they do not disappear immediately 3) 
they are pervasive, in other words, they permeate and set the ―tone‖ of consciousness 
4) they are profound – there is a psychological depth to them that physical pains or 
pleasures lack. Haybron claims, additionally, that all central affective states are either 
moods, mood-constituting emotions, or a combination of the two.
223
  
According to Haybron, happiness involves central affective states, and, 
additionally, mood propensities. This latter entity, as a reflection of point 1) above, is 
a tendency for certain moods or emotional states to be produced. An individual is 
happy not just by virtue of the number of experiences of positive affect that she has, 
but by virtue of her tendency to respond to certain things in a positive way. For 
example, someone who is happy responds to neutral or positive events in a different 
way than someone who is unhappy, and she recovers her tranquility or whatever state 
usually constitutes her happiness more quickly than someone who isn‘t as happy as 
she is. In other words, we can see her to be a happy individual even through her 
experience of negative affect. Haybron also claims that mood propensities involve 
more than a person‘s temperament – while this, as Haybron sees it, is fixed, 
happiness and unhappiness are states that can change. However, like temperament, 
they also have a dispositional character.   
In my opinion, the divisions that Haybon draws between central affective 
states and other affective states are somewhat vague, if they, in fact, exist at all. I 
would claim that all affective states meet the first three qualifications to varying 
degrees. Indeed, Haybron, in his elaboration of the persistency requirement of central 
affective states, says, ―when they occur, they generally last a while. Perhaps only a 
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minute or so, usually longer.‖224 This criterion (one-minute length) for the 
characteristic of persistence is an extremely inclusive criterion for central affective 
states, and illustrates the vagueness of the concept. 
While Haybron‘s discussion of mood states, mood propensities, etc., is 
interesting in its own right, I believe that the differences between the various kinds of 
affect that Haybron attempts to point out are not as relevant to happiness as he 
believes them to be. In past formulations of his emotional-state theory, when it came 
time for him to state explicitly what happiness is, he wrote, ―To be happy is for one‘s 
emotional condition to exhibit a sufficiently favorable balance of positive versus 
negative.‖ This is vague. The next definition is a slight improvement, ―one is happy 
if, and only if, one‘s emotional state is predominantly positive and one is relatively 
free of seriously negative affect.‖ Haybron himself recognizes the vagueness of these 
determinations and admits that the problem of a happiness cut-off point is 
―surprisingly difficult.‖ His vagueness on this point makes it clear that Haybron‘s 
theory is vulnerable to the threshold problem mentioned above in the treatment of the 
hedonistic theories.  
The threshold problem of happiness involves the difficulty of determining the 
―beginning‖ of happiness when a theorist has determined something that happiness is 
about, or constituted by. For ease of discussion, let‘s call this its ―substance.‖ For the 
hedonistic theories, the substance of happiness is pleasure, for Haybron‘s theory it is 
positive affect, and as we shall see shortly, for Daniel Kahneman‘s theory of 
objective happiness (1999) it is utility. In each case the following question arises: 
How much of the substance must one have to be happy. These theories face the 
following conundrum in their determination of an answer to this question, in other 
words, in identifying a necessary level of the substance: If proponents of the theory 
say that 70% (for simplicity‘s sake, imagine that the amount of the substance is 
measured by the amount of time in which a person ‗experiences‘ the substance) of 
positive affect is necessary for happiness while a person may have no more than 30% 
negative affect, what do they do with all of the people who have 65% positive and 
35% negative affect and claim to be happy? Or 55% and 45%? In answer to this, they 
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could lower the standard and simply say that a person is happy when they have more 
than 50% positive affect.  
But might there still not be people with less than 50% positive affect who 
claim to be happy, and what of the people with more than 50% positive affect who 
claim not to be happy? Are people‘s convictions about their own happiness irrelevant 
when we talk about their own happiness? Are they always wrong when their 
judgment diverges from the objective standard? Most importantly, what possible 
justification do we have for setting a specific, objective level of the substance 
necessary for happiness? I believe that the threshold problem dooms to failure all 
theories of happiness which approach the question in this way. It is not possible to set 
a universal standard for the amount of the substance necessary for people to be 
happy, neither happy nor unhappy, or unhappy. This is not the way that we use the 
word, ‗happy,‘ and does not fit to the phenomenon that we describe with it.  
The threshold problem is that on which many theories of happiness founder 
and, consequently, that about which many theories say virtually nothing at all. It 
comes as no surprise in light of the rest of his excellent contributions to the literature, 
that in the most recent formulation of his theory, Haybron shows his awareness of 
this problem and deals with it extensively while admitting that he has not provided a 
final resolution. He begins by emphasizing the problems with the views he tacitly 
accepted in earlier versions. For one, a ―predominance‖ view does not allow for the 
wide number of cases of people who would not say that they are either happy or 
unhappy, but instead would position themselves somewhere in between. This is a 
problem for most any threshold, simply conceived. Secondly, a simple 50% threshold 
evinces a lack of sensitivity to our idea that crossing this threshold is to cross an 
important threshold.  
There is one crucial difference, however, between Haybron‘s and my framing 
of the problem. In his discussion of borderline cases of happiness or unhappiness, 
Haybron never mentions the perspective of the person making the judgment. He 
introduces examples like that of Sam, who experiences positive affect around 55% of 
the time and negative affect about 38% of the time, with the positive and negative 
affect being of equal strength. Haybron then says, ―It is not the least obvious that 
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Sam should be counted happy, particularly if we reflect on what it would be like to 
have that much negative affect.‖225 Interestingly, in this example, Sam‘s opinion 
about his own happiness is irrelevant – it is simply not mentioned. 
Using the example of Sam, Haybron conducted a informal survey of six 
sections of an introductory ethics course with the results that 38% called Sam 
moderately happy, 34% said that he was neither happy nor unhappy, and 24% called 
him moderately or very unhappy. Haybron uses this as evidence that the 50% rule is 
inappropriate, but does not seem to doubt the enterprise of finding some objective 
limit. To my mind, far more interesting is the diversity of the responses – when 38% 
call Sam moderately happy, 34% believe that he is neither happy nor unhappy, and 
24% call him unhappy. Might it not be the case that this very subjectivity of the 
individual standards applied plays a significant role in our understanding of 
happiness as a whole? This is the case that will be made in the explication of the 
dynamic affective standard model of happiness.  
Haybron clearly recognizes the difficulty involved in obtaining an objective 
threshold of happiness, but does not realize the source of the difficulty – that part of 
our contemporary conception of happiness is the standard of the individual as to how 
much positive affect is necessary for happiness. Instead, he makes reference to a 
paper by Fredrickson and Losada in which they argue that healthy functioning or 
―flourishing‖ requires at least a 2.9:1 ratio of positive to negative affect, while lower 
ratios are a sign of ―languishing.‖226  
Although Haybron regards such proportions as interesting, he does not 
ultimately think that this is the way in which we go about determining someone‘s 
happiness. Instead, we get a general sense of someone‘s emotional condition. If she 
has cheery feelings throughout the day, but at night when she is undistracted, cries 
regularly, then it is doubtful that we would call her happy. If some measure of 
tranquility is not there, then happiness is not there either, no matter what kind of 
proportion one finds. In the end Haybron concludes that ―perhaps no fixed threshold, 
in terms of the proportion of positive and negative affect…can yield intuitively 
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plausible results.‖227 Haybron, however, does not claim this for the reasons that the 
DAS does so; instead, he claims this because of his view of happiness as an 
emotional condition, somewhat akin to depression. Just as depression is more than 
simply the number of experiences of negative affect that one has, happiness is more 
than the number of positive affects that one has.  
According to Haybron happiness is: ―to respond emotionally to one‘s life as if 
conditions are broadly favorable, with any problems being minor. In general, things 
are good, with no serious concern required; one‘s ‗affective welfarometer‘ so to 
speak, is in the green zone. To be unhappy is to respond as if one‘s problems are 
major, threatening even the minimal achievement of one‘s needs or goals (as the 
psyche ‗sees‘ them).‖228 This description does not seem to bring us any sort of 
solution to the threshold problem. Haybron makes another, similar suggestion: ―…to 
be happy, one‘s emotional condition should be broadly favorable—across the three 
dimensions of attunement, engagement, and endorsement—with negative emotional 
states comprising a relatively minor part of the picture. This is the state of ‗psychic 
affirmation.‘‖229 A state of ―psychic rejection‖ on Haybron‘s view is represented by 
the emotional state of the unhappy person: ―…an unhappy person‘s emotional 
condition will exhibit negative affect to a major extent, or will fail broadly to be 
favorable while having substantial levels of negative affect.‖230 While it does not 
seem that we have come closer to any sort of threshold with these descriptions of 
happy and unhappy people, it does seem fairly clear what Haybron is getting at: a 
condition, similar to depression but oppositely poled, that is made up not just by 
instances of affect, but also dispositions to react with affect of a positive valence. 
It is probably best to let him repeat it in his own words in his summing up of 
the ―intuitive idea‖ of his theory: ―The intuitive idea is for happiness to embody an 
emotional response appropriate to good conditions with only minor problems, so one 
might be happy despite having lots of relatively minor negative affects, since this 
might be compatible with one‘s basic emotional condition being broadly favorable.‖ 
What Haybron is struggling with here in saying that we are responding ―as if‖ things 
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were going well for us in the world is not simply a characterization of the happy 
person, but also the question of how to define positive affect. As a felt phenomenon, 
we can name feelings that are different examples of positive affect, but a further 
characterization would have to go in the way in which Haybron is pointing. Positive 
affect evolved as a kind of psychic affirmation of things in the world that were in 
some way evolutionarily advantageous. This is a functional description of positive 
affect in its usual role. This is not to say that positive affect cannot be called forth or 
maintained in other situations, but it requires great emotional skill (and presumably 
much practice) to subjugate positive affect to our desires for the kinds of emotion 
that we would like to have independent of external events. 
 
Conclusion 
I believe Haybron‘s theory to be greatly superior to the hedonistic and life-
satisfaction theories prominent prior to his writings on the subject, and in the end I 
will suggest that Haybron‘s position does capture important insights of one sense of 
our use of ‗being happy‘ that I suggest we call ―objective happiness.‖ This term is 
borrowed from Daniel Kahneman‘s title for his happiness construct, which will be 
examined in the following chapter. He, too, is concerned with developing some way 
of talking about happiness independently of the judgment of the individual in 
question. My justification for splitting happiness into ―subjective‖ and ―objective‖ 
happiness will be clear only after the elucidation of the dynamic affective standard 
theory, but suffice it to say that Haybron‘s theory is the best description that we have 
of happiness independent of the judgment of the individuals concerned.  
That said, not only is Haybron‘s determination of happiness vague as a result 
of suffering from the threshold problem, but he also ignores one intuition that I will 
argue is fairly central to the way that we use ‗being happy.‘ One of Haybron‘s 
conclusions illustrates this problem: 
This view of happiness also gives the lie to any notion that happiness could 
be largely transparent to us. While it takes little discernment to figure it out 
when you feel happy, it takes a lot to figure out how you are doing across the 
several dimensions of your emotional condition, some aspects of which do 
not involve conscious or even occurrent states…Those who have spent much 
time gaining the perspective of living outside mainstream civilization know 
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well that many of us may not have a clue how happy, or unhappy, we really 
are.
231
  
The claim that ―many of us may not have a clue how happy…we really are‖ is a bold 
statement. Here Haybron runs roughshod over the strong intuition that the 
individual‘s own thoughts about the issue make some difference in the determination 
of her own happiness. Haybron really does treat happiness as something that is either 
there or not – a psychological condition that can be determined objectively, from the 
point of view of a third party with sufficient knowledge of the individual‘s emotional 
state. Although I agree with Haybron with regard to the states (positive affective 
states) that are happiness-constituting, I believe that when we say that someone is 
happy, we are doing something quite a bit different than what he suggests, and this is 
the motivation for the development of the dynamic affective standard theory 
explained in Chapter Eight. Although in the end I will suggest for clarity‘s sake that 
we call that which the dynamic affective standard theory describes ―subjective 
happiness,‖ I think it comes closer to describing our use of ‗being happy‘ than a 
theory that describes a conception of happiness about which many of the agents 
experiencing it ―may not have a clue‖ whether or not they are experiencing it.  
                                                 
231
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Chapter 7: Psychological Approaches to Happiness 
 
How have psychologists approached happiness? For the most part, 
psychological study of happiness has been results-oriented and data-centered and, 
indeed, consciously so. As recently as 1998, Ed Diener argued that psychologists 
needed to know more ―elementary facts before a large theory is created.‖232 This 
approach to research on topics related to happiness has proven to be very valuable. 
The bulk of work on happiness has involved psychologists stipulating the 
characteristics that the construct that they would like to investigate should possess, 
and then attempting to understand what exactly influenced measurements of that 
construct to move in a positive or negative direction. Ed Diener‘s research on the 
construct subjective well-being is a good example of this. Subjective well-being is a 
term that he coined and uses to describe: 1) life satisfaction 2) high frequency of 
positive affect and 3) low frequency of negative affect.
233
 This type of research has 
resulted in fascinating studies of the influence of personality
234
, demographics
235
, and 
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genetics
236
 (just to name a few) on these constructs. Although many of the constructs 
examined (i.e., life-satisfaction) are not precisely what we have in mind when we talk 
about ‗being happy,‘ they, nonetheless, most likely bear a relationship to it that is 
strong enough for the majority of correlations to hold. 
Alternatively, psychologists, realizing that ‗the good life‘ extends beyond 
happiness, have begun to examine other constructs which come closer to the 
philosophical concepts of the ancients that have been translated into English as 
‗happiness.‘ For example, Carol Ryff criticized the one-sided psychological attention 
given to happiness or life-satisfaction and argued that additional aspects of 
psychological well-being were being neglected. Indeed, she found that positive 
relations with others, autonomy, purpose in life, and personal growth, although 
clearly subjectively valued, were not strongly related to previous assessment indexes 
focusing on life satisfaction or happiness.
237
 
In a similar vein, Alan Waterman contrasted what we have been calling, for 
clarity‘s sake, psychological happiness with a eudaimonic conception of well-being 
which involves people living according to their daimon, which for Waterman means 
their ―true self.‖ This results in a state he calls ―personal expressiveness‖ that occurs 
when people‘s ―life activities‖ are most congruent with their deeply held values and 
when they are fully engaged. When this happens, people feel alive, authentic, and 
live as they truly are (thus personal expressiveness).
238
 And Richard Ryan and 
Edward Deci have developed ―self-determination theory‖ which posits three basic 
psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness.
239
 In sum, much work 
has been done in the last few years both on issues surrounding psychological 
happiness and on issues surrounding the good life or flourishing.  
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That said, Peter Salovey and David Pizarro recently made an observation 
about psychology in general that I believe to be particularly true of the field of 
empirical happiness studies. They remark on psychology‘s data-driven nature and, 
while expressing understanding and support for this approach, say it ―…can lead to 
an accumulation of theory-independent research. However, in the absence of a 
guiding theoretical model, science progresses slowly. In spite of its empirical riches, 
the field‘s growth is stunted.‖240 Because the empirical study of happiness has 
followed Diener‘s advice and has, for the most part, stayed away from theories or 
definitions of happiness, Salovey and Pizarro‘s diagnosis is especially true of this 
field.  
As mentioned above, what psychology has done instead of developing a 
major theory, is to create constructs that ostensibly have something to do with 
happiness while simultaneously leaving the question as to of whether they are 
happiness open. One example of this is W. Wilson‘s early studies on ―avowed 
happiness.‖ In calling the construct he was measuring ―avowed happiness,‖ Wilson 
hedged on whether avowed happiness really is happiness.
241
 However, this hedging, 
which continues to the present day, is beginning to have an ever-greater effect on the 
field as a whole, even in the view of some of the researchers active in this field. 
Diener himself attests to this when in a recent article he and Ulrich Schimmack state, 
―Although this finding may seem trivial, it is noteworthy that many studies of 
‗Happiness‘ do not include the item happy. The reliance on scales with questionable 
content validity has led to counterintuitive findings…‖242 This problem has led some 
psychologists to call for clarity at the theoretical level. 
David T. Helm expressed an obvious truth in writing that, ―We must first 
come to a consensus on the definition of happiness, then examine ways to measure it 
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or determine who is happy by that definition.―243 In spite of the logic of this 
statement, psychological research on things that might be happiness has progressed 
and grown over the last thirty years without a protracted discussion about what 
exactly happiness is. One unfortunate result of this is not just a lack of clarity about 
the nature or definition of happiness, but also a lack of clarity about the constructs 
chosen to stand-in for happiness in the interim.  
The two most prominent researchers in this field, Ed Diener and Daniel 
Kahneman have chosen opposing strategies for dealing with this problem. Diener, in 
an effort to capture happiness (no matter what it turns out to be) in his construct, has 
made his construct of subjective well-being so encompassing that at one point Diener 
and his colleagues call it a field (i.e., the ―field of subjective well-being‖) instead of a 
construct.
244
 The connections between these constructs and happiness are often 
contradictory when compared from one article to the next and sometimes even within 
a single article. Daniel Kahneman, another prominent happiness researcher, has taken 
the opposite approach. Instead of creating a construct so broad that it must 
encompass any conceivable theory of happiness, Kahneman has introduced a very 
narrow concept that he calls ―objective happiness.‖ Without claiming that objective 
happiness really is happiness, he argues that research in the field of happiness studies 
should center on objective happiness.
245
  
Not only do empirical researchers employ widely differing constructs in 
attempting to study happiness, but they also use a very wide variety of measures to 
examine disparate phenomena that are then all called happiness. The difficulty facing 
empirical researchers in all of this is that happiness is a folk psychological concept 
and, therefore, conditions exist for its use and its meaning. It is not a concept that is 
―up for grabs,‖ to be defined as we see fit.246 Thus, a call to refrain from simply 
stipulating a definition of ‗happiness‘ is by no means a matter of philosophical 
pedantry. Instead it reflects the enormous importance that members of the linguistic 
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community attach to their use of the word. Not only do people often claim that they 
want to be happy, but they sometimes even claim that happiness is the single most 
important thing in their lives. The advice of scientists on this issue should be based 
on that thing which people actually want, and not something that eliminates memory 
errors or is easy to measure. In other words, their advice should be based on what 
happiness actually is. However, the content validity of measures of happiness will be 
extremely difficult to establish with certainty before we uncover what we mean when 
we say that someone is happy. It seems too obvious to have to state, but knowing 
what happiness is represents the ultimate prerequisite for determining whether a 
psychological measure of happiness really does measure happiness. 
 
Ed Diener‟s Approach 
As mentioned above, Ed Diener‘s approach to doing research on happiness 
without getting involved in a protracted discussion about the definition of happiness 
was to develop the construct of subjective well-being (also referred to as SWB). 
Because this construct was designed to encompass whatever happiness is, a lack of 
clarity abounds as to what this construct actually entails. This is evident at a fairly 
obvious level when psychologists other than Diener attempt to describe the 
relationship between happiness and SWB. One example of this is Ryan and Deci‘s 
discussion in their extensive review of the well-being field in 2001.
247
 They explain 
at the outset that ―SWB consists of three components: life satisfaction, the presence 
of positive mood, and the absence of negative mood, together often summarized as 
happiness‖.248 Later, however, they conclude an argument about Diener & Lucas‘ 
study of positive and negative affect
249
 in the following way: ―Thus, because having 
more positive emotion and less negative emotion is SWB, the studies imply that 
people, in general, have fairly high SWB.‖250 In this latter determination, Ryan and 
Deci simply leave out life-satisfaction as a component of the construct SWB. As our 
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discussions of the divergence between emotional experience and satisfaction with life 
shows, it really does make a difference whether or not life satisfaction is included in 
SWB.  
In addition, empirical research has shown that not only are affect and life 
satisfaction theoretically distinct, they are also empirically separable.
251
 Diener 
himself says, ―Despite a preponderance of negative affect, however, the caretaker [of 
an Alzheimer‘s patient] might still evaluate his overall life positively. This 
discrepancy between affect and cognitive judgments can occur for several 
reasons.‖252 This looseness of the construct of SWB bears a special urgency if a 
researcher would like to claim that SWB is equivalent to, or just is, happiness.  
The theoretical difficulties that arise when others write about Diener‘s work 
do not result from misunderstandings of the otherwise clear construct of SWB. 
Instead, a fundamental opaqueness exists at the level of the original research. On the 
one hand, Diener occasionally equates happiness strongly with the relative presence 
of positive and the relative absence of negative affect independent of the individual‘s 
judgment of life-satisfaction. For example, Diener and Lucas, after first emphasizing 
the distinctness of the three components of SWB, namely, life satisfaction, positive 
affect, and negative affect, go on to claim that the two latter elements, in the proper 
combination, can determine happiness independently of life satisfaction.
253
 In a 
separate article, Diener, Sandik, and Pavot claimed that happiness is the frequency, 
and not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect, again leaving out the 
component of life satisfaction.
254
  
More recently, however, the titles of Diener‘s articles indicate an 
abandonment of the view of happiness as a combination of positive and negative 
affect. Diener, Napa Scollon, and Lucas collaborated on the article, ―The evolving 
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concept of subjective well-being: the multifaceted nature of happiness.‖255 Although 
sometimes hedging, it is not only in the title of the article that they use SWB and 
happiness interchangeably. They make the following claim:  
Formerly researchers were searching for the core of SWB, but it is clear that 
there are multiple components that combine in complex ways, and that no 
single one of them reflects ―true happiness.‖ Instead SWB must be studied as 
a multi-faceted phenomenon. People combine the basic building blocks of 
SWB in different ways.
256
  
They are right about happiness in both a positive, helpful way and a way that is less 
helpful. On the one hand, it may, in the end, be helpful to separate two different 
meanings of ‗happiness‘ and name them for the purposes of theoretical discussion. 
On the other hand Diener and his colleagues needlessly increase the confusion 
surrounding happiness by starting their investigation with a construct (SWB) that has 
no clear definitional boundaries, then adding multiple disparate subjectively valued 
phenomena to it (because they are so unsure about what to call happiness), only to 
declare that no one aspect of happiness (by which they mean SWB) is true 
happiness.  
This problem arises because Diener and his colleagues insist on lumping 
happiness (having to do with positive and negative affect) and life satisfaction 
(which certainly very often uses happiness as a criterion, but does not always track 
happiness) together in one construct. Essentially without argument, Diener and his 
colleagues have given up on the project of finding a definite meaning for 
‗happiness.‘ This is an excellent example of attempts by some psychologists to 
short-circuit the process of philosophical analysis, and simultaneously makes clear 
the need for philosophical examination of these areas. Psychologists avoid 
philosophical analysis, not because they believe it to be lacking in value, but 
because, for the most part, they do not possess the tools to engage in it.  
 This approach to research results in constructs like SWB which appear to 
have no theoretical core, and thus offer no possibility for delimiting the phenomena 
that compose them. Diener and Eid offer a description of SWB: 
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SWB refers to people‘s multidimensional evaluations of their lives, including 
cognitive judgments of life satisfaction as well as affective evaluations of 
moods and emotions…Furthermore, SWB can be conceptualized as a 
momentary state such as the current mood or feelings of an individual, as well 
as an enduring trait such as the average mood level or the frequency of 
positive and negative affect in a specific period of time, e.g., several weeks or 
months.
257
 
Since emotions may not always be and moods certainly are sometimes not 
evaluations of one‘s life, it is questionable what holds this concept together, other 
than being a collection of things that we ostensibly (and subjectively) value. In an 
earlier article, Diener says: 
…subjective well-being (SWB)…in colloquial terms is sometimes labeled 
―happiness.‖ SWB refers to people‘s evaluations of their lives—evaluations 
that are both affective and cognitive. People experience abundant SWB when 
they feel many pleasant and few unpleasant emotions, when they are engaged 
in interesting activities, when they experience many pleasures and few pains, 
and when they are satisfied with their lives. There are additional features of a 
valuable life and of mental health, but the field of SWB focuses on people‘s 
own evaluations of their lives.
258
 
It is clear that individual emotions, for example, John being mad at Tom for stealing 
his lunchbox, are hardly evaluations of people‘s lives. Granted, most if not all 
emotions involve instant evaluations of situations, events, or objects in the world, but 
each of these implicit evaluations of something in the world can hardly be seen as an 
evaluation of one‘s life. And this is not simply the case on the side of ―emotional 
evaluations.‖ Diener and his colleagues also include the study of ―domain 
satisfactions‖ (i.e., satisfaction with family life, with work, with one‘s love life, etc.) 
in SWB. Now it is clear that domain satisfactions are also no longer evaluations of a 
life in the strict sense of the word; they are evaluations of specific aspects of our 
lives, some of which might be relatively unimportant for the person doing the 
evaluating. And it is unclear, once subjective judgments go beyond the specific target 
of ―my life,‖ what line can be drawn to exclude from SWB ever more specific 
judgments of satisfaction with situations and objects. Therefore, it certainly does 
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seem to be the case that there is no clear delimitation for things that make up 
subjective well-being.  
Kim Prieto, Diener, and their colleagues‘ article, ―Integrating the diverse 
definitions of happiness: a time-sequential framework of subjective well-being,‖ 
(again using the terms SWB and happiness interchangeably) attempts to place SWB 
on a sounder theoretical footing.
259
 In their abstract, however, they, perhaps 
unintentionally, pay homage to the expanse and lack of coherence of what is 
ordinarily termed the construct of subjective well-being by instead designating it as a 
field containing certain constructs. They state: ―The field of subjective well-being 
(SWB) is primarily concerned with people‘s evaluation of their lives; however, it 
includes a wide range of concepts, from momentary moods to global life satisfaction 
judgments. We propose a framework that integrates these diverse constructs.‖260 In 
this article in particular it is evident how diverse the range of phenomena is that 
Diener and his colleagues attempt to cover with the umbrella of subjective well-
being, something which may have motivated their talk of it as a field. Bizarrely, in 
light of the title of the article, Kim Prieto, Diener and colleagues begin the article 
talking about SWB as encompassing ―a wide range of components, such as 
happiness, life satisfaction, hedonic balance, fulfillment, and stress‖ [italics mine].261 
Obviously if SWB is happiness, as is suggested in the title and in many other of 
Diener‘s publications, then happiness cannot also be a component of SWB. At the 
most basic level one can protest here that happiness cannot be a component of 
happiness.  
Continuing, the authors outline a sequential framework for the study of 
subjective well-being that involves four stages or levels: 1) events and circumstances, 
2) emotional reactions, 3) recall of emotions, and 4) global judgments. They see 
things that can be called happiness or SWB at each of the latter three levels, none of 
which they believe is ―true SWB‖ (by which they presumably also mean ―true 
happiness‖). Thus, Diener believes that happiness is found at any and all of the last 
three levels and offers a framework so loose that it could perhaps be found multiple 
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times at each level. For example, hedonic theories of happiness, Haybron‘s 
emotional-state theory, and Kahneman‘s objective happiness are all to be found at 
stage two of Kim Prieto and Diener‘s SWB continuum. 
Although he does not mention hedonic or emotional-state theory explicitly, 
Diener does place Daniel Kahneman‘s ―objective happiness‖ at stage two with all 
other approaches that view ―SWB as an aggregation of multiple emotional reactions 
over time.‖262 Kahneman‘s construct is discussed in detail below, but suffice it to say 
that it involves random sampling of occurrent emotions using, for example, the 
experience sampling method (ESM). This is often done with a Palm computer or 
with a beeper that notifies the person at regular intervals that it is time to report their 
current emotional state. This information is then summed to determine the amount of 
time spent in positive and negative emotional states (as well as the intensity of those 
states). 
 At stage number three, Diener sees efforts such as those of Bradburn
263
 and 
others that involve asking respondents about their emotions over a certain period of 
time: ―Instead of inquiring about how happy or satisfied a person is in general, 
researchers…ask respondents to recall whether they experienced a number of 
relevant feelings, such as ―depressed,‖ ―joyful,‖ or ―on top of the world‖ during a 
certain period of time.‖264 At stage number four, Diener sees SWB as ―personal 
global judgments of satisfaction and quality of life. Research based on this approach 
often involves large surveys, in which respondents are asked to self-report on their 
general happiness or satisfaction with large global domains, such as work or social 
relationships.‖265 
This sequential framework allows for an explosion of things called happiness, 
with multiple phenomena that are legitimately called ‗happiness,‘ situated at each of 
the three levels. As to what happiness is, I claim that it is none of the things that have 
yet been listed in the sequential framework. It is neither emotional reactions, nor 
recall of those reactions, nor is it an underdetermined global judgment – although it 
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does involve each of these components as we shall later see in the elaboration of the 
DAS. The sequential framework is helpful in categorizing the different measures that 
psychologists use when investigating things they think could be happiness, but I 
question whether offering legitimacy by granting the title of ―happiness‖ to just about 
everything that psychologists measure in this area really represents forward progress. 
For example, it completely avoids the argument of the relative merits of emotional-
state theory versus life-satisfaction theory. The field can certainly do better than this 
―anything goes‖ approach.  
In sum, Diener, confronted with disagreement in the field about the nature of 
happiness, attempted to provide a solution that would make further research possible 
by creating a wide-ranging construct that encompassed both positive and negative 
emotions, a judgment of life satisfaction, and the sum of satisfaction with specific 
domains. Later he expanded his wide-ranging construct into a field and legitimized 
almost every definition of happiness in that field by claiming that just about 
everything along the sequential framework is happiness in one way or another. Other 
prominent early happiness researchers have chosen a similar route. Michael Argyle 
and his colleagues viewed happiness as the frequency and intensity of one‘s 
experience of joy, one‘s average level of satisfaction, and the absence of negative 
emotions.
266
 Although researchers choosing this strategy may be on the safe side 
when it comes to being certain that the demographic variables, etc., that they are 
studying correlate with happiness (because at least one of the things in their 
constructs must be happiness), the justification for the coherence of these elements is 
absent, and so no real theory is created. And when that coherence-giving reason is 
absent, it is difficult to exclude anything that we subjectively value from the vague 
conception of happiness that is the inevitable result of this approach.  
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Daniel Kahneman‟s “Objective Happiness” 
As mentioned above, Daniel Kahneman has taken a narrowing approach (in 
contrast with Diener‘s broadening approach) to unifying research on happiness. 
Kahneman splits happiness into two parts by developing the construct of ‗objective 
happiness.‘ This construct eliminates the need for long-term recollection of the 
valence of affect, thus avoiding the biases involved in such recollection, such as 
peak-end bias and duration neglect.
267
 He describes his division in the following way: 
―Subjective happiness is assessed by asking respondents to state how happy they are. 
Objective happiness is derived from a record of instant utility over the relevant 
period.‖268 Kahneman assumes a fairly hedonistic conception of what he calls 
‗instant utility‘ though he admits that other elements will have to be added to 
complete our picture of such ‗utility‘: ―Being pleased or distressed is an attribute of 
experience at a particular moment. I will label this attribute ‗instant utility,‘ 
borrowing the term ‗utility‘ from Bentham (1789/1948). Instant utility is best 
understood as the strength of the disposition to continue or to interrupt the current 
experience.‖269 Of course, this is confounding two different things; it is quite clear 
that we can want things to continue for reasons of guilt, habit, the meaning of the 
event, etc., that are nonetheless extremely distressing to us. At least in this respect, it 
is clear that Kahneman has not diminished, but instead added to the challenges facing 
his theory in his attempt to escape the difficulties facing hedonistic theories.  
Kahneman summarizes the reasons for his objections to traditional measures 
of happiness in the following passage: 
The perspective of the present chapter…seeks an objective and normatively 
justified definition of ―true‖ well-being that is based mainly on information 
about instant utility. An assessment of Helen‘s objective happiness in March 
should be made on the basis of the relevant aspects of her life during that 
month by applying definite rules to summarize this information in a single 
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value. Helen‘s own judgment of how happy she was in March is viewed as a 
fallible estimate of her objective well-being. This conception does not deny 
the significance of Helen‘s evaluation of her life…In the present framework, 
however, what Helen thinks about her happiness matters to her ―true‖ or 
objective well-being only to the extent that her thoughts affect the 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of particular moments in her life.
270
  
Although Kahneman‘s ‗objective happiness‘ is a useful construct and deserves 
extensive examination, it suffers from an underdetermined ―substance‖ of happiness. 
In this case, emotional-state theory provides a much more cogent account of that 
which forms a basis for the way in which we use the word ‗happy‘ to describe 
ourselves and others, namely, positive affect. Objective happiness, however, joins 
emotional-state theory in suffering from the threshold problem. Indeed, where are we 
to draw the line that determines who is happy according to an objective measure of 
affect over time?  
Kahneman‘s definition of objective happiness‘ counterpart, subjective 
happiness, is also problematic. For one thing, it is not really a definition at all. 
Although Kahneman spends much time telling us what objective happiness is (a task 
simplified by the fact that objective happiness is what Kahneman stipulates it to be) 
he only tells us how subjective happiness is assessed: ―Subjective happiness is 
assessed by asking respondents to state how happy they are.‖271 What subjective 
happiness is, is not dealt with at all. If Kahneman intends this to be a kind of 
definition, then one difficulty with this definition of subjective happiness (as nothing 
more than individuals‘ avowals of happiness) is that it eliminates the possibility of 
incorrect judgments about one‘s own happiness. However, we do believe that people 
can be wrong about their own happiness (Haybron even seems to believe that many 
of us often are). If people cannot be wrong about their own happiness, and if there are 
no procedural requirements for making this judgment, then happiness is reduced to 
the simple act of making the judgment or perhaps even the statement, ―I am happy,‖ 
with absolutely no phenomenon behind it. Perhaps it is partly in light of these 
difficulties that in Kahneman‘s most recent writings on the subject, he does not 
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mention ‗objective happiness.‘272 Instead he places himself within the umbrella of 
SWB. Instead of objective happiness, he talks simply of ―net affect‖ or ―experienced 
utility,‖ which represent the differential of positive over negative affect that one 
experiences.  
Kahneman‘s objective happiness and Haybron‘s emotional-state theory are 
structurally very similar. Both theories reject an approach to happiness based on the 
judgment of the agent, and in this way they are objective with regard to judgment 
subjectivity. Haybron has the more robust theory, but in principle, what Kahneman 
says about assessing a person‘s happiness would be roughly the way in which one 
would have to assess happiness in an emotional-state theory. As Haybron‘s mood 
propensities are more difficult to measure (and should ordinarily, and certainly over a 
long period of time, be reflected in actual affect and mood), one would measure net 
positive and negative affect in much the same way that Kahneman suggests. The 
important common denominator in both theories is that an observer with (admittedly 
impossible) complete access to the experienced affect of the agent would be able to 
determine the happiness of the agent independent of her standards or judgments 
based on those standards. As I suggested above, it would serve well the cause of 
clarity in discussions of happiness to follow Kahneman and call such theories 
―objective theories of happiness.‖  
There certainly is a kind of objectivity in all of our judgments about 
happiness; no one is an extreme subjectivist in the judgment sense – that is to say, no 
one believes that happiness is determined only by the agent‘s judgment about her 
own happiness. If this were not the case, no real limits would exist regarding that for 
which the concept could stand. Nevertheless, in Chapter Eight I make the case that 
we ordinarily allow much more room for subjective judgment about happiness than 
objective theories like those of Haybron and Kahneman allow. The above statements 
from Kraut and von Wright show that others share this intuition. Philosophers and 
psychologists alike have emphasized the importance of the agent‘s own judgment of 
his happiness for his happiness.  
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One philosopher who has taken direct aim at Kahneman‘s construct and some 
of his claims (in particular his claim that objective happiness should supplant self-
report, judgment-based measures of SWB for the purpose of policy-making) is Anna 
Alexandrova. In her article entitled, ―Subjective Well-Being and Kahneman‘s 
‗Objective Happiness,‘‖ Alexandrova takes the position that Kahneman‘s averaging 
of positive emotional states of the subject precludes several aspects of happiness that 
we generally view as essential to the concept and that become clear to the subject 
only retrospectively.
273
 At the very least, no argument based on our use of ‗being 
happy‘ exists to eliminate these aspects in favor of an objective averaging approach.  
Indeed, at least one psychologist, Sonja Lyubomirsky, has recently responded 
to Kahneman and brought forth a suggestion for measuring ―subjective happiness.‖274 
In 1999, Lyubomirsky complained that a measure of subjective happiness was 
missing in the psychological literature. She begins her attempt to create one with the 
question of how one determines whether someone is a happy or an unhappy person. 
Instead of seeing this as primarily a problem of determining what happiness is, she, 
like many psychologists, sees the problem as one of how to measure levels of 
happiness. This eschewing of the difficult philosophical discussion is especially clear 
in her phrasing of the challenge at hand: ―How does one discern then if someone is a 
happy or an unhappy person? Every student of happiness and well-being has had to 
tackle the problem of how to measure levels of individual happiness.‖275 Ignoring 
many of the issues discussed in this essay up until this point, she dives right into a 
discussion of whether there are any reliable psychophysical measures or brain 
techniques to differentiate happy and unhappy people, and concludes that there are 
not. From there, she moves on to discussing the various self-report-based techniques, 
the most widely used of which is Bradburn‘s Affect Balance Scale.276 This scale 
assesses the balance of positive and negative affect that an individual has experienced 
over the past four weeks, and in so doing, is taken by some to measure the affective 
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component of subjective well-being. A myriad of scales tap the cognitive component 
of subjective well-being, chief among them Diener‘s Satisfaction with Life Scale.277  
Lyubomirsky clearly believes that none of these methods are able to capture 
subjective happiness, which she describes as a ―global, subjective assessment of 
whether one is a happy or an unhappy person,‖278 and criticizes Diener‘s attempts to 
equate his construct of subjective well-being with happiness
279
 when she says: 
―…most individuals are capable of reporting on the extent to which they are a happy 
person (or an unhappy one), and this judgment is likely not equivalent to a simple 
sum of their recent levels of affect and their satisfaction with life.‖280 Echoes of the 
earlier argumentation of numerous philosophers against life-satisfaction theories of 
happiness are evident in her argumentation as well: ―For instance, one may 
conceivably appraise oneself as a very happy person, despite having only a 
somewhat happy life.‖281 She also shows sensitivity for the threshold problem, or at 
least to difficulties of Kahneman‘s suggestion of summing of units of utility to 
determine an individual‘s happiness: ―Conversely, one may identify oneself as a 
generally unhappy person, despite having felt ‗pleased,‘ ‗proud,‘ and ‗particularly 
excited‘ in the previous month (as items on the Affect Balance Scale would 
suggest.)‖282 She then suggests her alternative, which involves a four item scale that 
she calls the Subjective Happiness Scale. Interestingly, each of the four items use 
variants of the verb ―is‖ and the adjective ―happy,‖ in other words, variants of the 
basic phrase suggested in this essay as being central to the analysis of happiness. 
Although Lyubomirsky does not deliver a theory of what happiness (or subjective 
happiness) is, she does indicate that dissatisfaction exists with the lack of clarity 
surrounding subjective approaches to happiness (as is the case in Diener‘s attempts), 
as well as with the incompleteness of objective approaches to happiness (such as 
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those suggested by Haybron and Kahneman). It is this gap in the philosophical and 
psychological literature that I hope the next chapter contributes to filling.  
 
Conclusion 
Most psychologists have remained cautious about defining happiness and 
have instead done work on constructs that purport to be related to happiness, even if 
they turn out not to be happiness itself. This atheoretical approach, while producing 
much interesting research, has resulted in stunted growth in the field as a whole. 
Until consensus is reached on what happiness is, empirical researchers will not have 
any way of knowing to what degree that which they are studying bears a relation to 
happiness. Two prominent happiness researchers, Ed Diener and Daniel Kahneman, 
have chosen opposing strategies to deal with this problem. Diener has developed the 
construct of subjective well-being, which includes judgments of life satisfaction and 
domain satisfaction, as well as measures of emotional experience. In later articles, the 
number of phenomena that subjective well-being encompasses becomes even greater, 
with its proponents talking about the ―field of subjective well-being.‖ This is an 
inevitable result of developing a construct that hopes to encompass everything that 
happiness could be and, as a result, lacks a theoretical core.  
Kahneman, on the other hand, has chosen a narrowing approach to happiness 
studies. He introduced the construct of ‗objective happiness,‘ which is an objective 
(i.e., independent of the memory or judgment of the individual in question) record of 
the affect of an individual if it meets certain criteria for the amount of ―instant utility‖ 
experienced. Anna Alexandrova has criticized Kahneman‘s construct on several 
accounts and Sonja Lyubomirsky has called for a theory of ‗subjective happiness.‘ 
The dynamic affective standard theory represents one such account of a theory of 
subjective happiness.  
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Chapter 8: The Dynamic Affective Standard Theory 
 
Many happiness theorists are of the opinion that the hedonistic, life-
satisfaction, and emotional-state categories of theories exhaust the possibilities for an 
understanding of our use of the concept ‗happiness.‘ But since all are in some way 
deficient, something must exist that can fill the gap and explain what we mean when 
we say that we want to ‗be happy.‘  
 
Happiness and Judgments of Positive Affect 
One way to approach this question is to look at what exactly we are doing 
when we call ourselves happy. It does seem that we are making a judgment, as the 
proponents of life-satisfaction theories claim, but it is also clear that happiness and 
life-satisfaction diverge. The judgment is therefore one that does not have 
‗satisfaction‘ with ‗our lives‘ as its object. As discussed extensively in Chapter Five, 
in situations of divergence, happiness tracks affect and not the attitudes directed 
toward the changing external circumstances of our lives. 
Therefore, life-satisfaction theories are attractive because they pick up on a 
process that actually occurs. They do not, however, follow it through to its 
completion. Life-satisfaction theories see happiness in the following way: happiness 
is an attitude we have toward our lives in reaction to our varying life circumstances. 
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When someone asks us if we are happy, we think about how our lives are going and 
whether our central desires for our lives are being fulfilled. We might typically think 
about our jobs, our families, our friendships, our romantic relationships, etc. It is far 
from my purpose to deny much of this account; we do, in fact, examine selected 
things in our lives. The catch, however, has already been illustrated. When we think 
about these varied aspects of our lives for the purpose of answering the question, 
―Are you happy?‖ (which from here on will be referred to as the ―happiness 
question,‖) the result of our evaluation does not track the attitudes about whether our 
lives are meeting certain standards or whether our desires are being fulfilled – 
instead, it tracks positive affect. This becomes especially evident when standards met 
or desires satisfied diverge from positive affect.  
Life-satisfaction theories thus have paid close attention to what we do when 
we think about our own (or others‘) happiness, but these theories fail to take into 
account the fact that the judgment is, in the end, only about goals and desires, etc., 
insofar as they have a positive affective payoff. Life-satisfaction theories have 
nonetheless been widely accepted because they identify correctly that happiness 
involves a judgment, and positive affect often does track desires satisfied and goals 
achieved. 
One might make the following objection to my claims thus far: If the 
judgment involved in happiness is really just about positive affect, why do we not 
then ignore external events and situations and think about positive affect directly? 
The simple answer to this question is that this is just not the way our mind works. As 
illustrated in Chapters Two and Three, our minds have evolved to serve certain 
purposes and the efficient memory of free-floating emotions was not one of them.  
It is best to start with a simple and straightforward example: When we are 
asked how happy we have been in the last hour, we would probably think mostly 
about our mood and our feelings. How are we feeling right now; how were we 
feeling at the beginning of the hour? It is very likely, however, that we would not be 
able to remember exactly how we felt one hour ago, say at 11:37 am. How would we 
overcome this obstacle? We would probably try to think of what we were doing at 
11:37, and then think about how that activity made us feel. Oftentimes the feeling 
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and the activity are so interwoven in our memory that it is not necessary for us to 
reflect on how the activity made us feel – it is simply obvious. So the way in which 
we remember how we were feeling, even over short periods of time, is to remember 
the events which caused or accompanied that feeling.  
Our memory for feelings by themselves is not anywhere near as refined as our 
memory for events or facts. The likely reason for our weak memory of feelings, 
independent of events during which they occurred, is that in our evolutionary 
development remembering what feelings one had at a certain period of time, 
independent of what was going on at the time, was nowhere near as important as 
remembering events and facts and how we felt about them. A feeling with no 
relevance to the external world, that is to say, not even with an uncertain relevance 
(an uneasy feeling that later turns to wariness as one views the slightly unusual facial 
expressions of a traveling companion), is of no value to survival or reproduction. 
Feelings, however, serve an incomparably important role when combined with 
external events; feelings are typically the signals for the salience of these events for 
our lives, and they often mark out the external events that are particularly important 
for us to remember. Thus, they are remembered in combination with these events. So, 
feelings hang on external events in our memory; the two are remembered as a 
package with the event often being the primary tag by which we call the package 
back into consciousness.
283
  
So the answer to the objection introduced above is that we do think directly 
about positive and negative affect, but as a part of our mental landscape, they are 
hung on events, people, thoughts we have had, goals achieved, etc. Accessing these 
mental representations is the most efficient way to access affect. It seems then that 
happiness involves a judgment about affect accessed by way of various mental 
representations. Life-satisfaction theorists have caught onto this, but do not seem to 
have understood the whole process, thinking instead that the process was only about 
the mental representations, and not about the affective information gathered through 
them.  
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Happiness: Judgments vs. Standards 
 It seems that we have two possible determiners of happiness at this point. One 
could take the position that the result of the judgment about positive affect is what 
determines happiness. We would then ascribe first-person authority to the author of 
the judgment. This would mean that a person can never be wrong about his or her 
own happiness; whatever the result of the judgment is, it is right. The other possible 
position focuses on the individual standard of the agent as the determiner of whether 
or not someone is happy. This position leaves room for incorrect judgments of 
happiness as a result of improper application of the standard, and it also leaves room 
for standards that are themselves illegitimate. The DAS denies the first-person 
authority of judgments of happiness and instead takes the second position, claiming 
that people can certainly be wrong about their own happiness in several different 
ways.  
To understand the role of the standard in the DAS it may be most helpful to 
review what it is the DAS is rejecting, namely, the first-person authority of 
judgments of happiness. To be clear, what is not at issue here are dishonest claims 
about one‘s happiness. An honest claim means that the person in question, let‘s call 
him Rob, does not hold one conviction and communicate another. Rob could tell us 
that he is happy for reasons of social desirability, for example, while knowing full 
well that he is unhappy. This kind of self-promotion is not the issue under 
consideration since Rob himself does not believe his own statement. The question is: 
Are honest, or earnest claims of happiness always to be taken at face value? Is the 
person doing the judging always right when she believes that she is happy? 
The model cases of first-person authority are things like pain, or seeing colors 
or objects. If someone honestly says that he feels a pain in his leg, then he really does 
feel pain. If someone honestly claims that he sees a stone in front of him, then he 
really does have an image of a stone before him in some way, independent of what 
actually exists in the world. What relation does happiness bear to these examples of 
first-person authority? 
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These examples of clear first-person authority are examples of direct 
experience. Happiness, however, is a judgment, and as such, can be flawed. The 
primary way in which individual judgments of happiness can be flawed involves a 
violation of what I will call the procedural requirement of happiness. This is best 
illustrated with an example. 
Let‘s say that Rob actually decides to make a happiness judgment. Human 
minds (including Rob‘s) work in stranger ways than we often realize, and, as 
psychological experiments have shown, unconscious influences on judgments are 
very common. Take the following deep-rooted conviction of Rob‘s: ―It is wrong for 
me to be unhappy because God put me on this earth. God is good, and therefore what 
he does is good. For that reason, I really ought to be happy.‖ Although parts of this 
argument have been a part of Rob‘s conscious life in the past, he is not fully aware of 
this conviction when it comes time to make the happiness judgment. Nonetheless, 
this conviction does have a strong impact on his judgment.  
In fact, Rob claims to be happy even when only 10% of his day is 
accompanied by positive affect, and his judgments often ignore massive negative 
affect. It is not that he is not aware of the negative affect in general; it is just that he 
half-consciously, half-unconsciously avoids taking it into consideration when he 
makes the happiness judgment. Rob‘s judgment of his own happiness does not 
exhibit the normal random variation that is always present in judgments of happiness 
(as a result of changing patterns of affect and of the dynamic nature of the standard 
discussed below). Instead, his judgment is always biased in a positive direction. He 
himself believes (mostly because he wants to believe) that he is, indeed, happy. His 
family and friends have been urging him to enter therapy because they believe he is 
depressed, but Rob does not see any problem with his life.  
Is there a systematic way that we can separate legitimate considerations in the 
judgment of happiness from those that are illegitimate? Indeed, there is. The forces at 
work in a judgment of happiness that can influence the standard in a non-biased 
manner are thoughts, convictions, memories, etc., about what happiness is. In a 
biased decision the forces influencing the standard – and usually in a more extreme 
way – are thoughts and convictions about what the result of the judgment should be, 
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as a result of considerations external to happiness, per se. There are more than a few 
considerations of the latter sort. One common one has to do with the fact, pointed out 
by Haybron, that we often use happiness as a proxy for our overall well-being, even 
though it is not the only aspect of well-being that we care about.
284
 For some people 
(perhaps many of them reside in the United States), being unhappy is akin to 
admitting that one is a failure, or a ―loser‖ in the game of life. For others, an 
admission that they are unhappy might force them to make a difficult decision about 
their marriage. These are all not considerations about how much positive affect one 
can expect in life, or what level of richness of positive affect is enough to call oneself 
happy. They are considerations that instrumentalize happiness for purposes external 
to happiness itself. This provides the background for the procedural requirement for 
judgments of happiness: The happiness judgment should be about happiness, and 
refrain from instrumentalizing the judgment for external considerations. 
The vast majority of flawed happiness judgments are going to be violations of 
the procedural requirement. But what about those cases in which the procedural 
requirement is not violated and an unusual assessment of happiness results? Take 
Sarah for example. Sarah‘s judgment of happiness is free of unconscious influences 
extraneous to her happiness, but still regularly calls herself happy when she 
experiences positive affect only five percent of the time on a given day, with ninety-
five percent of her time accompanied by negative affect. This sounds very abstract, 
so let us make it concrete. Sarah cries herself to sleep almost every night, experiences 
intense anxiety at work and sadness alone in the evenings, but experiences a bit of 
positive affect (5% of her day) when she watches one of her favorite sitcoms. Is 
Sarah happy? No, she is not. Sarah applies an unusual standard for her judgment of 
happiness. In order to understand why her standard is not legitimate, and why she is 
not happy, we must leave the abstract level at which we have been discussing 
positive and negative affect. We also have to explore in greater detail what happiness 
is all about. 
It is easy to lose oneself in the abstract discussion about ‗positive affect‘ and 
forget what we are really talking about. Positive affect does not exist by itself, but 
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instead, it is a way of characterizing many distinct emotions that can be individuated 
(to various degrees) and identified according to their unique characteristics. Some 
examples are bliss, cheerfulness, calmness, contentment, delight, delirium, ecstasy, 
elation, enchantment, euphoria, exhilaration, exuberance, gaiety, gladness, glee, 
hilarity, hopefulness, joviality, joy, jubilation, light-heartedness, mirth, optimism, 
peacefulness, playfulness, rejoicing, repose, tranquility, vivacity. It is these emotions 
and others that constitute happiness.  
However, because happiness involves a summing across many distinct 
emotions, it is more abstract than a specific emotion like joy. As mentioned earlier, 
the transition from one emotion to another is a process which is difficult to pinpoint. 
At what point in intensity does frustration become anger? There are paradigm cases 
of both frustration and anger but the delimitation between the two is not entirely 
clear. Delimitations, which are almost always difficult, are especially difficult in the 
case of emotions. This does not hinder us in our use of the words ‗angry‘ or 
‗frustrated‘. So for something like happiness, which is more abstract than a simple 
emotion (as it involves the summing of them) it is likely that the borders will be, 
indeed, difficult to draw. Likewise, paradigm cases of happiness do exist, and they 
certainly do not have to be of the ecstatic variety – tranquility will do just as well and 
is probably more characteristic of happiness than a collection of more intense 
emotions. It may well be that there are numerous disparate paradigm cases of 
happiness, for example contentment vs. ebullience. The ideals of complete tranquility 
or constant ebullience allow for reductions in intensity and frequency while still 
being happiness. How many of these positive emotions are necessary for happiness is 
a matter that must be solved in the same manner as what degree of intensity is needed 
for frustration to become anger: It is a matter of our usage of the words. At this point, 
an analogy might be helpful. 
In American society (and most likely in many others) a concern exists about 
having or earning ―enough money.‖ Enough for what? Ideas about this differ, and 
they do so partly according to the social group in which you have been raised. You 
hear about it in the prudential conversations of your family and friends, and it is often 
mentioned explicitly. Through this process, you develop an idea of what it means to 
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have enough money. In time you come to believe that, of course, you certainly 
should earn enough money – otherwise, well, you‘ll have problems. So ―having 
enough money‖ represents an extremely important life goal. But it is also socially 
constructed. For someone who has grown up in a disadvantaged environment 
‗earning enough‘ might mean $30,000 a year. For someone from a less 
disadvantaged environment it might be $55,000, and for someone who is very 
privileged, it could extend up to $200,000, and it is to be expected that for the 
children of the very wealthy, even higher standards apply.
285
  
The justifications for levels of earnings that are ‗enough‘ differ greatly 
depending on one‘s level of income. At the lower end of the scale, the main concerns 
might include clothing, food, schooling, and living in a relatively safe neighborhood. 
At the upper end, concerns might revolve around being able to move easily with 
one‘s social peers. So there is variation among standards, but in each case, there is a 
vague idea of what is enough for a decent life. The exceeding of the exact monetary 
level is fairly irrelevant – an exact monetary goal is probably not what one has in 
mind anyway. It is when you get to the general area of ‗enough‘ income that you start 
to feel satisfied, and you are more satisfied the closer you get. At some point you 
have the feeling, ―Ok, this is enough. It would be nice if I had a bit more, but I really 
don‘t need it, and I‘m not going to kill myself trying to get it.‖ This is, of course, not 
true of all people. For some, in money as well as in positive affect, no matter how 
much is acquired, ‗enough‘ never makes its appearance in their lives. 
As mentioned earlier, although ―earning enough‖ is a social construction, it 
has great importance for us. It is an essential part of a vague conception that we have 
of a good life. In this way it is similar to the level of positive affect we each think is 
necessary for happiness. Happiness, too, is part of a vague conception that we have 
of a life that is good – our society gives us hints (some of which may be unrealistic) 
of how much ‗feeling good‘ can be expected as a part of a decent life. So why is it 
valuable that you reach this level? Well, even more so than with income, if you are 
happy, you may also have a strong tendency to feel as though your life is a success. 
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In fact, as I mentioned earlier, happiness serves as a proxy for well-being in our lives. 
We often say to our children, ―John, I don‘t care about X (e.g., you succeeding in 
becoming a doctor), I just want you to be happy.‖ And when we make life choices, 
we often think about what effect they will have on our happiness.  
One reason for this is the connection that was illustrated in our discussion of 
life-satisfaction theories. Although there is no necessary connection, positive 
emotions correlate strongly with the occurrence of other things in our lives that we 
value (even if this correlation is less strong and lasting than we believe). Thinking 
about well-being in general is a difficult task; for the great majority of us, and 
perhaps all of us, it is undoubtedly a concept much vaguer than happiness. Happiness 
is, therefore, both a major part of socially and individually constructed good life and 
a proxy for our conception of a good life in our small and large decisions. If we, in 
our lifetime, achieve the level of positive affect and relative absence of negative 
affect that we have internalized as belonging to a good life, we may well feel that we 
have done a fairly good job in life. 
We are now in a better position to explain why Sarah‘s standard for happiness 
is illegitimate. So far we have established that saying that someone is happy involves 
a standard for positive affect that is based on the amount of positive affect we can 
expect from a vague conception of a ―good life.‖ Like the standard for ―enough 
money,‖ there can be variation in the standard for enough positive affect to call 
oneself happy, but in both cases there are objective limits to the variation.  
The analogy itself is not perfect because happiness is a much tighter social 
construction than having enough money. All other things being equal, we would say 
that someone who cannot feed himself and his family does not have enough money 
whatever he might claim, because it is difficult to argue for any conception of the 
good life that encompasses the inability to feed oneself and one‘s family. Restrictions 
also hold in the case of happiness, and a much wider range of ongoing or recurrent 
states of affairs exist that preclude one‘s being happy. Most of these involve the 
presence of strong negative affect.  
As Haybron has rightly claimed, happiness is also characterized by the 
relative absence of strong negative affect. I mentioned this aspect earlier but have for 
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simplicity‘s sake concentrated up until now primarily on the role of positive affect in 
happiness. In most cases, I will continue to only mention positive affect with regard 
to the standard, but what I mean in each case is both the minimum level of positive 
affect necessary for happiness and the maximum allowable level of negative affect.  
When one looks back at the list of emotions that have positive affect as a 
common element, all of them are incompatible with simultaneous strong negative 
affect. In fact, some paradigm examples of happiness such as contentment, 
peacefulness, and tranquility seem almost to be defined by the absence of strong 
negative affect, and shattered by its presence. Although in a state of tranquility 
positive affect should not be too intense, there is much more room for intense 
positive affect than for corresponding levels of negative affect. In fact, relatively 
strong positive affect can come and go (as long as it is not ecstatic or wild positive 
affect) without ending a state of contentment, but strong negative affect would not be 
compatible with this state.  
Thus, one of the greatest attractions of happiness is the freedom from serious 
and lasting disturbance by negative emotions. Indeed, this almost certainly accounts 
for part of the powerful appeal of happiness. When one reads stories about people 
who changed course and started searching for happiness in their lives, the reason is 
very often strong and regularly recurrent negative emotions, such as frequent anxiety, 
hatred, depression, feelings of meaninglessness, sadness, etc., and far less often the 
desire to simply experience more positive affect.  
So, in both the case of ―enough money‖ and the case of happiness, there are 
objective limits on possible standards, there is intersubjective variation of standards 
(different agents have different standards), and there is intrasubjective variation of 
the standards (long-term and short-term change in a single agent‘s standards). 
Sarah‘s standard violates the objective limit on the maximal amount of negative 
affect allowed to simultaneously exist with happiness (crying herself to sleep every 
night, strong anxiety at work) and the objective requirement for the minimal positive 
affect necessary for happiness (only 5% of her day). Sarah‘s case is intuitive, but 
there are other cases that are less clear-cut. Zeroing in on the objective limits and 
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requirements for happiness would have to be done in the same way that we would 
determine a rough border between frustration and anger. 
The job of finding the bottom limit for happiness must be undertaken with 
reference to the linguistic community which is the source of the social construction 
of a ―good life,‖ and the positive affect that should (as well as the negative affect that 
should not) accompany it in the first place. Practically, this might be difficult to do – 
perhaps it would involve something like developing extensive descriptions of 
affective states of people with dubitable happiness claims, presenting them to a large 
number of people, and analyzing the results. A successful result of such an 
undertaking would be a range of legitimate standards for happiness. The result could 
look something like the following: light negative affect is allowed, but not for more 
than 70% of one‘s total time. The longer the period of light negative affect, the more 
intensive the remaining positive affect has to be in order to cancel it out. Serious 
negative affects have to be intermittent and thus not continuous or regularly recurrent 
in close intervals. The important thing is that above the bottom limits, there will be a 
range of legitimate standards and, thus, also a multitude of different standards for 
happiness. The difference between this and previous approaches is best illustrated by 
the example of Haybron‘s efforts in this regard.  
Haybron, because he does not take the standard of the individual into account, 
is searching for some sort of objective limit, which, as the results of his informal 
survey suggest, is extremely problematic. What the DAS searches for is a range 
within which individual standards can legitimately vary, because intrinsic to our use 
of ―being happy‖ is the idea that a person‘s own perception of the amount of positive 
affect necessary for a vaguely conceived ‗good life‘ matters in the determination of 
her happiness. Just as with ‗enough money‘ there will be a bottom level below which 
the concept begins to not make any sense, but this bottom of the range of legitimate 
standards allows for individual minimum standards for the amount of positive affect 
necessary for happiness that lie far above it.  
But why would someone like Sarah claim that she is happy when her life 
seems to most of us to be so miserable? Most cases of bizarre claims are going to be 
cases of bias, cases of people who instrumentalize the judgment of happiness for 
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other purposes, thus violating the procedural requirement. And what of the others? 
There are people who are seriously mentally ill, who make all sorts of erroneous 
claims about themselves and the world and no doubt about their happiness as well. 
Additionally, there are always people who are not competent speakers of the English 
language. Beyond this, cases of claims that violate the standards of the linguistic 
community should be fairly rare. They certainly are possible, and the people who 
make such claims, (i.e., who say that they are happy while simultaneously feeling 
very little positive affect and serious negative affect) might not understand the 
various positive emotions that are the source of the positive affect; perhaps they have 
experienced very few of them in their lives. We can safely assume that there are 
some people, like some of the depressed, whose brains are such that it is difficult for 
them to experience positive emotions. These people may be in a situation similar to 
those who are red-green colorblind. They may simply not understand what other 
people are talking about when they speak of specific qualities of positive emotions, 
just as some people will never understand the difference most people see between red 
and green. But the vast majority of people with very little positive affect have enough 
experience with the linguistic community to know that they are unhappy. It could 
still be useful to pursue the kind of survey outlined above, but the cases of non-
biased and erroneous happiness claims should be very limited in number. 
 
The Dynamic Nature of the Individual Standard  
At first glance, however, there appears to be a glaring difficulty with this 
description. Aren‘t we sometimes, if not always, happy without thinking about the 
fact that we are happy, much less judging that we are so? To make matters worse, if 
the standard is the determiner of someone‘s happiness, what need is there for the 
judgment? If an individual‘s standard is in place, then there should be a fact of the 
matter about whether she is happy before any judgment is made.  
The situations in which we clearly are happy, that is to say, the situations in 
which it appears that no judgment has taken place, are situations in which the 
judgment according to our individual standards is (or would be) exceedingly obvious. 
It seems that in these cases, instead of deciding, or really even making a judgment, 
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we simply identify the existence of a certain system of mental states, much in the 
same way that, when we have 20 million dollars in various banks, we just know that 
we have enough money without adding up the balance of each account. In these 
cases, our level of positive affect exceeds any possible standard we could come up 
with, and we thus know that we are happy. It is still the case that a judgment is made, 
but a case could be made for the existence of happiness before the judgment is made 
precisely because the amount of positive affect overpowers any possible upward 
change in our standard. For this reason, there are extended periods of time in which 
we could answer the happiness question positively in the bat of an eye, and even 
periods of time when we are aware of being happy while we go about our daily lives. 
In those situations, there is nothing that could change our standard of the amount of 
positive affect necessary for happiness so dramatically that it would have a material 
effect on our judgment. This is not to say that nothing could happen to decrease the 
amount of our positive affect.  
This type of ―carrying knowledge of happiness with us‖ situation seems, 
however, to be the exception and not the rule. Our answer to the happiness question 
ordinarily develops a bit differently. We more often than not return a positive or 
negative answer to the happiness question after a short pause. There is something we 
have to decide, something we have to judge, before we can say that we are happy. As 
we will see later, the reason the judgment is necessary, in the vast majority of cases, 
is that up until that point, although there may be an range specific to the agent in 
which the agent‘s standard can move, the actual position of the standard within this 
range is not yet established. An examination of the possible ways in which standards 
can diverge will cast light on this process.  
Differences in individual standards of happiness show themselves along three 
lines of comparison. Firstly, individuals can have differing standards for happiness. 
Let us call this interpersonal divergence of standards. Secondly, the standard of one 
and the same individual can change over a long period of time (e.g., adolescence to 
adulthood). Let us call this long-term intrapersonal divergence of standards. Finally, 
the standard of one individual can change over a very short period of time as a result 
of context effects and chance thoughts. Let us call this short-term intrapersonal 
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divergence of standards. It is this last type of divergence that precludes the 
establishing of happiness prior to the occurrence of the judgment.  
There is no constant, unchanging standard of happiness imprinted on our 
consciousness, although there probably is a range within which the standard moves. 
Instead, I propose that, as has been shown in judgments of life-satisfaction
286
, our 
standard for happiness is quite flexible and very sensitive to context effects. The fact 
that these fluctuations occur within an agent‘s range of standards for happiness does 
not lessen the legitimacy of each standard that is produced on the occasion of each 
judgment. Indeed, how should it? Although the experiences we have just had and the 
cognitive associations we make right after being asked the happiness question affect 
the standard, because all standards within the individual range are subject to these 
effects, none is any more legitimate than any other. For that reason, we are left with 
the surprising result that in most cases, happiness does not exist until the judgment is 
made, not because of the result of the judgment, which, as we have seen, can be 
flawed, but as a result of the fixing of the standard that occurs at the time of the 
judgment. Up until that point, all we have is a jumble of various affects waiting for a 
standard.  
To illustrate this, imagine that Jane is asked if she is happy and she responds 
that she is happy. Jane has also just finished watching a documentary on the 
tribulations of people with major depressive disorder. If we had asked her yesterday, 
she would have taken the same level of remembered affect
287
 that forms the basis of 
her judgment today to constitute unhappiness, but her intuitions about what level of 
positive affect is necessary for happiness have changed after watching the 
documentary. Probably unbeknownst to her, she has lowered her standard for 
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ascribing the term ‗happy‘ as a result of seeing people experiencing an overwhelming 
amount of negative affect, a state in which she, too, could partake if her 
circumstances were to change. But this is only one possible direction in which her 
standard could go. If Jane had made a different association, perhaps concerning her 
friend Jill who overcame depression to be one of the happiest people she knows, her 
standards for the necessary level of positive affect might have gone up instead of 
going down.  
So this is one interesting result that the DAS has for our thought on 
happiness: Happiness, at least in the cases in which we are not already carrying the 
results of the judgment around with us, does not exist until the judgment is made. A 
collection of positive and negative affects exists, but they only have the potential to 
be happiness – or unhappiness for that matter. They are not either of the two until the 
standard is in place and the specific past experiences or beliefs about affect are 
accessed. This occurs when the question is asked and the process of making the 
judgment begins. 
For another example of the change in our happiness-standards, imagine a 
young man, let us call him Pablo, who spent his formative years in the midst of a 
civil war. During the four years of the war, Pablo was relatively unhappy as a result 
of mental stress and physical injuries. There were times when he did tell people he 
was happy, though. In these situations, it was enough that his physical pains 
decreased significantly, without going away. In spite of these pains, he experienced 
positive affect because of the reduction in pain. Infrequent and low intensity positive 
affect was enough for Pablo to claim to be happy over a given period of time. Now, 
five years after the end of the war, Pablo is a successful businessman. He owns 
several stores and is married with two small children. His life is generally quite 
pleasant. Now, however, in order for him to say that he is happy, positive affect of 
much greater intensity and frequency is required.  
In Pablo‘s case one could object that this is just another example of being on 
what psychologists call a hedonic- or a satisfaction treadmill: Pablo still calls the 
same collection of affects happiness and unhappiness, but the external objects and 
situations that lead to these emotions have changed. Indeed, Pablo‘s standards for 
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external goods (in the widest sense of the word) have changed, and what has changed 
about them is the amount of positively valued external events or goods that Pablo 
needs to experience in order to feel positive affect. Whereas during the war, Pablo 
experienced strong positive affect simply when he had something to eat, no matter 
how ill-tasting it was, now Pablo requires much higher-quality food to experience 
positive affect.  
This is doubtlessly the case. It is clear that Pablo‘s standards for feeling 
positive affect in response to external states of affairs have changed, but this is not 
the only change that has taken place. Pablo‘s demands on happiness have also 
changed, as explained above, and these are two separate levels. The first level is the 
amount and quality of external stimulus that Pablo needs in order to respond with a 
given amount of positive affect. The second level is the amount and quality of 
positive affect that Pablo considers necessary for happiness. Changes on both levels 
take place after the end of the civil war. Pablo has become accustomed to greater 
amounts and higher quality of positive-affect producing goods, and he has become 
accustomed to greater intensity, longer duration, and higher quality of positive affect.  
In sum, one‘s standard for the minimum amount of positive affect and 
maximum amount of negative affect can vary strongly over the short-term and long-
term. Because of short-term variations, in most cases the judgment is necessary not 
because of its result, which can be flawed in several ways, but because of the need 
for the fixation of the dynamic standard.  
 
Contradictory and Correct Judgments? 
 Contradiction is never pleasant, and it might be thought that it could cause a 
problem for a theory that takes individual standards into account. For example, what 
happens when two people judge the happiness of a third and contradict each other? 
Still more problematically, what happens when the judgments of one person about 
the same period of his past are contradictory when the judgments are made at 
different times? To illustrate this problem, let us take Jakko, who was a successful 
punk rocker in his youth. Jakko eventually settled down, started a family, and 
became a loving father to his three children. When Jakko was in his punking prime, 
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he described himself as happy, and now, in retirement and caring for his children, he 
also describes himself as happy. Problematically, however, he now, looking back on 
his rocking days, claims he wasn‘t happy then. Through the warm and loving feelings 
that he has experienced in his family, Jakko has come to value a different kind of 
positive affect, an affect that has a warmer and deeper tone than the excited, wild 
feelings of conquest of his younger days. When he now thinks about the drugs, the 
women, the parties, etc. that he so valued in his twenties, he wonders how he could 
have called himself happy on the basis of the feelings he derived from all of that. It 
thus seems that we have a contradiction, with the same person making two 
conflicting claims about his happiness during one period of time. So how do we 
determine which party is in the right? And who is wrong: Jakko the family man, or 
Jakko the punk rocker? 
 The DAS contends that they are both right – and both wrong for that matter. 
To explain this it is perhaps best to introduce both a modified example used by John 
Macfarlane and his concepts of ―context of use‖ and ―context of assessment‖ to 
explain our use of the word ‗know‘.288 Imagine that Mike has a fit of environmental 
sensitivity and has decided to take the bus to work this morning. He leaves his car in 
the driveway, and the bus carries him to work just in time to be greeted by his 
officemate, Bob. After hearing that Mike took the bus to work, Bob immediately asks 
Mike, ―Well, do you know where your car is?‖ Mike replies that yes, of course he 
knows where his car is. He left it in the driveway not an hour ago. Bob points out that 
car thieves have recently been active in residential areas after people leave for work, 
and asks Mike how he knows that his car hasn‘t been stolen. Mike resigns and admits 
that he actually doesn‘t know where his car is, he only believes (and hopes) that it is 
still in his driveway.  
 In this case, the standard that Mike uses for the application of the word 
‗know‘ has changed. Macfarlane explains this by saying that although the context of 
use has stayed the same, the context of assessment has changed and with it the 
standard that we use for the application of ‗know‘ has changed as well. Varying 
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demands are put on ‗know‘ at certain times depending on the needs of the parties 
involved in the conversation. These can be consistent within a certain context—the 
standard for the use of ‗know‘ in the command center of the nuclear arsenal of the 
United States is presumably higher than Mike‘s claims about the location of his car—
or they can change within the course of the conversation, as was the case with Mike 
and Bob.  
 This does not mean, however, that Mike was simply wrong when he 
answered the question. In fact, if asked a similar question in the future, he would 
again respond that he knows where his car is. It is not as if he has learned a lesson 
about the criterion necessary for knowledge of his car‘s whereabouts. Instead, he has 
simply accepted a changed standard in a particular situation. This means that Mike‘s 
claims are correct and incorrect, or true and false depending on the standard which 
obtains in the situation. 
 In the same way, Jakko, looking back on his twenties with a different 
standard for happiness than he had back then, could rightly claim that he was not 
happy back then. But from the perspective of his twenties, he was happy (and if his 
punk rocker self could have knowledge of Jakko the loving father, he might also 
claim that Jakko the father is by no means happy). As long as an individual‘s 
standard for happiness moves within the bounds set by the linguistic community, no 
standard is more legitimate than any other. In the case of happiness everything 
depends on the perspective of the individual and her individual standard for the 
amount of positive affect necessary for happiness. This also applies to two people 
assessing the happiness of a third, and to some degree, two people arguing about the 
happiness of one of them. For example, Susan and Jim are having a disagreement 
about Jim‘s happiness. In this case, however, although neither one of their standards 
is more legitimate than the other, Jim‘s judgment has priority in two ways. First of 
all, Jim‘s standard is the one which is practically relevant for his life decisions. Jim is 
looking to make himself happy, and he will do so by meeting his standard for 
happiness, not Susan‘s. Secondly, Jim has better epistemic access to the emotional 
states that Susan and Jim are taking as the basis of their judgments. So although 
standards themselves, as long as they move within the range set by the linguistic 
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community, are not more or less legitimate, other considerations such as prudential 
relevance and epistemic access can explain the priority we often assign to agents‘ 
own assessments of their happiness. 
 
Conclusion 
 The dynamic affective standard theory (DAS) attempts to provide a resolution 
to the problems plaguing other theories of our contemporary conception of 
happiness. According to the DAS, happiness involves an individual and variable 
standard for positive affect typically set by the agent at the time of the judgment, as a 
result of her interpretation of the amount of positive affect that can be expected from 
a socially constructed ―good life.‖ So, like life-satisfaction theories, the DAS 
recognizes that the judgment of the individual is important to happiness, but also 
does justice to the fact that external events called to mind in the judgment are only 
relevant to happiness if they produce a positive affective payoff. Happiness tracks 
affect in the case of divergence between affect and satisfaction of central desires or 
satisfaction with our lives as a whole. One reason for the plausibility of life-
satisfaction theories is the fact that we do think about external events, situations, and 
material goods when making judgments of happiness, but, again, these external 
phenomena are only relevant for our judgments of happiness insofar as they make an 
affective difference in our lives. We think about these elements, instead of thinking 
directly about the emotions in question, in part because although happiness is 
strongly affective, our minds are such that emotions are recalled by calling forth the 
events that triggered them.  
 So, in contrast with the view of most hedonistic theories and the emotional-
state theory, personal standards are relevant for the way we use ‗being happy,‘ but 
the personal standards in question are standards for the amount of positive affect that 
is to be expected from a vague conception of a socially constructed ‗good life‘ and 
not for external aspects of the good life itself (happiness is presumably an internal 
aspect of such a good life). Nonetheless, the emphasis on the importance of personal 
standards does not cede complete first-person authority on the state of their own 
happiness to the agents themselves. First of all, judgments about happiness must 
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follow the procedural requirement of happiness. This means that things that 
influence the agent‘s standard should do so in a non-biased manner and, thus, should 
involve thoughts, convictions, memories, etc., about what happiness is. In a biased 
decision that violates the procedural requirement, the elements that influence the 
standard are thoughts and convictions about what the result of the judgment should 
be, as a result of considerations external to happiness, per se. 
 Unusual claims about happiness that do not violate the procedural 
requirement and, thus, represent unusual individual standards for happiness are not 
all legitimate. Even though ―having enough money‖ is a social construction that 
admits of a wide variation, there are some situations, such as not being able to feed 
oneself or one‘s family, that cannot be considered to be instances of ―having enough 
money.‖ A similar situation exists in the case of happiness. Although variation exists 
in this social construct, some states, especially those involving strong negative affect, 
cannot be reconciled with ―being happy.‖ To develop some sort of bottom limit 
would be a task for empirical psychological research involving the presentation of 
descriptions of individuals‘ affective lives to large numbers of participants who 
would then determine whether the descriptions were those of people who could 
rightly be called happy, unhappy, or neither happy nor unhappy. Although this 
approach appears to be similar to that which Daniel Haybron recommended, it differs 
in one crucial way. Because Haybron‘s emotional-state theory rejects individual 
judgment as a determinant of an agent‘s happiness, he is in the difficult position of 
trying to find a cut-off for happiness that is independent of the individual‘s standards, 
in other words, completely objective, something that, by his own admission, he has 
not yet succeeded in finding. Because the DAS admits of a range of legitimate 
individual standards, the task here is not to find an objective cut-off of happiness for 
all people, but instead to find the bottom of the range, below which claims of 
happiness no longer make sense. 
 In the DAS, both the judgment and the standard are crucial to the 
determination of an individual‘s happiness. If standards were static, then we could 
reasonably say that there is a fact of the matter about whether an individual is happy 
before any kind of judgment is made. However, psychological experiments have 
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shown that standards in life-satisfaction judgments are not at all static, in part as a 
result of being subject to a number of context effects. There is good reason to assume 
that the same is true of standards for happiness. It is most likely that for each agent a 
range exists within which standards for happiness will vary. As a result of this short-
term intraindividual variation, the agent‘s standard for happiness can be said to be a 
dynamic standard. For that reason, it is not until the moment of the judgment that the 
standard is set and a determination of happiness can be made. 
Because legitimate standards for happiness can vary both interindividually 
and intraindividually, there is room in the realm of happiness for seemingly 
contradictory, but true and legitimate judgments of a single agent‘s happiness, 
whether they be made by one and the same agent at different points in time or 
simultaneously, for example, by different agents about a third agent. This 
phenomenon is explained by reference to John Macfarlane‘s trenchant analysis of our 
changing standards for the use of the word ‗know.‘ Even when the context of use of 
happiness claims remains invariant, the context of assessment can change. The 
standard in place in the context of assessment determines whether the happiness 
claim is accurate or inaccurate. In sum, the DAS offers the most detailed and most 
plausible account of what we mean when we say that we want to be happy.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This investigation found its beginning in concern about the confusion 
reigning in philosophical and psychological discussions of happiness. This is a state 
of affairs that does not do justice to the strong and widely-held practical interest in 
this concept. A case was made that not only is happiness rightly part of the purview 
of philosophy, but that philosophy is the only discipline with the analytical tools to 
parse this folk concept in an appropriate way.  
Indeed, things called happiness have a lengthy history in philosophy, and that 
history goes a long way in explaining the divergence in our linguistic intuitions 
among the various uses of ‗happiness‘ and its cognates. Without boring the reader 
with a repetition of the extensive summary at the end of Chapter 3, suffice it to say 
that the philosophical turn in conceptions of happiness represented a human 
emancipation from evolution. The pre-philosophical conception of happiness was a 
collection of external goods, all of which bear a fairly straightforward relationship to 
differential reproductive success of a male human being. This type of happiness was 
exactly the sort which the happiness motivational system was designed to pursue. 
Quite logically, the happiness motivational system was formed to motivate us to 
obtain external goods (in the widest sense of the word, i.e., advantageous situations, 
etc.) that influenced our differential reproductive success in a favorable way. 
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For various reasons, early Greek philosophers attempted to find unity in the 
world of the goods that we value, and their attempts sometimes led to surprising 
places, places far afield from pre-philosophical happiness and correspondingly far 
afield from anything that could be viewed as a pre-formed goal arising from natural 
selection. The current endpoint of the development of our concept of happiness owes 
much to the Enlightenment, being very subjective, internal, and affective. 
Interestingly, it is just this sort of continuous positive affective state that the 
happiness motivational system was designed to avoid. As Kant so shrewdly observed 
over two centuries ago, ―nature‖ did not design us to be happy. Humans were shaped 
by natural selection not to be happy, but in numerous respects and for numerous 
reasons, to be unhappy. Unhappiness provides us with an incentive to continue 
striving for those goods and situations that bring us greater differential reproductive 
success. This can be seen in a variety of mechanisms uncovered in recent years by 
empirical psychology that serve to do just that: to make certain, that even if we 
achieve the things for which we strive, our positive reactions to these achievements 
dissipate very rapidly, and in almost every case, much more rapidly than we expect. 
This, as well as other factors named in Chapter Three, provides an explanation for a 
disturbing human tendency to continue to look for happiness in places it cannot be 
found and when it is not found, to believe that it can be found in the next place it 
seems natural to look.  
Knowledge about this shell game that our evolutionarily preformed desires 
and the happiness motivational system is playing with us would be a very valuable 
addition to the prudential decision-making procedures of the general populace. Parts 
of this ―devious‖ system have been recognized by all the major religious traditions 
and many philosophical schools. But without a cogent explanation of why the pursuit 
of desires so often fails to deliver the promised result, exhortations to avoid their 
satisfaction often seem like so much moralized prohibition of enjoyment, pleasure, or 
fun. Such an explanation is one part of what this evolutionary reframing of our 
conceptions of happiness attempts to offer. It also offers a perspective on the material 
with which the early Greek philosophers had to work in their attempts to find 
something to call happiness that would represent an improvement on that which was 
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already on offer. This very short history of happiness served also, of course, to 
prepare the ground for a determination of what it is that we mean when we say that 
we want to be happy.  
In the end, the appeal of the attempts of traditional theories of happiness to 
make this determination is fairly clear. Hedonistic theories are certainly onto 
something. They realize that happiness is both divorced from external events, and 
that it has to do with the way that we feel. However, pleasure has far too broad an 
extension to be the basis of happiness and is simply not the criterion that we aim at in 
talk about happiness. Proponents of hedonistic theories of happiness failed to 
recognize that happiness involves a judgment (either a tacit or an explicit one), and 
their simple ―balance‖ formulas neglected both individual standards themselves and 
the dynamism of those standards. In addition, they neglected the differing relative 
importance of positive and negative affect for happiness. To put it in their language, 
pain cannot simply be weighed against pleasure in a determination of happiness. The 
existence of major and regularly recurrent negative affect cannot be outweighed by 
an equal number of strong positive affects. One of the strongest attractions of 
happiness is the freedom from regularly recurrent strong negative affect.  
Life-satisfaction theories recognize the importance of judgments for 
happiness. What life-satisfaction theories miss is the fact that happiness does not 
track objective changes in our lives, nor our attitudes toward them, nor the meeting 
of goals or the attainment of standards for external events. Instead, it tracks positive 
affect. For that reason, among others, life-satisfaction and happiness are disparate 
concepts. 
Emotional-state theory is somewhat similar to hedonistic theories. Although 
more highly developed, especially in view of its criticism of pleasure and pain as the 
building blocks for happiness, emotional-state theory, like hedonistic theories, fails to 
see that a determination of happiness does involve individual judgments. And 
because emotional-state theory does not recognize this, it is cast into a state of 
immobility when it attempts to make a final determination of the limits of its account 
of happiness. Emotional-state theory teeters between a view of happiness as a sort of 
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long-term emotional condition on the one hand, and a vague summation along the 
lines of the hedonistic theories on the other.  
The dynamic affective standard theory claims that happiness involves an 
individual and variable standard for positive affect. This is usually set by the agent at 
the time of the judgment as a result of her interpretation of the relative presence of 
positive affect and the relative absence of negative affect that can be expected in a 
vague conception of a socially constructed ―good life.‖ The standard for positive and 
negative affect is the determiner of happiness, while the actual judgment that is made 
based on this standard can be flawed in numerous ways, most prominently by 
violating the procedural requirement. However, because the standard is dynamic and 
undergoes short-term variations, an act of judgment on the part of the agent in 
question is necessary, as the standard is usually first set at the time of the judgment. 
As a result of the unclear status of the standard before the occurrence of the 
judgment, happiness usually does not exist up until the point in time at which the 
judgment is made; instead all that exists is a collection of various affects.  
The exception to this is the class of situations in which the basis of the 
happiness judgment is made up of so much positive affect and so little negative affect 
that no upward change in the agent‘s standard could make a material difference in the 
determination of the agent‘s happiness. The range of legitimacy for such individual 
standards is determined by the extension of the social construction created by the 
linguistic community. Within that range there is room for conflicting, but correct and 
legitimate, judgments of a single agent‘s happiness. The interpersonal, short-term 
intrapersonal, and long-term intrapersonal divergences in standards for happiness can 
all result in conflicting judgments. The correctness of each of these judgments 
depends on the time of evaluation of the result of the judgment and the standard for 
happiness that obtains at that time. However, for epistemic and prudential 
considerations, the judgment of the agent about her own happiness has additional 
weight as long as it meets the other criteria for legitimacy. I believe that the DAS 
provides the best description of our use of happiness and its cognates. However, as 
there is much interest in both philosophy and psychology in the amount of affect that 
an individual experiences, independent of her judgment about her experience of 
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affect, for the sake of clarity it might be best to refer this actual occurrence of affect 
(on the positive end of the spectrum) as ―objective happiness.‖ That which the DAS 
describes, again for the sake of clarity, could be called ―subjective happiness.‖ 
In this essay, I have attempted to demonstrate that the dynamic affective 
standard theory provides a detailed account both of what happiness is, and of our 
behavior towards our own and others‘ happiness, while simultaneously explaining 
the attraction and resolving the inadequacies of previous theories.  
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